ADMINISTERINGINTERPRETATION


justideas
transformativeidealsofjusticeinethicalandpoliticalthought
serieseditors
DrucillaCornell
RogerBerkowitz


ADMINISTERINGINTERPRETATION
DERRIDA,AGAMBEN,ANDTHEPOLITICALTHEOLOGYOFLAW
PeterGoodrichandMichelRosenfeld,Editors

FORDHAMUNIVERSITYPRESS
NEWYORK2019


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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Names:Goodrich,Peter,1954–editor.|Rosenfeld,Michel,1948–editor.
Title:Administeringinterpretation:Derrida,Agamben,andthepoliticaltheologyoflaw/PeterGoodrichandMichel
Rosenfeld,editors.
Description:Firstedition.|NewYork,NY:FordhamUniversityPress,2019.|Includesbibliographicalreferencesand
index.
Identifiers:LCCN2018060277|ISBN9780823283798(cloth:alk.paper)|
ISBN9780823283781(pbk.:alk.paper)
Subjects:LCSH:Law—Philosophy.|Derrida,Jacques—Influence.|Agamben,Giorgio,1942–—Influence.
Classification:LCCK235.A3532019|DDC340/.1—dc23
LCrecordavailableat />PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
21201954321
Firstedition


Contents
Introduction
PeterGoodrichandMichelRosenfeld
I.ReconstructingInterpretativeCommunities
1.InterpretationsasHypotheses
BernhardSchlink
2.AntoninScalia,BernhardSchlink,andLancelotAndrewes:ReadingHeller
StanleyFish
3.TheInterpreter,theAnalyst,andtheScientist
JeanneL.Schroeder
4.LawagainstJusticeandSolidarity:RereadingDerridaandAgambenattheMarginsofthe
OneandtheMany
MichelRosenfeld
II.DerridaandDissimulation
5.JacquesDerridaNeverWroteaboutLaw

PierreLegrand
6.Derrida’sLegalTimes:Decision,Declaration,Deferral,andEvent
BernadetteMeyler
7.Derrida’sShylock:TheLetterandtheLifeofLaw
KatrinTrüstedt
III.TheJusticeofAdministration
8.APostmodernHetoimasia—FeigningSovereigntyduringtheStateofException
MarinosDiamantides
9.ContraIurem:GiorgioAgamben’sTwoOntologies
LaurentdeSutter
IV.CounterPlaces,CounterTimes
10.CitiesofRefuge,RebelCities,andtheCitytoCome
GiovannaBorradori
11.AGhostStory:ElectoralReformandHongKongPopularTheater
MarcoWan
12.AppearingunderErasure:OfWar,Disappearance,andtheContretemps
AllenFeldman
ListofContributors
Index


ADMINISTERINGINTERPRETATION


Introduction
PeterGoodrichandMichelRosenfeld
Interpretation,accordingtoGiambattistaVico,hasitsetymologicalrootsininterpatrari,in
minglingwithorenteringthediscourseofthefathers.Whiletheetymologyisdubious,the
concept is peculiarly applicable to legal interpretation, where the search for authority, for
prior and precedent determinations, whether contained in a code or in judicial decisions,

playsaninordinateroleintheelaborationofmeaningandthedecidingofdisputes.Whatever
jurisdictionisinplay,theassumptionthatunderpinsthetaskofinterpretinglegaltextsisthat
there is an authority which will dictate and delimit the choice of the decision maker and
ideally will stipulate a certain, which is to say indisputable, outcome. The conflict of legal
interpretations is confined historically to disputes within an established corpus of
authoritative texts within a monotheistic tradition of truth and in its corresponding juristic
formofverdict,orstatementofthetruth.
Whileitmayappearanachronistictoaddresslegalinterpretationviaitsreligiousrootsand
specificallyitsmonotheisticgenesisandenvirons,itisnecessarytorecognizethecontinuing
senseinwhichhermeneuticsisatbaseascripturaldiscipline.Itentailsfaithinthetextanda
core belief in the textual basis of legal decision. Even inpartibusinfidelium, among those
whodonotbelieveorhaveleftthestricturesofexplicitreligiousfaithinfavorofContinental
theory, culture wars, deconstruction, or oikonomia, the hermeneutic character of the
disciplinesremainsanddictatesasharedmethod,ifnotcommonoutcomes.Howevermuch
the essays in this volume may differ in approach and theme, in political orientation and
affectivescope,thefocusoninterpretationasawaytomakediscursivesenseofaninherited
textual corpus is a constant and shared parameter of debate among judges, lawyers,
interdisciplinaryscholars,novelists,andpublicintellectuals.Thepointtobestressedhereis
thattheapparentchasmbetweenU.S.andEuropeanlegaltheoryortheradicaldiversityof
approaches to legal interpretation derived from disciplines external to law can otherwise
appear both disconcerting and syncretic. Our starting point is thus a counterintuitive
commonality among those who apparently have nothing in common, civilian and common
lawyers,U.S.pragmatistsandContinental(French)theorists,analyticphilosophyoflanguage
and deconstruction, and, finally, its successor theory of oikonomia and the empty space of
sovereignty.
ThestartingpointisclosetoVico’sstipulationofthetaskofinterpretationascomingto
termswithandmakingsomethingofthetextualtraditionoflawinitspatristicandexegetical
forms.Thepoliticaltheologyoflawremainsapivotalelementindebate,initiallyandquite
literally in the derivation and application of a biblically based hermeneutics to legal texts.
Thereisascripture,asindeedthereiswithalltheRenaissancedisciplines,andlawdiffers

only in its proximity to biblical exegesis and in its accessing of the regalia of power as
wieldedthroughinterpretation.ThusBernhardSchlinkbeginshisdefenseoflegaldecisionas
consensus through a protocol of falsification by way of reference to early experiences and
familialinculcationoftheinterpretationoftheBibleasadistinctiveanddifferentapproachto


meaning that nonetheless shares with law the impulse to postulation of precepts. Judge
Schlink is mindful of the requirement of decision in cases and distinguishes legal
interpretation from other hermeneutic pursuits, specifically the literary and the spiritual,
throughascientificmodeloffalsification.Thereisnolegaltruth,buttherearedecisions,and
these determinations of disputes gain consensus through being tested and not falsified.
Interpretationisthehingeonwhichthecaserevolves.Itispreciselyagainstconsensusandin
propagation of correct decisions that the contrarian Stanley Fish pitches his critique of
Schlink. Reviving, or better resurrecting, the dead figure of the author, Fish finds the
metaphor of textual genesis in the intention of the writer that resolves the conflict of
interpretations.Somethingismeant,anditisthatintendedmeaningwhichcanbeuncovered
ordiscoveredbycarefultextualanalysis.Thetexthasafather,aprogenitor,andalawinthe
semioticsenseofafigurethatsentit.
Ifthestartingpointofdebateisthesearchfortextualauthority,lodgedinconsensusorin
authorship,orasJeanneL.Schroederputsit,inanimaginarystability,aputativesymbolic
truth, the figure provoking and at least covertly animating the dispute is that of Jacques
Derrida, and specifically his neologism of deconstruction. The method of deconstruction
arrests the linear progression of interpretation and dictates time and the recognition of the
incalculableasthenecessarythoughimpossiblecriteriaofjustdecision.Brieflyfashionable
inthe1990s,thespecterofdeconstructionhauntsboththelegalandtheliteraryacademiesin
the United States as the portentous and unstable figure of French theory, or as Franỗois
Cussetputsit, thecampus drug derridium.It is deconstruction that,as much asand before
any other “post” movement, swept through the culture and acted particularly in law as a
speciesofthreat.Indeterminacy,theabsenceoftheconsensus,theaporiaofdecidability,the
impossibility of the certainty that lawyers crave, both challenged doctrine and raised the

