Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment
Inflows To Vietnam

Quynh Hoa Le
Thu Dau Mot University, Vietnam
Abstract
The effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) on FDI inflows to Vietnam remains unexplored despite
the proliferation of treaties that the government efforts to sign to attract foreign investment at the end of last
century. This paper asks whether BITs stimulate FDI flows to Vietnam by using different explanation variables
and various estimation technique to test the robustness. I find a very weak positive relationship between BITs
and FDI, though effects of FTAs and WTO are estimated to promote FDI flows into Vietnam. My results show
the importance of accounting for guiding investment policies to narrow down the gap between law regulations
and provision of BITs.
Keywords: BITs, FTAs, FDI, Vietnam,
JEL codes: F15, F21, F36, F37
1. Introduction
The last century has proven that international economic integration is an indispensable trend. The evidence
is that barriers of trade and investment among countries decrease through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). In recent decades, many countries, especially developing countries, try to
sign a number of BITs in order to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) that boost economic growth,
enhance nation’s capital and skilled labor force.
Not apart from that trend, in recent years, Vietnam has participated in a total of 65 BITs and has started to
implement the policy of attracting FDI since 1987. So far, after over 30 years, this source of capital has become
one of the important driving forces for promoting economic development. In the period of 3 decades, Vietnam
has witnessed the presence of foreign investors, typically multinational corporations such as Samsung, Honda,
Intel, Yamaha, Panasonic, Microsoft, LG ... The "billion" projects of these multi-national corporations show
that Vietnam has been an attractive investment destination for foreign investors. According to UNCTAD
statistics (2017), FDI inflows into Vietnam increased dramatically with total stock about 370 billion USD in
2017, the number is ten times more than that of the year 1997.
However, the impact of BITs to FDIs of developing countries remains a controversy subject among
scientists. As suggested by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), Neumayer and Spess (2005), Desbordes and Vicard

(2007), Lejour and Salfi (2015), Nguyen and Cao (2017), signing a treaty has a positive effect on FDI. On the
other hand, Hallward-Driemaier (2003), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2003) and Yackee (2007) have tended to
find that BITs fail to boost inward FDI into the developing countries that sign them.
Therefore, the previous empirical studies of the impact of BITs on FDI have had mixed results and the
question is whether or not signing BIT does help Vietnam to attract more FDI and more favorable BITs lead to
further FDI inflows to Vietnam.

480


To answer this question, I develops a theoretical argument to explain the mixed results of previous studies
and to advance the understanding of BITs and their impacts on FDI with the data collected from the period of
1996-2017.
Since the introduction of the paper has been given, the next section gives a brief overview BITs and FDI
inflow to Vietnam; the third discusses the related literature review. Section four illustrations the research
design, including variables, methodology and estimation framework. Then, section five comes to the results
and discussion. Lastly, final section summarizes the findings of the paper and policy implications.
2. Overview Of Bits And Fdi Inflows To Vietnam
As for Vietnam, foreign investment has made positive and impressive contributions in many aspects in the
process of integration and socio-economic development in each period of development. By 2017, there has
been 120 countries pouring FDI into Vietnam with a total capital of over USD 350 billion.

Figure 3 FDI inflows and stocks in Vietnam from 1996 to 2017
FDI inflows and stocks in Vietnam
1996-2017
400
350
300
250
200

150
100
50
0

FDI inflows

FDI stocks

Source: Author’s calculation from UNCTAD database on FDI

As can be seen from the figure 1, total FDI stocks in Vietnam increased continuously over the years from
1996 to 2007, especially in 2008 there was a sudden increase when Vietnam became a WTO member. In the
next period between 2009 and 2017, FDI remained an upward trend and reached over 370 billion USD at the
end of 2017.
However, the growth rate of FDI fluctuated within three decades and it can be summarized as follows. In
term of FDI inflows, within the first five years from 1996 to 2000, FDI inflows into Vietnam decreased both in
registered capital and the number of projects due to the impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Then, in
the next five years (2001-2005), FDI started to recover but the pace was slow. The explanation for this could be
that Vietnam's investment environment and policies at that time were slowly improving, while being subject
to strong competition from the other countries like China, Thailand, Singapore, etc.
After Vietnam participated in WTO (2007), the capital of FDI poured into Vietnam increased rapidly and
reached its peak at over 70 billion USD in 2008. Moreover, the domestic investment and business environment
had been improved and the legal framework for investment had become more and more consistent with
international practice, resulting in large waves of investment from Korea, the United States and Japan, etc.
However, in 2009 and 2010, due to the impact of the global economic crisis, FDI inflows into Vietnam also
decreased significantly and remained stable at about 20 billion USD per year between 2011 and 2016.

