roundtable  •  regional perspectives on america ’ s evolving asia policy

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration
Joseph Chinyong Liow

T

he election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United
States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his
administration’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views
have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte
will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S.
commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from
prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded
the region’s prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains
that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy
toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of
geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members
who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to
say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed
with great interest—not to mention a fair amount of trepidation—around
the world, not least in Southeast Asia.
The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have
emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump
administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for
U.S.–Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern.

Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations’
Policies toward Asia
The Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not
since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much

attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama’s Asia
policy, christened the “pivot” and later the “rebalance,” saw the United
States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East
Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian
countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if

joseph chinyong liow is Dean and Professor of Comparative and International Politics in the
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He
can be reached at <>.

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not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive
nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined—and eventually
led—discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched
as the “gold standard” for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim
countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and
ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional
states coming on board in the future.
With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January,
Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a
considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears,
they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared
similar concerns. Candidate Trump’s decision to adopt a cantankerous
line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What

caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the
United States from the TPP and review the country’s security commitments
to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these
concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with
tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan
president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about
possibly reviewing Washington’s long-standing one-China policy. Days
after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by
means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions
on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile,
during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested
that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the
artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that
Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict.
Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump’s
approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits
and observers were expecting. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis,
Secretary Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence to Japan and South
Korea, along with Pence’s visit to Indonesia, were accompanied by familiar
reassurances of the United States’ commitment to the security of its allies.
The closely watched meeting between Trump and his Chinese counterpart
Xi Jinping proceeded cordially and a close personal rapport was apparently
established between the two leaders. The fact that both leaders have
apparently been talking on a regular basis further testifies to this. A side trip
to Australia afforded Vice President Pence the opportunity to repair damage
done by a difficult phone conversation between Trump and Australian
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roundtable  •  regional perspectives on america ’ s evolving asia policy


prime minister Malcolm Turnbull earlier in the year. Pence later managed
to secure Trump’s attendance in May at the commemorative ceremony in
New York to remember the Battle of Coral Sea, where a very cordial meeting
took place with Turnbull.
A similar pattern has unfolded for Southeast Asia thus far. While it is
highly unlikely that the Trump administration will continue the rebalance
in word, there are signs of continuity in deed. Phone calls with the leaders
of Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines were well received. The visit
by Vice President Pence to Jakarta in April nudged Southeast Asia up on
the Trump foreign policy agenda. During the trip, Pence visited Southeast
Asia’s largest mosque, Istiqlal, and in a gesture reminiscent of Trump’s
predecessors praised Indonesia’s “moderate” form of Islam in an effort to
dampen fears about Trump’s harsh anti-Islamic rhetoric. Approximately
$8 billion worth of energy deals were reportedly signed during his visit,
while talk of Trump’s desire to renegotiate trade deals with Indonesia was
kept under the lid, even as Indonesia offered to temporarily exempt Freeport
from its ban on mineral exports just days before Pence’s arrival.1 During
his trip to Jakarta, Pence also met the ASEAN secretary general, Le Luong
Minh, and committed the president to a visit to the region in November for
the East Asia Summit and the U.S.-ASEAN Summit in the Philippines and
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vietnam.
Further reassurances were offered by way of a meeting with ASEAN
foreign ministers hosted by Secretary Tillerson in Washington, D.C., on
May 4. Tillerson reportedly urged ASEAN to take a firm stance on North
Korea even as he reiterated the U.S. position on the South China Sea. In
addition, crucial first steps in outlining a U.S. approach to trade in the
region were taken with on-the-record discussions about U.S.-ASEAN
Connect, the U.S.-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement,
and the ASEAN Connectivity through Trade and Investment program.

In late May, the United States conducted its first freedom of navigation
operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea since President Trump took
office. The last operation had been undertaken in October 2016 under
the Obama presidency, and two initial requests by Pacific Command had
reportedly been rejected by the Pentagon, apparently due to concerns

1 Fedina S. Sundaryani, “U.S.-Indonesian Deals during Pence’s Visit Related to Energy,” Jakarta Post,

April 20, 2017.