question of justice as being in conflict with law. For Derrida, theory is necessary to
interpretationbecauseallmeaningisaphilologicalandphilosophicalinvestigation,opento
contestation,andcontingentinthesenseofopennesstoalternativesandasaperpetualwork
inprocess.Thereare,withinthedeconstructiveframe,onlypositions,onemightsayspecters
ofmeaning,withinatextwithoutend.Thelawyer’snecessaryyetartificialinterruptionsof
theinterpretationofthetextgeneratemomentsofhiatusofmeaninginwhichthepossibility
ofjusticehastostepinandplaytheroleoflaw.
As against the concepts of consensus and certainty, however advocated, the broader and
lingering debate on legal interpretation seeks to convert the perceived threat of
deconstructionintoaproductivity.TheexquisitelydetailedattentiontolanguagethatDerrida
offeredpromisessignificantgainsandopportunitiesforlegalinterpretationthathaveyetto
befullyexplored.Thereisanethicstointerpretation,atemporalityandmaterialitytotexts
thatlegalscholarsanddoctrinehaveyettofullyexplore.Thereisalsoasignificantdividein
thatitispredominantlytheEuropean,andmostusuallytheAnglophone,legalacademythat
haspursued,taught,andworkedthroughtheimplicationsofdeconstruction,itspotentiality
forexpandingtheconceptoflegalinterpretation,whiletheU.S.legalacademy,traumatized
bythebriefsuccessofcriticallegalstudies,hasturnedawayfromanyexpansivereceptionof
Derrida’sworkand hasincreasinglyanathematized whateverphantasmisperceivedtolurk
behind that nomination. As Duncan Kennedy has formulated it, the hermeneutics of


suspicionhasdenouncedDerrida,oratleasttheuncertaintyandimmoralitythathisworkis
contended to stand for, as extraneous, divisive, suspect, and at root fraudulent. Its
“critiquiness” stands not so much for something, as in the way of clarity, certainty, and
proper promulgation of the norms of law. In an old trope, revived from the era of legal
realism, deconstruction was deemed and denounced as nihilistic, and thus has been little
taught and, as Pierre Legrand meticulously details, even less understood in the U.S. legal
academy.
It is true, as Bernadette Meyler points out, that jurisprudence or philosophy of law has
littlepedagogicalplaceorinstitutionalroleintheU.S.legalacademy,andsothepotentialof

grammatologyordeconstructioninthetheorizationandpracticeofinterpretationremainsyet
tocome.Debatestendtobespecifictosubstantivelegaldisciplines,andsoitisinterpretation
in the law of contract, constitutional interpretation, statutory meanings, and the like that
providestheprincipalaccesstomethodsanddebatesthatgenerallyneitheraspirenorriseto
thelevelofhermeneutics.Itisthusasignificantpartofthepurposeofthiscollection—this
Collect,thisprayer—toreintroducethepotentialoftheoryandthepossibilitiesofjusticethat
interpretation at best portends. Janus-faced, the work aims to look back, to recollect, to
resurrectandreinvigorateadebatethatflaredbrieflyandthenvanished,astotheliteraryand
philosophicalparametersandresourcesoflegalhermeneuticsinacontextstillhostiletothe
impracticality of interdisciplinary endeavors and wary of the perceived pretentiousness of
critique.Thelegalresistancetotheory,borneonthebackofU.S.exceptionalism,isindeedat
a high point. Clinical training, skills, professional practice are the keywords, the buzz, in
Americanlawschools,andassuch,theintricaciesandimpracticalities,thetimenecessaryfor
theoryasthesourceoftheclinicandtheprotocolthatgeneratespractice,getunderminedand
overlooked in the rush to commerce. Deconstruction proffers the prospect and makes the
argument that this is never decided, that interpretation will always come back, that clinical
practiceispreciselythepursuit,asMichelRosenfeldpostulates,ofjusticeorattheveryleast
of just interpretations. The neglect of theory demotes the office of the jurist and frays the
ethicalbondsoflegalcommunity,leavingbothsubjectandinterpretationtothevagariesof
the unconscious and the infidelities of the imaginary. Crumbling and slippage, or in Fish’s
radical diction, evil, take the place of scholarship and extended deliberation alike. Easy
answersreplacehardcases.
Jurisprudence,broadlymeaninglegaltheory,isstill,bywayofcomparisonandcontrast,
compulsory in a majority of law schools in common law jurisdictions outside the United
States,andtheoryismuchmorelikelytobeintegratedintothesubstantivecurriculuminthe
teaching of public law, human rights, and international law. Hermeneutics, deconstruction,
andtheoriesofoikonomiaandstateapparatusesareincorporatedintodoctrinalelaborations
in private and public law in a manner that is largely unknown in the U.S. legal academy,
where,atmost,itiseconomicsandatastretchidentitypoliticsthatlayaclaimtospaceinthe
increasingly clinically oriented curriculum. The resistance to theory means indeed that

Derrida is largely an unknown name and unread theory in the new generation of legal
scholars, and Giorgio Agamben is an even more distant figure, despite his training as a
lawyer. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that legal theory is a minor concern in marginal
spacesinsofarasthecontributionsinthisworkarepredominantlyfromlawprofessors,albeit