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Overall, in the period of 1996-2017, the FDI into Vietnam have been fluctuating but always positive and
has an upward trend.
Bilateral investment treaties, or BITs, is defined "agreements between two countries for the reciprocal
encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's territories by companies based in
either country." (UNCTAD’s definition).
Initially, BITs were signed between developed and developing countries. For developed countries, which
export capital, BITs have been part of a long-term efforts to establish international rules that facilitate and
protect the foreign investments of its citizens and enterprises. Developing countries have joined in BITs in
order to improve the policy framework and attract more FDI. Moreover, by becoming more and more involved
in BITs, developing countries have begun to see BITs as an investment protection device for their own
investors.
Figure 4 Proliferation of BITs between Vietnam and partners

Proliferation of BITs between Vietnam and partners
1990-2017

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

VNM BIT's signed per year

Cumulative

Source: Author’s calculation from UNCTAD database on Bilateral investment treaties


The number of new treaties of Vietnam and total cumulative BITs can be seen in figure 2.
Vietnam ratified the first bilateral investment treaties with Italia in the 1990 but 4 years later, it came into
force. Until the 1990s at most twenty-five treaties were ratified. After 20 years, BITs have become popular and
in 2010, Vietnam has signed total 62 BITs with several countries, most of these are developed countries, which
have abundant capital.
However, in the period of 2010-2017, only 3 BITs were signed representing the lowest annual number of
treaties in the last 27 years.
3. Literature Review
Previous studies examine whether the BITs have actually had an important role in increasing the FDI flows
to the signatory country with various economic methods, different samples, time periods, and outcomes.
On the one hand, some studies have found that the signing of a BIT could attract a greater amount of
investment to the country.
Using both random-effects and fixed effects models in the research about whether BITs increase the
investment to developing countries, Neumayer and Spess (2005) indicate some explanatory variables
(including: GDP, population, economic growth, inflation, resource rents, BITs, WTO membership, institutional
quality, composite political risk, investment profile, government stability, law and order) to estimate the role
of BITs plays in attracting FDI. They claim that developing nations that engage in more BITs with developed

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partners receive larger amount of FDI inflows. In specifically, a developing country signing a BIT is expected
to attract FDI inflows with an increase amount from 40 to 90 percent.
Similarly, Büthe and Milner, in the study of “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing
Countries Increasing FDI through international Trade Agreements” in 2008, have examined the effect of BITs
on inward FDI into developing countries. They conclude that foreign investors consider BITs as government
commitments to broaden economically liberal, which alleviates or reduce the political risks to FDI in
developing countries. According to their results, there is a predicted positive, statistically and substantively
significant correlation between BITs and FDI inflow into developing countries from 1970 to 2000.