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about managing tensions around the Korean Peninsula.2 The USS Dewey
conducted the FONOP around Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. The
reef is still the subject of competing claims by the Philippines and China,
even though an international arbitral tribunal determined on July 12, 2016,
that the reef lies in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. More
importantly, Mischief Reef hosts Chinese military installations. The
operation included a man-overboard drill, which is significant because
such a drill would have been deemed illegal if carried out within the
twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea of another country. The South China
Morning Post explained that FONOPs are signaling exercises for the United
States, and the Chinese response to the particular “signals” that the United
States had sent on this occasion was worded appropriately to maintain
China’s claims. Chinese jets also intercepted a U.S. surveillance aircraft
around Hainan Island on the same day.3


Outlook for U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump
Administration
The preceding overview suggests that U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia
in the early months of the Trump administration is characterized more
by continuity than change, at least in the area of security and diplomatic
engagement. Nevertheless, several reasons for concern remain. These are
not insignificant and require close monitoring.
First, notwithstanding the semblance of normalcy that appears to
characterize security policy, there is little substantive indication yet of how
the Trump administration intends to engage Southeast Asia on issues of
trade and economics, despite some headway in the exploratory discussions
between Vice President Pence and ASEAN Secretary General Minh. The
fact remains that the U.S.–Southeast Asia relationship under the Trump
administration started off on a rocky footing with the United States’
withdrawal from the TPP. This move all but shifted regional attention to
China, which was already the top trading partner with all countries in the
region and has signaled a readiness to assume economic leadership with
its Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
As the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Asia
2 Sam Bateman, “U.S. FONOPs: Game On Again in the South China Sea,” Lowy Institute

for International Affairs, Lowy Interpreter, May 26, 2017 u />the-interpreter/us-fonop-game-back-south-china-sea.

3 Ankit Panda, “The Real Purpose of U.S. Navy ‘Freedom of Navigation’ Operations around Disputed

South China Sea Islands,” South China Morning Post, May 28, 2017.

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roundtable  •  regional perspectives on america ’ s evolving asia policy

and the Pacific conceded: “Our strategy for engaging Asia, particularly
Southeast Asia, relied so heavily on the TPP that when the United States
withdrew, there was not much of a policy left.” 4 Further, at that House
Committee hearing in May, aptly titled “Revitalizing U.S.-ASEAN
Relations,” discussion centered on confronting the Chinese influence in
Southeast Asia. During that meeting, Walter Lohman, director of the Asian
Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, presciently observed: “What the
Chinese seemingly understand better than the United States, however, is the
connection between their economic and strategic goals.”5
Second, as investigations into alleged Russian interference in the
U.S. presidential election gather pace and the administration struggles
to implement a raft of campaign promises, the embattled White House is
likely to be consumed by domestic challenges for the foreseeable future. The
Russia investigations not only could cast doubt on the election result but are
potentially damaging to the president’s credibility and legitimacy abroad.
The foreign policy risk of these domestic challenges is that a distracted
Trump administration might not have the bandwidth to sustain its recent
strategic engagement with Southeast Asia.
Third, the unpredictability of the Trump administration’s foreign
policy, evident from several policy reversals and U-turns, raises further
questions of commitment. Trump’s emphasis on personal chemistry with his
counterparts, combined with the glacial pace at which subcabinet and other
senior official positions are being filled, makes for a period of unorthodox
U.S. foreign policy that is causing consternation across Southeast Asia. This
has led regional states to pursue prospects of deeper security cooperation
with other extraregional partners such as Australia, India, and Japan, even
as they continue to cast a longing eye toward Washington in the hope for
greater certainty about the traditional offshore balancer’s commitment to

the region.
Finally, given the Trump administration’s preference for bilateralism,
it is likely that regional states will prioritize national engagement over
regional engagement in their approach toward the United States. Thus, in
contrast with the Obama administration, which actively engaged ASEAN,

4 “Revitalizing U.S.-ASEAN Relations,” hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17, 2017 u />FA05/20170517/105979/HHRG-115-FA05-MState-Y000065-20170517.pdf.

5 Walter Lohman, “Southeast Asia: The Need for Economic Statecraft,” testimony before the

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17, 2017
u />
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there is a risk that the Trump White House will treat regional organizations
with insouciance. To address this challenge, ASEAN unity and cohesion
will be imperative, which is already proving to be a tall order, especially on
the security front. On the other hand, given his relatively frosty reception
at the NATO and G-7 summits in late May, Trump may actually find that
he enjoys spending time in Southeast Asia more, where U.S. power is not
questioned. The November trips to the Philippines and Vietnam will be the
litmus test for his long-term outlook for the region. 

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