eccentricandhalcyonrepresentativesoftheacademyascurrentlyoriented.Arsiurisforthe
sakeofarsiurisisafailingmemory,adistantcry.
Thelastpointandthemerelatingtocomparativetrendsinlegalinterpretationisthatinthe
absenceoftheoryitbecomesinternaltolegaldoctrineandnarrowlyconfinedtovariationson
commonsense themes of literalism and purposivism. If that is a necessarily general
descriptionofadiscoursethatisjudiciallygeneratedandoriented,italsofitswiththethesis
propagatedbyAgambenandtakenupinthelatterportionofthepresentvolume,namely,that
administration has become the dominant mode of governance operating as a legally
generatedexceptiontothecriteriaofstrictlaw.Economyasthedispositionofsocialforces,
asthealignment,capture,andreproductionofsocialspaces,ofsubjectsassuch,definesand
determines administration according to a logic of self-reproduction, the autopoietic
replicationofanygivenapparatusorassemblageofblankcontinuance.ForAgamben,lawis
displaced by a pure assemblage of apparatuses, which he defines through a theological
genealogy of administration out of the hidden theology of oikonomia. The father
administratesthehousehold,whichistosay,disposesanddistributesitselementsaccording
tothedesireforgloryandcontinuance,andinacomparablemannerthestateadministrates
civilsociety,purportingtofollowsovereigndictateandestablishedlawwhilesimplyacting
according to the criteria of administrative self-reproduction, according to an economy of
interpretation that propels the subject in a choral and acclamatory fashion toward a
paternalistic conception of its own good. Administration, in this schema, exists simply to
reproduce itself and operates accordingly through the pure desiderata of its own
reinstallation. The apparatus is consecrated to the goals of administration, to “the exit of
things from the sphere of human law” and subjective value: “Every apparatus implies a
processofsubjectificationwithoutwhichitcannotfunctionasanapparatusofgovernance,”

towhichisaddedthesalutarypropositionthatinadisciplinarysociety,“apparatusesaimto
create—throughaseriesofpractices,discourses,andbodiesofknowledge—docile,yetfree,
bodies that assume their identity and their freedom as subjects in the very process of their
desubjectification.”1
Theapparatus,ordispositorasAgambenpreferstotranslatetheterm,signalstheendof
the universal as an explanatory category. Singularities need explanation, cases, practices,
subjects,theprocessesofvariation,andmodesofmultiplicityaretheobjectsofgovernance
anddispositionandassucharethematerialitiesthatfocusinterpretation.Adrift,becauselaw
historically favors norm and generality, universalia and other dogmas, a certain dualism
emerges. Borrowing from the Pure Theory of Law, the work of the Austrian jurist Hans
Kelsen, Agamben depicts a dual ontology of the social.2 The dualism of the “is” and the
“ought”becomesHellenizedasthatof“estô”and“esti,”ofbeingandthatwhichoughttobe,
theontologyofcommand,astheinterpretativeeconomyofadministration.Theapparatusof
governanceaswillanddisposition,asthecircularcommandofwhatoughttobe,generatesa
divisionbetweentheoryandpractice,theempiricalandthegovernmental.Itisinthisvein
that Agamben recirculates the baroque maxim that the king rules but does not govern,
arguing in essence that sovereignty is spectacular and necessary in choral and acclamatory
terms,buttheenthronedgloryofruleisantinomicallyrelatedtoadministration,whichhasits
ownhermeticlogicofpracticebasedaroundapparatusesofgovernancethatareconstituted


byassemblagesofsubjectivecapture.Theapparatusofthewarmachine,inAllenFeldman’s
analysis,thusoperatesbyvirtueofascopicregimethatgeneratesadivergenttemporality,a
countertime,andthedesubjectifiedsubjectoftheenemyasthecorpse,asthe“oughttobe”
of nonbeing, the forensics of legitimated disappearance. For Marinos Diamantides as well,
the spectacular appearances of sovereign and law, the scopic regime of the social, belies a
practice that is quite antinomic to the stated politics or advertised programs of political
parties. One thing is said and another is systematically done: atheists kiss the hands of
bishopsandbowtothechurch,socialistspayobeisancetohierophants,becausetheseritual
modesofrecognitionofsovereigntyhavenopracticalroletoplay,indeedarenecessarybut

separatefromthefunctioningoftheapparatusesofgovernmentalreproduction.
Translatedintothedialogueoverlegalinterpretation,Agamben’stheoryanditsreception
inEuropeanjurisprudenceprovidesomethingofacontinuationofDerrida’sgrammatological
concerns.Inarguing,particularlyinTheKingdomandtheGlory,thatthespectaculardomain
of sovereign power bears little to no relation to the practice of governance, the theory of
oikonomia, of social disposition according to multiple apparatuses of administration
operatingtocaptureandreproducesubjects,thehermeneuticsofsuspicionisintroducedinto
theapprehensionandreconstructionoflegalmeaning.3ForDerrida,thetextwasanartifact,
anditsplenitudeofmeaningscalledforjusticeinthesenseoftime,patience,careinrefusing
precedent or prior determinations of sense, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “prejudice” as
prejudgment,infavorofattendingtothepluralityoftextualandintertextualconnotations.As
Legrand points out, Derrida was not a lawyer, and one consequence of that is a degree of
distanceandacertainfreedominhisanalysisofjusticeinrelationtolaw.Deconstruction,as
he famously formulated it, could play with social science; it could take its time, plead for
justice,listenfortheotherintheshelloftheself.ForAgamben,asalawyer,thereisagreater
emphasis on sources and the lineage of textual meaning as recuperated through far-flung
philologicalandetymologicalexcavations.Inafashioncomparableinmanyrespectstothe
work of the French jurist Pierre Legendre, Agamben’s goal is to reconstruct the Christian
theologyandwayoflifethatisharboredinandactedoutthroughthesocialandlegaltextsof
the Western tradition. In tracing the cenobitic roots of Western administrative offices and
formsoflife,thepointismadeagainandagainthatthespacesandaffects,placesandroles,
of the Western subject are dictated by the categories of faith and the modus vivendi of
religiouscommunity.Thelegaltext,inthisanalysis,istheparamountbutindistinctavenueof
instantiation of inherited categories of the symbolic. Law opens the door to the social,
establishes its structure and sites, but then disappears into or is absorbed by the
administrativeassemblagesofsubjectificationandreproduction.Itisinthissenseaparadox,
aself-abrogatingmeaningintheformoftheexception,thatinstitutesalawwithoutlawin
theformofadministrativepractice.
Where Derrida’s philosophy of interpretation was sometimes perceived as threatening to
thelegalacademybecauseinitssurveyofthepluralityofthetextitwasperceivedtostall

meaning, Agamben proffers a rather more stringent sense of the predetermination of both
affect and interpretation. Where Marco Wan traces the ghosts, the hauntology of a cultural
past, in Hong Kong cinema, and postulates a political morphology to these specters,
Agambenoffersamorecomprehensiveangelologyofsocialforms.Eventheheresiarchshide