Using extensive data from 1985 until 2011 to assess the impact of the treaties on bilateral FDI stocks, Lejour
and Salfi (2014) make an investigation conducted for 34 OECD countries reporting FDI inward and outward
stocks towards 217 partners. They find that engaging in BITs increase bilateral FDI stocks by 35% on average
compared to those of non-treaty countries. In addition, less developed countries receive larger inward FDI
stocks from developed partners and distinguishing by region, FDI stocks increase mainly in East Asia and
Middle and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, some empirical analyses of bilateral investment flows, in particular, indicate that
developing countries could not use BITs to attract more FDI (Hallward-Driemeier’s, 2003).
Hallward-Dreimer (2003) and Tobin & Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that there is very weak positive link
relationship between the treaties and investor’s behavior. In the earlier study by Hallward-Dreimer (2003),
analyzing bilateral FDI flows in the period of 20 years from the OECD members to developing partners finds
little evidence that BITs have stimulated additional investment. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) apply a twopronged approach and use panel data from the first BIT signed in 1959 through 2000 for low- and middleincome countries (176 countries). They find that BITs only have a positive effect on investment when countries
have a stable business environment; whereas the opposite occurs or BITs affect negatively FDI inflows if the
country has a high political risk.
These results are consistent with the research of Yackee (2008) focuses on whether the presence of BITs
meaningfully influences investment decisions and finds no evidence in support of the impact of BITs on
investment decisions.
Overall, the previous studies only focus on the link between the treaties and FDI flows from developed
regions to developing countries without considering the impact on a particular country. In term of Vietnam,
despite Vietnam has signed 65 BITs and 16 FTAs, there is little research has been done on the impact of these
agreements. Can say about the study by Cao and Nguyen (2016), the investigation has been conducted to
examine the impact of BITs in general and on FDI inflows to Vietnam in particular. Basing on the study of
Chaisse and Bellak (2011) and using the principal component analysis, they apply the gravity model with the
estimation techniques for panel data such as Fixed and Random effect to affirm the consistent positive effects
of BITs on FDI inflows to Vietnam with various independent variables (proxies for openness, institution…).
Beside a connection between BITs and bilateral FDI flows, joining free trade agreements affect the changes
in inward FDI because of several reasons, such as: improving policies and economic environment of the
country, decreasing political risk, lower tax rate and giving more incentives for investors. However, the
previous researchers only evaluate the impact of BITs and the WTO, and some of the major agreements on
FDI, not measure the effect of FTAs and BITs simultaneously on the investment inflow, specifically in Vietnam.

4. Research Design
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that the more BITs a developing country joins in, the more attracted
foreign investors consider it as an investment destination, and the more FDI the country will receive.
Therefore, dependent variable and explanatory variables are identified to examine the hypothesis.

483


Dependent variable
To test the hypothesis statistically, statistical analyses of inward FDI stocks into Vietnam are collected from
the UNCTAD FDI database and Statistical yearbook of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam from 1996 to
2017. The research uses total FDI stock instead of FDI flows because stocks, due to the accumulation of flows,
may more effectively capture long-run effects (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). Moreover, the absolute volume
provides the most accurate base for the analysis technique used in the study. Then, the natural log of the
dependent variable is taken to reduce the skewness of its distribution and increases the model fit substantially.
Explanatory variables
The model applies a total cumulative number of ratified BITs as a key explanatory variable and data about
the date of signature and the date of entry into force of BITs are available from a listing published by UNCTAD.
I use the cumulative BITs instead of new BITs that Vietnam signs in every year, because the negotiation and
signing of a treaty is a lengthy process and Vietnam doesn’t participate in new BITs every year. Therefore, the
cumulative number will reflect more accurately the growth of BITs and its impact in the model.
Moreover, if a developing country have signed more FTAs with a developed country, it might receive more
FDI inflows because such agreements sometimes also contain provisions on policies which might be beneficial
to foreign investors and it is easier to export or import commodities with low taxes. This indicator is evaluated
by a dummy variable indicating whether Vietnam becomes a WTO member as well as a variable counting the
number of trade agreements Vietnam has concluded, based on information are obtained from WTO (2017).
Based on the findings of Chakrabarti (2001) about the determinants of foreign direct investment, the paper
uses some control variables including: market size (GDP per capital and POP), economic growth (GDP
growth), trade openness, inflation, natural resource rents.
Market size has been the most widely accepted as a leading determinant of FDI inflows in past empirical