behind the Christian figures of truth because they are what is there, they constitute the
symbolic,andbecausetheirsignificanceliesparadoxicallyintheirprofoundlackofmeaning,
in their absence from the administrative practices that they legitimate and unleash as selfperpetuatingpowers.Whatislefttoanalyzeandinterpretwithinthisframeistheantinomy
ofmeaningandpractice,thescissionoftextanddecision,normandinstanceofdeciding,the
dictation of what ought to be and the event of what is. For Derrida and Agamben, the
specters—the no more one, more than one of these subjects—reexamined in the multiple
forays of this collection, the economy of interpretation is for both a practice of opening to
meaning and in that very aperture opening meaning to itself. For both thinkers, it is the
fissuresinthetext,theenigmasandotherreferencestoforgotteneruditions,hiddenpractices,
excludedcauses,thwartedfreedoms,thatexcitetheinterpreter’sattention.Thesharedcause
isthatofthediversificationofinterpretationandtheopeningoflawtoitsownhermeneutic
wealth, to the plurality of traditions and multiplicity and potential of the severality of
jurisdictions that compose the discourse, the texts of the jurists. It is, then, in the end, a
primary purpose of interpretation to address the open in the sense of the future, the
nonexistent, inchoate, and unformed life to come. In this dimension, in the futureity of the
hermeut’stask,theadventureisandremainsthatofsculptingawindowintothenotyet,the
communityanddemocracyofmeaningtocome.
NOTES
1.GiorgioAgamben,WhatIsanApparatus?(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,2009),19–20.
2.ForthiscommentaryonKelsen’sKantian-inspiredcritique,seeGiorgioAgamben,OpusDei:AnArchaeologyofDuty
(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,2013),123–25.
3.Ontheotiosecharacterorimpracticalityofsovereignty,seeGiorgioAgamben,TheKingdomandtheGlory:Fora
TheologicalGenealogyofEconomyandGovernment,translatedbyLorenzoChiesa,withMatteoMandarini(Stanford,
Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,2011),68.



I

ReconstructingInterpretativeCommunities


1

InterpretationsasHypotheses
BernhardSchlink
1
IgrewupwiththeBiblebeingreadandinterpretedeveryevening.Afterdinnermyfamily
remainedseatedaroundthetableandreadonechapter,myparents,mythreesiblings,andI
takingturnsversebyverse,andthenmyfather,aprofessorofdivinity,interpretedwhatwe
hadread.BeforeIlearnedhowtoread,anAmericanBiblewithillustrations—itmusthave
beenapostwargiftbyanAmericanreeducationinstitution—wasopenedbeforemesothatI
hadapicturetolookat.
Did I learn anything for my life as a lawyer and legal interpreter? When my teachers in
Gymnasiumtriedtofamiliarizemewithliterature,obviously,theypresentedadifferentkind
ofinterpretation.Igotasenseofthedifferencebetweeninterpretingsomethingthatismeant
togovernourlifeandinterpretingsomethingmeanttoinspireus,towidenanddeepenour
understandingofthe humancondition.NotthattheBibleisnotmeanttoinspire us.Itcan
even be entertaining; one winter, after my father had us read Paul’s Epistles one after the
other, we children rebelled and demanded something more exciting, and he gave in. All
winter,wereveledinthesexandcrimeofthebookofKings.Butagainandagain,theBible
isaboutnorms,aboutwhatisrightandwhatiswrong,whatwemayandwhatwemustnot
do.Thentheinterpretationisnotfarfromtheinterpretationoflegalnorms.
The interpretations of legal norms, which are abstract and general, are also abstract and
general.Theinterpretationsofliterarytextsorhistoricaldocuments,whicharespecificand

individual,arealsospecificandindividual.TheinterpretationoftheBibleisboth.
The interpretation of a literary text or a historical document tries to find out what the
specific author meant or how his or her specific contemporaries understood the text or
document,orhowitfitsintoaspecificcontext,beitthecontextofotherworksbythesame
author, or of works by other authors, or of other cultural or political or social events or
creationsofthesameperiod.Sometimesliteraryinterpretationisnotinterestedintheauthor,
his or her contemporaries or contexts, and attempts only to satisfy our wish for something
new and fun, surprising and stimulating. It can present a determined Hamlet instead of a
hesitantHamlet,Faustasapetitbourgeoisratherthanacharacterwithdeepestandhighest
aspirations,andAntigoneasacomicinsteadofatragicfigureandstillwork,thatis,make
the audience of the performance enjoy, wonder, and think. But this too remains something
specific and individual, an individual interpretation for an individual audience, on this
specificstageatthisspecificmoment.
Of course, literary theory enjoys abstract and general insights, and poems and stories,
novels and plays, can trigger all kinds of abstract and general ideas about beauty, truth,
justice,guilt,andsoforth.Buttheyareeitherdiscussedastheabstractorgeneralideasofthe
specificauthororhisorhertimes,ortheyarediscussedinandofthemselves,andthetext


anditsinterpretationaremerelytheoccasiontodoso.Whenonediscussestheabstractand
general ideas about justice, law, and tradition that Sophocles presented and that his
contemporaries found in Antigone, one stays with Sophocles and in his times. When one
discusses justice, law, and tradition as today’s abstract and general issues, one may be
inspiredbySophocles’sAntigonebutleaveitsinterpretationbehind.
Theinterpretationofalegalnormmayalsotrytofindoutwhattheauthormeantorhow
thenormwasandisunderstoodbyothersandhowitfitsintoitslegalcontext.Itmayalsobe
an interpretation for an individual audience, the parties on a specific stage, the courtroom
wheretheirspecificcaseisarguedanddecided.Still,itisneverjustaninterpretationforthis
specificcasewiththeseindividualparties.Legalinterpretationisalwaysaninterpretationfor
allcaseslikethiscaseandforallpartiesliketheseparties.Itoffersalegalsolutionforalegal

problem that can arise in different cases with different parties. If a norm is phrased or
paraphrased as an if-then sentence—if this factual constellation occurs, then these are the
legalconsequences—theinterpretationaimstocoverallcasesthataresimilarenoughtofall
undertheif-clauseandallvariationsthatthelegalconsequencescantakeon.
Interpreting“Congressshallmakenolawabridgingthefreedomofspeech”or“ifsomeone
speaks,hisorherfreedommustnotbeabridged”meanselaboratingonwhothissomeoneis
—every citizen and also the public employee? People and also organizations? On what
speech is—the verbal and also the nonverbal expression? The expression by symbols and
also the expression through action? On what an abridgement of freedom is—previous
censorshipandalsosubsequentsanctions?Aprohibitionwhattosayandalsoaprohibition
when and where and how to say it? And so forth. The interpretation may be driven by a
specific conflict between individual parties and may research individual cases past and
present and may argue hypotheticals looking like individual cases. The result is always an
abstractandgeneralinsight;thespeaker,thespeech,andtheabridgementoffreedomallare
interpretedasabstractandgeneralcategories.

2
Therearetwo kindsof if-then sentences, those that predict factual consequences of factual
constellationsandthosethatdemandlegalconsequencesforfactualconstellations.Inother
words, there are then-clauses that predict what is expected to happen, and there are thenclausesthatstipulatewhatmustormustnothappen.Inthefirstcase,iftheexpectationturns
outwrong,ifwhatthethen-clausepredictsdoesnothappen,theif-thensentenceisfalsified.
Inthesecondcase,ifthenormisnotfulfilled,ifwhatmusthappendoesnothappenorwhat
mustnothappenhappensanyway,thenormisstillavalidnorm,atleastaslongasviolations
of the norm do not become rampant. If a meteorologist predicts that sudden, heavy
temperaturedropsmeanrainandthetemperaturedropsanditdoesnotrain,welearnthatthe
prediction was wrong. If a norm stipulates that damages have to be compensated and
someone who caused damages and should pay compensation avoids doing so, the norm
remainsunquestioned.1
But even though the normative and the factual if-then sentences differ in this important
respect,theyalsohavesomethingimportantincommon.Bothareabstractandgeneral,both



express something that claims relevance for an infinite number of instances, whether these
instancesbelegalconstellationsornaturalorsocialevents.
Having as their reference an infinite universe of discourse, they can never be verified,
neverbeprovedright.Nevercanoneexcludethepossibilitythatsomethingthatprovesthem
wrongwillnotcomeup.Theycanonlybefalsified,provedwrong.Ofcourse,theycanshow
theirworthbynotbeingprovedwrongoveralongperiodoftime.Butthisworthcanalways
beshattered;thereisnoguaranteethatanewcaseortherethinkingofthelegalconsequences
that an established interpretation took for granted will not falsify the established
interpretationorthatanewnaturalorsocialeventwillnotfalsifyanestablishedtheory.
ThisiswhatImeanbyinterpretationsashypotheses.Legalinterpretationspresentanorm
as demanding a certain category of legal consequences for a certain category of factual
constellations. They are abstract and general if-then statements about factual constellations
andtheirlegalconsequences.Likescientifichypothesesthatcoveraninfiniteuniverse,they
cannot be verified but only falsified. They are hypotheses—their validity is inescapably as
hypotheticalasthatofscientifichypotheses.

3
Sinceinterpretationsandscientifichypothesescannotbeprovedright,therecanalsobeno
rulesthathaveonlytobefollowedtodiscovertherightinterpretationorhypothesis.There
can only be rules for falsifying hypotheses and interpretations. To put it differently and
maybe more positively: there can only be rules for justifying interpretations and scientific
hypotheses, justifying them preliminarily by demonstrating that all ways to falsify them,
currentlyavailable,havebeentriedandtestedwithoutresultinginafalsification.
Thattherecanbenorulesfordiscoveringtherightinterpretation,astherecanbenorules
fordiscoveringtherightscientifichypothesis,givesthecontextofdiscoveryitscharacteristic
freedom. Anything can be used to come up with an interpretation or scientific hypothesis
interesting enough to be considered and tested. Dmitry Mendeleyev dreamed the periodic
system of elements as a game of solitaire2; August Kekulé dreamed the benzene ring as a

snakebitingitstail.3Mostofushaveexperiencedthinkinglongandhardaboutaproblem,
goingtobedclueless,andwakingupwiththesolution.
ThisiswhatlegalrealismanditsGermancounterpart,theFreieRechtsschule,4gotright
andalsowrong.Theygotitrightthatlawyers,attorneys,judgesdon’tnecessarilyfindtheir
idea for an interpretation by going from interpretative step one to step two to step three to
stepfour.Theyfindtheirideasbythinkingaboutwhatfeelsright,rightintermsofjustice,or
politics, or efficiency, by talking about their cases in a more or less scholarly way to
colleagues and friends, husbands and wives, by liking or hating the parties of a case, by
feeling burdened from a meal too heavy or cheery after a glass of champagne in the
afternoon.Theymay,likeMendeleyevandKekulé,findtheinterpretationindreams.Butlike
Mendeleyev and Kekulé, once they get out of bed, they have to test the interpretation that
came to them. They have to try to falsify it in all currently available ways. They have to
justifyitbydemonstratingthattheyhavetesteditwithouttheresultbeingfalsification.
ThisiswhatlegalrealismandFreieRechtsschulegotwrong.Thecontextofdiscoveryand


thecontextofjustificationaregovernedbydifferentprinciples.5Inthecontextofdiscovery,
anything goes, so long as it is imaginative and creative. What matters in the context of
justificationarethepossiblyfalsifyinginstances;theyhavetobeagreedon;thediscovered
interpretation has to be tested against them; the test must not result in falsification. Legal
realism and FreieRechtsschule got it right that lawyers find their interpretations in erratic
ways.Theymissedthatlawyershavetotestandfalsifyorjustifytheirfinds—andthatthey
do.
That they missed it is understandable. The standards for interpretation that legal
scholarship and jurisprudence have developed over time were, and are even now, normally
presentedasstandardsforfindingtherightinterpretation.Thatispreciselywhattheycannot
be,whattheycannoteffect.SolegalrealismandFreieRechtsschulehadaneasytriumphby
showingthatthefindingofaninterpretationcanhappeninstrangeandweirdways.Butitis
finally an empty triumph, because what matters is not the context of discovery but the
contextofjustification.

Nottobemisunderstood—thetwocontextsarenot neatly separated.Lawyersdon’tfirst
gothroughthecontextofdiscoveryandthenthroughthecontextofjustification.Theyhave
anideaofaninterpretation,testitagainstthepossiblyfalsifyinginstancesthatcometomind,
easilydropitormodify it,testitagain,have anotheridea thattheylikebetter orthatthey
findawaytocombinewiththefirst,andsoforth.6Theymoveinacircle—avariationofthe
hermeneuticcircle.7
Theydon’tkeepmovinginitforever.Thereisafinaldraftofaninterpretationandafinal
test. And when the interpretation passes the final test, when it is finally not falsified, it is
justifiedandaccepted—atleast,forthemoment.

4
Howdothetestswork,theteststhataccompanythemovethroughthehermeneuticcircleand
alsothefinaltest?Howarelegalinterpretationsfalsified?
Scientifichypothesesarefalsifiedbyrealityor,tobeprecise,byanewunderstandingof
reality or, to be even more precise, by a new consensus about how to understand reality.8
OncethescientificcommunityagreesthatasituationXthatundertheif-thenofahypothesis
shouldresultinsituationYresultsinsituationZinstead,thehypothesisisfalsified.
Howarelegalinterpretationsfalsified?
Invariousways.Newcases,newfactualconstellationscanshowthataninterpretationis
wrong.LetmegiveaGermanexample.Ataxnormthatgavepublisherscertainbenefitswas
interpretedasprivilegingallpublishers(Verleger)regardlessofwhattheypublished—books,
magazines, newspapers, records. When videos came on the market, a medium less bought
than rented, the question came up about whether their publishers should also enjoy the
privilege.Yes,thelawyersforthevideopublishersarguedthatpublishersarepublishers,and
allpublishershavealwaysbeentreatedequally.Itisnotthateasy,wasthecounterargument;
whattheargumentofthelawyersforthevideopublishersoverlooksisthefactthatwholesale
tradersinbeerandotherbeveragesaretraditionallycalled“beerpublishers”(Bierverleger),
butwerenevermeantandalsoneverclaimedtobeprivilegedbythetaxnorm;toprivilege