studies and economic theory. GDP per capital and population of the countries are two popular proxies to estimate
the specification of variables. The study doesn’t use the absolute GDP because it is a relatively poor indicator
of market potential for investors, especially in many developing economies, as it reflects size of the population
rather than income (Chakrabarti, 2001). As finding of most of previous papers, like Tobin and Rose (2005),
Yakee (2008), Frenkel and Walter (2017), etc, GDP per capital has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows
to developing countries. On the one hand, to be able to distinguish any possible remain determinant of market
size, the country’s population seems to be appropriate scale to measure this variable. Both GDP per capital
and population are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database.
Economic growth, or growth rate of GDP, is a crucial factor in influencing the inflow of foreign investment.
There are a number of reasons why foreign investors may prefer a faster-growing market (Busse (2008), Yakee
(2008), Buthe (2009) and Frenkle (2017)). For example, a country with high economic growth provides
relatively better opportunities, like more efficient production or a larger market, for making profits. Moreover,
the growth is a measure and signal of market demand which attracts FDI.
Low rate of inflation is considered an incentive for FDI inflows in many empirical studies. (Alshamsi et al
(2015)). Khan and Mitra (2014) indicate that a low and stable rate of inflation can be considered as a sign of
internal economic stability because it reduces the risks and increases the confidence of people and businesses
to make investment decisions. Otherwise, a high inflation rate can impact the preservation of foreign capital
and may affect profitability as higher prices can lead to higher costs and lower profits. (Aijaz, Siddiqui, &
Aumeboonsuke, 2014).
Natural resource rents variable can be calculated by the total value of natural resource as a share of the GDP
and estimated by the Bank of the World (2017) as the price of the resource minus the average cost multiplied
by the amount of resources extracted.
Wage has been a potential determinant influencing on FDI and estimated by the Bank of the World (2017).
Theoretically, the importance of cheap labor in attracting multinationals is agreed upon by the proponents of
the dependency hypothesis as well as those of the modernization hypothesis.

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I expect a positive association of GDPpc, POP, Growth, WTO, FTAs and BITs with FDI; the opposite applies to

Inflation, resource rents and wage as these variables can be interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic distortions.
This study applies the following general structure of the estimation model:
Ln(FDIvnt) = 1*Ln(GDPpcvnt) + 2*Ln(POPvnt) + 3*Inf + 4*Growth + 5*Resource_rents + 6*Wage+ 7*BITs
+ 8*FTAs + 9*WTO + const
Where:
Ln: Natural logarithm of variables.
FDIvnt is the log of total inward FDI to Vietnam in year t.
GDPpcvnt is value of GDP per capital of Vietnam in year t.
POPvnt is the Vietnamese population in year t.
Inf is the percentage of inflation of Vietnam in year t.
Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP of Vietnam.
Resource rents is total natural resources rents as a share of GDP.
Wage is calculated by WDI database and modeled ILO estimate; It is wage and salaried workers, total (%
of total employment).
BITs are the total cumulative number of BITs Vietnam ratified in year t.
FTAs is the total cumulative number of FTAs Vietnam ratified in year t.
WTO is a dummy which is 1 in years after Vietnam is a WTO and zero otherwise.
Const is a constant of model.
Estimation Methods
Different techniques are applied in the regression analysis: simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression,
generalized least squares (GLS) estimation and Tobit regression. The use of several alternative estimation
methods in this research to examine the robustness of the results.
5. Results And Discussion
Table 10. Estimates of the Effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties
on Total Foreign Direct Investment Activity
OLS
LnFDIvnt

GLS
LnFDIvnt


TOBIT
LnFDIvnt

lnGDPpc

0.488**
(2.53)

0.488***
(3.43)

0.488***
(3.43)

LnPOP

1.1350
(0.69)

1.1350
(0.94)

1.1350
(0.94)

Growth

-0.0469**
(-2.63)


-0.0469***
(-3.56)

-0.0469***
(-3.56)

Resource_rents

-0.0108
(-1.23)

-0.0108*
(-1.66)

-0.0108*
(-1.66)

Wage

-0.0148
(-1.33)

-0.0148*
(-1.80)

-0.0148*
(-1.80)

Inf


0.00777*

0.00777**

0.00777**

485


(1.82)

(2.46)

(2.46)

WTO

0.160*
(2.02)

0.160***
(2.73)

0.160***
(2.73)

FTAs

0.0747**

(2.86)

0.0747***
(3.88)

0.0747***
(3.88)

BITS

0.0078
(1.03)

0.0078
(1.40)

0.0078
(1.40)

_const

3.2540
(0.48)

3.2540
(0.65)

3.2540
(0.65)


t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation by STATA

I have explored the robustness of the results by testing the sensitivity of key variables with different
techniques in the regression analysis. The result shows that the coefficients of the explanatory variables have
a low fluctuation, which means that the model is highly robust and reliable.
Firstly, GDP per capita and trade agreements and WTO that Vietnam participates in have a positive impact
on FDI inflows. This result is consistent with the hypothesis and previous studies, for example, Neumaye and
Spess (2005) and Büthe and Milner (2009). Secondly, the elasticity coefficient between inflation rate and
dependent variable is 0.007, which means that the inflation has positive and statistically significant effect on
FDI. It is against the expected negative relationship between the two in the findings of recent researchers.
According to the argument of Romer (1990), the inflation can have a positive effect on FDI provided that it
does not exceed a certain threshold.
In contrast, natural resource rents and labor’s wage have the effect of reducing the flow of FDI. The result
is in line with previous papers, as the low cost of resource extraction and labor cost are the key incentives for
foreign investor’s decision. (Frenkel and Walter (2017) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005)).
In terms of economic growth, the empirical study reports negative effects of GDP growth rate on FDI. It is
similar to the findings of several scientists (e.g Wint and Williams (2002), Tobin (2005) and Buchanan et al.
(2012)). One explanation for such result is that it is a scaling effect (Jensen (2003) and Tsai (1994)). Another
argues that a negative correlation between economic growth and FDI can also occur if low economic growth in
Vietnam means greater opportunities for future profits. For instance, a country has a low growth economy
that is relatively poor capital, which means that labor and natural resources are relatively abundant and cheap.
There may here be an opportunity for investors to benefit with the hope of realizing unexploited opportunities
for profit.
From the findings, there is no association between population and inward FDI stocks, this is similar in
Aisbett's study (2007). The reasonable explanation for this could be that developed countries are more
concerned about labor productivity and labor costs than absolute amount of population. While Vietnam's
quality labor is not high and labor productivity is much lower than its neighbors such as Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia, etc.

Ideally, if the BIT is considered input, the increase in FDI must be the output. Though the provisions of
BITs are expected to provide a healthy investment environment, which is beneficial for investors; nevertheless,

486


in my findings, BITs do not have the significant effect of attracting FDI into Vietnam, because there is a gap
between policy and enforcement in Vietnam. For example, despite the Vietnamese government’s recent
attempts to negotiate more balanced investment rules in the provision of BITs and ensure consistency within
the body of investment treaties and then national laws and regulations, but it is far from sufficient to deal with
these challenges. To bridge the gap, though Vietnam just reformed the new Law on Investment and the new
Law on Enterprise which became effective on 1 July 2015, so it takes time for the effect of increased democracy
to show, for which our sample is too short.
Moreover, as for Vietnam, since it is not a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) Convention; therefore, when a dispute arises, the foreign investors can only litigate the
Vietnamese government in accordance with BIT regulations. And this is one of the terms that investors are
afraid of because it will be detrimental to them.
In fact, Vietnam's economy still has many internal obstacles that have not been overcome, such as lack of
high quality human resources, low productivity, poor infrastructure and services compared to many countries
in the neighbor region. According to research by Sachs and Sauvant (2009) “There is no clear evidence that
BITs have significant impact on FDI inflows in developing countries. BITs only have a positive impact on FDI
in the country with an stable economic environment and strong policy. If a BIT is signed while the government
is in institutional reform and liberalization to encourage investment, this reform will affect the investment
decision of the investor rather than the BIT.”
On the contrary, the WTO has the most positive impact on FDI inflows as the WTO content strictly regulates
commitments that Vietnam must make and change policies in line with international regulations. This creates
a more competitive environment and a more opening market for investors than BITs regulations.
6. Conclusion
Vietnam is considered as one of the dominant destination of FDI from many developed economies in the
world. In recent years, Vietnam has participated in a total of 65 BITs and has started to implement the policy