them would be plainly absurd. The counterargument didn’t decide how the publishers of
videos were to be treated. It falsified the interpretation that to enjoy the privilege it was
enoughtobecalledapublisher.Therighttreatmentofpublishersofvideoshadtobefound
throughadifferentinterpretation.
The rethinking of the legal consequences that an interpretation has accepted as part of a
norm can also falsify the interpretation. Let me, slightly simplified, offer another German
example.9 Person A drives along a street open only to the vehicles of residents and others
whoaredeliveringtoresidentsorvisitingthemwithoutbeingaresident,butinacarefuland
orderlymanner.SuddenlypersonB,aresident,drivesoutofhisdriveway,notlookingleftor
right,andcrashesintoA’scar.BarguescausalityandtheillegalityofA’sbehavior—ifAhad
not driven down the residential street, the accident would not have happened; and to drive
downtheresidentialstreetwasillegalforA—andclaimsdamages.Indeed,thecausationof
anaccidentthroughillegalbehaviorhadtraditionallybeenacceptedassufficientgroundfor
damages.ButinthecaseofAandB,thecourt—followedbyacademicopinion—regarded
thisresultasunjust,incompatiblewithnormativeprinciplesinherentinthelegalsystem.It
decidedtounderstandcausationandillegalityasnecessarybutnotsufficientconditionsfor
the full recovery of damages. It required as a further condition that the illegality of the
behaviorcausedthedamage,aswasnotthecaseherebecausethesameaccidentwouldhave
happened if a resident had driven down the street. Again the struggle for the adequate
interpretationdoesnotendhere.Howtheconnectionbetweentheillegalityofthebehavior
andthedamage,ofcoursenotasimplecausalconnection,hastolook,howtheillegalityof
A’sbehaviorhastobeweighedinrelationtoB’sbehavior,howthedamagemayhavetobe
split—theseareallopenquestions.Buttherethinkingofthelegalconsequenceshadfalsified
the interpretation under which the causation of an accident through illegal behavior was
sufficientgroundfordamages.

5
As these two examples demonstrate, the occurrence of a new factual constellation and the
rethinkingofthelegalconsequencesarenottwoneatlyseparatedfalsifyinginstances.They
are intertwined. And the new factual constellation is of importance and the legal

consequenceshavetoberethoughtbecause,inthefirstexample,thetextofthenormisread
more thoroughly and taken more seriously, and, in both examples, the intention of the
legislatureispresumedtowanttoavoidabsurdorunjustlegalconsequences.
Scientific hypotheses are falsified by consensus about how to understand reality. Legal
interpretations are also falsified by consensus: about what the text of the norm says, about
what the legislature intended, and about the consequences of a legal interpretation being
compatible or incompatible with the rest of the legal system and its normative principles.
Again,thesethreeinstancesoffalsificationareintertwined;thelegislatureknowsthatitcan
legislate only text, not intentions; the intentions to be considered can be those only of an
idealized legislature, not of the actual several hundred members of the legislative body of
whomsomeintendthisandsomeintendthatandsomenothingbecausealltheywantistoget
it over with and go home; the idealized intentions—the intent of the legislature—aim at


consequencesthatareatleastcompatiblewiththerestofthelegalsystemanditsnormative
principles.10
That these three consensuses matter is not due to methodological principles of
interpretation.Itisduetotheconstitutionalstatewithinwhichtheinterpretationtakesplace.
Intheconstitutionalstatethepowerofthewordreplacesthepowerofbruteforceasfaras
possible;thereforethewordsofthelaw—thetextoflegislation—havetobetakenseriously.
In the democratic constitutional state the law must be created by the will of the people
throughitsrepresentatives;thereforetheintentionsoftheelectedlegislatorsmatter.Andin
the constitutional state under the rule of law the citizens have the right to know what to
expect as the legal consequences of their actions and must therefore be able to rely on the
consistencyofthelegalsystem.11
The struggle to establish a consensus about text, intentions, and consequences is the
lawyer’sdailybread.Oftenenoughtheconsensusisnoteasilyestablished,andsometimesit
isnotestablishedatall.Thequestionsaskedintheattempttoestablishtheconsensusarethe
old,familiarquestions:Whatdoesthetextreallysay?Whatdidthelegislatureintend?What
aretheconsequencesofthisorthatinterpretation?


6
Sincetheold,familiarquestionsreappearinthefalsificationmodelofinterpretation,whatis
its advantage? Is it just, as we say in German, old wine in new skins? What is gained by
understandingpresumedinstancesofverificationasmereinstancesoffalsification?
Understandinglegalinterpretationsasthehypothesesthattheyareconfirmsthatthereis
noonerightinterpretationandthatthequestforitgoesastray.Therearemanyinterpretations
that have not been falsified, not only over time but also at any given time. The falsifying
instances,consensusbasedastheyare,aretooweaktoreducethecompetinginterpretations
toone;therewillalwaysbeseveralinterpretationsworthconsidering.But eventhoughthe
falsifyinginstancesmaybeweak,theyarestrongenoughtofinishinterpretations.Againand
again it happens that an interpretation is shown to be incompatible with the text or the
intentionsortheconsequencesastheyareconsensuallyunderstood.
Sincetherewillalwaysbecompetinginterpretations,whiletherecanonlybeonedecision,
judgeshavetochoose.Theresponsibilityofjudginggoesfartherthaninterpreting;itincludes
choosingbetweeninterpretations,andthejudgecannothidebehindinterpretationandwhatit
requireshimorhertodo.Thereisavarietyofviewpointsunderwhichjudgeschoose.Stare
decisis; whether a decision works; whether it keeps social forces, prone to conflict, in
equilibrium;whetheritpacifies;whetheritisfair;whetheritisproportional—theseandmore
arealllegitimatepointsofview.Butapplyingthemisnotinterpretation,unlesstheyaremade
normsbyaconstitutionorstatute,as,forinstance,theprincipleofproportionalityisinthe
Germanandotherlegalsystems.Therearealsoillegitimateviewpoints,amongthempolitical
orreligiousaffiliations,genderbias,andlaziness,thisoften-ignoredfactorthatmakesjudges
choosetheinterpretationthatmakesthingseasyforthem.Theroleofthejudgeasservantof
thelawdecideswhatislegitimateandwhatillegitimate—notaharddecision.
Judgingismorethaninterpreting.Itendsthedebateovertheinterpretationtobechosen;it


choosesbetweenpossibleinterpretations;itchoosesbetweentherelevantpointsofview;it
finishes all consideration; it decides. But this decision embodies neither an aporia nor a

paradox, is nothing mystical or mythical, not the conservation and at the same time the
destruction of law, no incursion of the irrational into the rational or of violence into
discourse, as we sometimes can read.12 The step from considering to choosing, from
calculating to deciding, is simply the point where theory becomes practice. And wherever
theory becomes practice, be it a house that has been designed and is now being built, an
operation that the surgeons wondered how to perform and now go to perform, something
endsandsomethingbegins.Theoryendsandpracticebegins.
Buttheorydoesn’tdisappear.Ifadecisionusesafalsifiedinterpretation,itiswrong,even
if it is the decision of a court of last instance, unappealable, unchangeable. That practice
createsanew,unchangeablerealitydoesn’tmakethepracticeright.Adentaltreatmentisa
mistake,eventhoughthehealthytooththatthedentistmistakenlypulledoutinsteadofthe
badonecannotbeputinagain.

7
LookingbacktotheBiblereadingandinterpretinginmyfamily,IthinkImightalsohave
caughtaglimpseofthepracticalroleofinterpretationinreligion—asopposedtothenotional
roleofinterpretationinliterature.
Literaryinterpretationisthecoreofdealingwithliterature.Dealingwithliteraturebegins
with reading and ends with interpreting, and since it is impossible to read without
interpreting, we can say that dealing with literature begins and ends with interpretation. In
religion,asinlaw,interpretationisjustanelement,acrucialelement,butstilljustanelement
ofsomethingmuchbigger.Itisanelementofaworldwithinstitutions,traditions,theneed
for abstract and general instructions, different kinds of practice, the need to bridge the gap
between theory and practice, the hope to bring people faith. This world determines what
interpretationinreligionandinlawis.
I understand that lawyers have turned to the field of law and literature with delight.
Lawyersarereaders,manylawyersreadliterature,manylawyersloveliterature.Andtoget
studentsinterestedandengagedwithproblemsoflegalphilosophyandjurisprudence,justice
andinjustice,lawandmorality,guiltandpunishment,literaturesometimesworksbetterthan
philosophicalandjurisprudentialtextsproper.

Butiflawyerslookformethodologicalcousinhoodandinspiration,literaturemaynotbe
the first choice. Theology, psychiatry and psychology, engineering—any area where
interpretationhastocomeupwithabstractandgeneralinstructions,andwhereinterpretation
playsaroleasahingebetweentheoryandpractice—maybeclosertolawthanliterature.
NOTES
1.Cf.NiklasLuhmann,DasRechtderGesellschaft(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1995),133–35.
2.JohnBoghosianArden,Science,Theology,andConsciousness(Westport,Conn.:Praeger,1998),59;GerardIrwin
Nierenberg,TheArtofCreativeThinking(NewYork:CornerstoneLibrary,1986),201.
3.JohnRead,FromAlchemytoChemistry(London:Dover,1957),179–81.
4.TheprotagonistsofthemovementbeingErnstFuchs,HermannKantorowicz(GnaeusFlavius),andEugenEhrlich.


5.Cf.FranzWieacker,PrivatrechtsgeschichtederNeuzeit(Gưttingen:VandenhoeckundRuprecht,1967),580–82.
6.Cf.KarlLarenz,Methodenlehre,6thed.(Heidelberg:Springer,1991),206–14,211.
7.MartinHeidegger,SeinundZeit,11thed.(Tübingen:MaxNiemeyerVerlag,1967),§32,pp.152–54);Hans-Georg
Gadamer,WahrheitundMethode,7thed.(Tübingen:MohrSiebeck,2010),1:270–81.
8.KarlR.Popper,LogikderForschung,3rded.(Tübingen:MohrSiebeck,1969),71–76.
9.Bundesgerichtshof,NeueJuristischeWochenschrift,December9,1969;NeueJuristischeWochenschrift,1970,421–23,
alsoJuristenzeitung,1970,186–88.
10.BernhardSchlink,“BemerkungenzumStandderMethodendiskussioninderVerfassungsrechtswissenschaft,”Der
Staat19(1980):73–107(esp.88–107).
11.FriedrichMüllerandRalphChristensen,JuristischeMethodik,9thed.(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,2004),1:517–27.
12.JacquesDerrida,“DeconstructionandthePossibilityofJustice,”CardozoLawReview11(1990):919–1047.


2

AntoninScalia,BernhardSchlink,andLancelotAndrewes
ReadingHeller
StanleyFish

1
At both the beginning and the end of his essay “Interpretations as Hypotheses,” Bernhard
Schlinkdistinguishesbetweenliteraryinterpretation,ontheonehand,andlegalandbiblical
interpretation,ontheother.1Literaryinterpretation,hesays,isspecifictoanauthorandhisor
hertime,andhasasitsaimthedeterminationoftheauthor’smeaning.Itisnotimpossible
thatliteraryinterpretationwillleadtootheractions—toaconversion,topoliticalactivism,to
the performance of patriotism—but such an additional stage of action is contingent, not
necessary. Getting a literary interpretation right (a notion Schlink challenges, I think
wrongly), or at least believing that you have done so, is its own reward; nothing more is
required. In contrast, legal and biblical interpretation take place in a normative field;
determiningthemeaningofastatuteoraclauseintheConstitutionoraverseintheBibleis
necessarilypreliminarytorenderingaverdict,orcommandinganactorthecessationofan
act, or renouncing one’s practices or being born again. The Bible speaks to all lives and
demands their reformation; the law speaks to all cases analogous to the present one and
announcesadecisiontowhichfuturelegalactorsaretosomeextentbound.Itfollows,then
—and this is Schlink’s conclusion—that if lawyers are looking for “methodological
cousinhood,”theyshouldprobablylooknottoliteraturebutto“anyareawhereinterpretation
hastocomeupwithabstractandgeneralinstructions,”instructions,thatis,whichextendfar
beyondthepresentinstance.2
Anotherwaytoputthiswouldbetosaythatbiblicalandlegalinterpretationareserious
activities;muchhangsonthem;andwhiletheymaycertainlyinvolveingenuityandwit,they
steerclearoffrivolity.Literaryinterpretation,ontheotherhand,canonoccasionbeplayed
likeaparlorgame.“Sometimes,”saysSchlink,“literaryinterpretationisnotinterestedinthe
author...andattemptsonlytosatisfyourwishforsomethingnewandfun,surprisingand
stimulating. It can present a determined Hamlet instead of a hesitant Hamlet . . . and
Antigoneasacomicinsteadofatragicfigureandstillwork,thatis,maketheaudienceofthe
performanceenjoy,wonder,andthink.”3Now,Idon’tthinkthatsuchperformancescancount
as interpretation, for in my view interpretation is limited to the effort to figure out what a
purposiveagenthadinmindwhenheorsheproducedthesewordsandimages;anactivity
nottetheredtoaninterestintheauthormaybe“surprisingandstimulating”andproductive