of attracting FDI since 1987. The study set out to find the potential impact of these BITs on FDI to Vietnam by
using different explanation variables and various estimation technique to test the robustness. Consequently,
GDP per capita of Vietnam and trade agreements and WTO have a positive effect on FDI inflows; while,
natural resource rents and labor’s wage have the reverse effect on the flow of FDI. These results are consistent
with previous studies and are explained in discussion section. However, the impact of inflation rate and
economic growth are against the expected relationship with FDI in the findings of recent researchers. More
importantly, BITs appear to have little impact on FDI inflows to Vietnam due to a gap between policy and
enforcement.
Therefore, some measures should be implemented to improve the effectiveness of BITs, such as: A
necessary first step is therefore the contemplation of a new model treaty text that takes domestic laws and
policy priorities into account. Secondly, the government should consider to participate in the ICSID
Convention to attract foreign investment and Vietnam can use ICSID experts and arbitrators, provide technical
assistance and capacity for the ISCID dispute resolution process, simplify arbitral awards. In addition to these,
rigorous regulations in BITs will create competitive pressures in domestic enterprises, so Vietnamese
businesses must understand the relevant issues in BITs, learn and promote innovation to improve their
capabilities.

487


References
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Sachs (eds.), The Effects of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and
Investment Flows” New York: Oxford University Press. Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 2255, posted 15. March
2007
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United Arab Emirates, Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 12(3-1)
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University Press, 2009: 171-224
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Economics, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 788-804
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Appendix 1: Countries sign BITs with Vietnam

488



No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Partners
Germany
Austria
Australia
Indonesia
Thailand

Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
China
Korea, Republic of
Denmark
Sweden
Finland
Netherlands
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Cuba
Latvia
Laos
Bulgaria
India
Egypt
Czech Republic
Tajikistan
Chile
Cambodia
United Kingdom
Korea, Republic of
Japan
Bangladesh
United Arab Emirates
Oman
Morocco
Greece

Finland
Lithuania
Mongolia
Argentina
Spain
Venezuela, Bolivarian
Republic of
Uruguay
Italy
BLEU
France
Switzerland
Belarus
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Slovakia
Armenia

Date of entry into
force
19/09/1998
01/10/1996
11/09/1991
03/04/1994
07/02/1992
09/10/1992
29/01/1993
25/12/1992
01/09/1993
04/09/1993

07/08/1994
02/08/1994
02/05/1996
01/02/1995
16/06/1995
24/11/1994
16/08/1995
01/10/1996
20/02/1996
23/06/1996
15/05/1998
01/12/1999
04/03/2002
09/07/1998

Status

Date of signature

In force
In force
In force
Terminated
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
Terminated
In force

In force
Terminated
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
In force
In force
In force
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force


03/04/1993
27/03/1995
05/03/1991
25/10/1991
30/10/1991
21/01/1992
27/02/1992
29/10/1992
02/12/1992
13/05/1993
23/07/1993
08/09/1993
13/09/1993
10/03/1994
26/08/1994
31/08/1994
15/09/1994
12/10/1995
06/11/1995
14/01/1996
19/09/1996
08/03/1997
06/09/1997
25/11/1997
19/01/1999
16/09/1999
01/09/2001
01/08/2002
15/09/2003
14/11/2003

01/05/2005
16/02/2009
10/01/2011
15/06/2012
13/10/2008
21/02/2008
27/09/1995
17/04/2000
03/06/1996
20/02/2006

In force

20/11/2008

17/06/2009

In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force

12/05/2009
18/05/1990

24/01/1991
26/05/1992
03/07/1992
08/07/1992
16/06/1994
15/09/2009
17/12/2009
01/02/1993

09/09/2012
06/05/1994
11/06/1999
10/08/1994
03/12/1992
24/11/1994
03/07/1996
07/04/2014
18/08/2011
28/04/1993

489

01/08/2002
05/06/2004
19/12/2004

08/12/2011
04/06/2009
24/04/2003
13/12/2001

01/06/1997
29/07/2011


52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Taiwan Province of
China
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Algeria
Myanmar
Korea, Dem. People's
Rep. of
Iceland
Namibia
Mozambique

Kuwait
Iran, Islamic Republic
of
Estonia
Sri Lanka
Turkey

In force

21/04/1993

23/04/1993

In force
In force
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)

08/06/1994
28/03/1996
21/10/1996
15/02/2000

08/12/1994
06/03/1998

Signed (not in force)

02/05/2002


In force
Signed (not in force)
In force
In force

20/09/2002
30/05/2003
16/01/2007
23/05/2007

Signed (not in force)

23/03/2009

Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)
Signed (not in force)

24/09/2009
22/10/2009
15/01/2014

Source: />
490

10/07/2003
29/05/2007
16/03/2011