of“fun,”asSchlinkobserves,butitisn’tinterpretation.4AreadingofHamletinwhichthe
prince is determined and resolute is an interpretation only if the interpreter believes that
Shakespeareintendedit.Ifhedoesnotsobelieve,heisnotinterpreting,althoughwhatheis
doing may arrest our attention. That argument, to which I shall return, is fully compatible


withSchlink’sdistinctionbetweenanormativeactivitywhoseperformanceinvolveslessons
wemustheed—betheylegalormoral—andanactivitywhoseperformanceweenjoyforits
ownsakeandwonderatforthepyrotechnicskillsitdisplays.
Schlink doesn’t make the point, but I suspect that he would join me in saying that it is
probablynotagoodideatomixthetwokindsup:thatis,toannouncethatoneisplayinga
seriousgameandthenproceedmerelytoplay;andhemightthink,asIdo,thatitwouldbea
positively bad idea to draw, or claim to draw, normative conclusions from a procedure—if
thatistheword—thatfollowednomandatednormativepath.Schlinkiscertainlyrighttosay
that “there can be no rules for discovering the right interpretation,” but there is a rule the
flouting of which will result not in wrong interpretation but in something that is not an
interpretationatall.5That rule(probably notthe bestword) is oneIhavealreadygiven:if
you’renotconcernedwithwhattheauthororauthorshadinmind,you’renotinterpreting;
you’re just playing around. This is my version of Schlink’s insistence that interpretations
havetobecapableofbeingtestedandjustified;aso-calledinterpretationthatcouldnotpass
thetestoronethatcouldnotfail—becauseitsproductionfollowednorulesandthereforeit
could not be held to any—must be rejected. Such an interpretation could not, in Schlink’s
vocabulary—a vocabulary I challenge later on—even be “falsified” because it is not a
candidateforbeingtrueorfalse.
A spectacular example of just that kind of faux interpretation, of an analysis that is not
really in the hunt, can be found in Antonin Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller.6 The case turns on a Washington, D.C., law that by banning the registration of
handguns effectively prevents citizens from keeping a handgun at home for self-defense.7
Thequestiondebatedbythemajorityandthefourdissentersiswhetherthestatuterunsafoul
of the Second Amendment: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a

freeState,therightofthepeopletokeepandbeararmsshallnotbeinfringed.”8JusticeJohn
Paul Stevens, writing in dissent, declares that the Second Amendment “was adopted to
protect the right of the people of each of the several states to maintain a well-regulated
militia.”9JusticeScalia,writingforthemajority,findsthattheamendmentgivescitizens“an
individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that
firearmfortraditionallylawfulpurposes,suchasself-defensewithinthehome.”10Eachside
claimsthatitspositionrestsonthe“naturalmeaning”ofthewordsofthetext.11Theydiffer,
however,onhowtodetermineexactlywhatthat“naturalmeaning”is.
Scalia, as everyone knows, was a textualist, someone who believes that correct
interpretationsaretobearrivedatbyexaminingthelanguageofthetextindependentlyeither
of its author’s intention or of the history (biographical or legislative) that led up to its
formation.12 It turns out that the textualist method (or as I shall argue, nonmethod) is a
perfect fit with Scalia’s thesis that the right granted by the Second Amendment is
“unconnectedwithserviceinamilitia.”13Theobviousobstaclethisthesismustovercomeis
the prefatory clause, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State.”14Howcanthisclause(technicallyan“absoluteconstruction”15),withitsemphasison
militiaserviceandnomentionatallofself-defense,be“unconnected”ordisconnectedfrom
the assertion of a right in the operative clause?16 The answer is at once brilliant and


dazzlinglysimple:unconnectordisconnectthemsyntacticallyandbysodoingdisconnectthe
meaningoftheamendmentfromalinearreadingofitswords.Syntax,ratherthanbeingthe
vehicleofmeaning,becomesaplaceholderformeaningsthatemergeindependentlyofit,a
frozenvisualfieldwhosecomponentscanbereadinanywayandinanydirection:right-left,
left-right, up-down, down-up. Unmoored from the constraint of linearity, that is, from the
pressureofwhatcomesbeforeandwhatcomesafter,wordscanbeturnedthiswayandthat,
canbeplayedwithuntiltheydisplaythemeaningtheinterpreterdesires.Thissoundslikethe
opposite of textualism, but in fact it is textualism followed to its logical, and massively
irresponsible,conclusion.
Scalia’s first move in this game is decisive, and it is a doozy: he reads the second,

operative,clausefirst.17Whatthisdoesisallowhimtoestablishitsmeaningapartfromany
interpretivepressureexertedbytheprefatoryclause;andafterhavingdonethat,hecanturn
around and say, with a straight face, that the first clause “does not limit the latter
grammatically.”18Howcouldit,giventhathehasexplaineditsgrammarinisolation?Scalia
disconnectsthesecondclausefromthefirstandthenobserves,inallinnocence,thattheyare,
well, disconnected; and if they are disconnected in syntactic fact, they can be said to be
disconnectedinsemanticfact;theirmeaningshavenothingtodowitheachotherbecausethe
contiguitythatbindsthemtogetherinatemporalflowhasbeenremovedwhentheorderof
theirconsiderationisreversed.
After acknowledging that he has begun “our textual analysis with the operative clause,”
Scalia promises to “return to the prefatory clause,” but only, he says, “to ensure that our
readingoftheoperativeclauseisconsistentwiththeannouncedpurpose.”19Hehimselfdoes
not announce the prefatory clause’s purpose until he has established (in isolation) the
meaningoftheoperativeclause.Onlythendoeshetellusthatthepurposeoftheclause(but
notoftheamendmentasawhole)is“topreventeliminationofthemilitia.”20Hecansafely
assertthisbecausehehasalreadydeniedtotheclauseanylimitingeffectonwhatfollowsit.
Itsliteralabsencefromhisanalysisformanypagesallowshimtoassertthatthepurposeof
the amendment is to affirm a right—the right of citizens to defend themselves by bearing
arms—they had always had apart from any participation in military service. To be sure,
participationinmilitaryserviceismademoreeffectivebytheaffirmationofthatright,butis
not what the amendment safeguards; it is a secondary beneficiary of the amendment’s
primary purpose. That is, while the Second Amendment’s central function is to “codify”
(Scalia’sword)therightofthepeopletokeeparmsforself-defense,ithastheadditionaland
happyconsequenceofpreventingtheeliminationofmilitias.21Thatconsequence,however,
isjustafortunateby-productofthecodifiedright,notthecontentofit.“Theprefatoryclause
does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the
right.”22Themainreason,heinsists,istopreserve“self-defenseandhunting.”23Again,this
conclusion is enabled by the reversal of temporal order: first establish the meaning of the
operativeclauseasifithadnoantecedent,andthengobackandseeiftheorphanedprefatory
clause can be made to fit with what you have established. I would say that the chances of

successare100percent.
If Scalia’s reasoning strikes you as strained, even tortured, it is nothing compared with