THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

SECURITY
AT

SEA
By

Brigadier (Retd) B A H Parritt, CBE
International

Maritime Security (IMS)

Foreword by
Mr W A O'Neil, Secretary General
The International Maritime Organization


This book is dedicated to
CAPTAIN E E MITROPOULOS
and
CAPTAIN J L THOMPSON

Two officers of the International Maritime Organization whose contribution to
security at sea has made life so much safer for so many passengers and crew.

SECURITY AT SEA

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Author wishes to thank the following for their patience and help in the
preparation of this book:
First, my colleagues in International Maritime Security, Mr T L Davies,
Mr R G T Raikes, Mr R J Stuchbury who distilled a security policy for ships into
practical solutions.
I would also like to thank Dr Paulo Cavanna for his wise advice and
Mr Francesco Sicardi for the details of the insurance claims of the Achille
Lauro. Professional help was supplied by Commander Don Goldstein, US
Coast Guard, and Mr Michael Chapman and Mr Fred Lake of the Ministry of
Defence Library.
I am particulary grateful to Captain 'Thimio' Mitropoulos and Captain John
Thompson of the IMO. Their contribution to the protection of all those who
travel by sea has been outstanding. I am also particularly grateful to Mr Mike
Ridler of the UK Department of Transport whose individual contribution in the
creation of the UK Aviation & Maritime Security Act has been a most
successful and significant achievement.
Finally may I thank Mr Julian Parker of The Nautical Institute for his
positive support, and the two IMS secretaries, Sue Foster and Biddy Boucher.

4

THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE


SECURITY AT SEA

CONTENTS


Chapter One
Chapter Two
Chapter Three
Chapter Four

Chapter Five
Chapter Six
Chapter Seven
Chapter Eight
Chapter Nine
Chapter Ten
Chapter Eleven

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Acknowledgements
Foreword
The Impact of Terrorism on Passenger Ships
Maritime Terrorist Acts
Factors in DeCiding the Appropriate Level
of Protection
The International Maritime Organization's
'Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea'

and Subsequent Legislation
Practical Measures to Improve
Maritime Security
Contingency Plans
Action to be Taken if the Ship
is Taken Over by Force
Anti Drug Smuggling Protection Measures
Security Measures to be Taken if
Entering Hostile Waters
Piracy
Letter or Parcel Bombs
Annexes
The International Maritime Organization
Maritime Safety Committee Approved Measures
to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and
Crew on Board Ships
The United States 1986 Ports and
Maritime Security Act
Directions Under the UK Aviation and
Maritime Security Act 1990
Threat Assessment Guidelines for Ships
Visiting the UK January 1991
Sea Carrier Security Manual. Drug Smuggling
in Containers, Trailers and Chassis
Specimen International Maritime Security (IMS)
Ship Security Plan Contents List
Searching Procedures in Ports and on Ships
Index

Page

4
7
9
13
19
22

27
33
36
38
44
51
55

56

72
78
84
89
95
99
103

SECURITYAT SEA
AA

5



Navigating officer on board the Seabourn Pride. He is 'carrying an explosive vapour
detector and has easy access to his hand-held metal detector, radio, visitors log and
crew card board.
6

THE NAUTICAL

INSTITUTE


FOREWORD
W. A. O'Neil Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization
MERCHANT
SHIPPING
provides an invaluable service to society transporting goods and commodities
across the world. However, the marine environment can be inhospitable, subjecting mariners to
storms, fog, ice and heat. The commercial climate is also highly competitive and there are strong
pressures to cut costs in order to survive.
It is difficult enough to operate ships today without further distractions, but insidiously a new
threat has to be recognised and dealt with. Perhaps it is no accident that reported incidents of
piracy and armed robbery against ships have been growing whilst the industry struggles to
become profitable.
No location is absolutely free from this threat, and merchant ships carrying out their lawful
business often with a minimum of crew on board are targets for those who seek to achieve their
ends through the illicit practice of terrorism, piracy or drugs contraband.
The multi-national
facilities for registering,
financing and manning ships diffuses
governmental involvement, whilst the freedom of the high seas makes it legally difficult to mount

international maritime security and surveillance.
Self-help is, of course, the most obvious response to a perceived threat, but how should this
be organised? During the first world war there was considerable debate about the desirability or
otherwise of convoying ships under escort.
However, statistics soon showed the value of the system and that ships could be better
protected and more effective use could be made of escorts using the convoy system. When an
attack did get through there was also a better chance of detecting and sinking enemy submarines.
So with security, there are ways of assessing threat and using the ship's resources to best
advantage. The great value of this practical book is that it demonstrates what can be done. It is
therefore invaluable to ship managers and seamen whose lives, heaven forbid, may depend on the
good advice it gives.
Of course, action taken by ships alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism or piracy; this
requires concerted diplomatic action and in some cases strong police or military intervention may
be necessary. Let us not forget, these are acts of violence against innocent people and they have
to be dealt with firmly.
The International
Maritime Organization has played a major role in co-ordinating the
international response to terrorism. The guidelines drawn up by a small group of experts were
unanimously agreed to by the Maritime Safety Committee and the maritime industry now has
valuable guidance on what each party, whether flag State, port State, shipowner or shipmaster,
should do in the event of a terrorist attack.
The IMO guidelines break with the tradition of established legislation in that they require
accountability of officers and managers with respect to the security of passengers and crew and
they cause companies to formulate plans for positive response. The whole process is well
discussed in this book and reflects great credit on mypredecessor, Mr C. P. Srivastava, and IMO
team who helped to formulate the recommendations.
Piracy is still a major problem and ranges from petty theft in port to armed assault directed
towards the capture of a ship, her cargo or the valuables from the master's safe. IMO is
continually monitoring the incidence of piracy incidents so as to provide warning about trouble
spots. The IMO is also using its influence to apply diplomatic pressure to convince governments

that piracy, armed robbery or other unlawful acts against ships occurring in their ports or
adjacent territorial waters must be brought under control and eradicated.
It is, however, necessary to be realistic. A well-organised police force does not prevent violent
crime in cities. An effective crime prevention force will, however, contain risk to within
reasonable levels. In certain areas even the forces for law and order may be part of the organised
gangs who prey on merchant ships.
IMOthrough its monitoring activities can help to identify those areas where the worst crimes
are being committed. If ships must trade to these areas we would recommend that it would be
prudent for them to take extra security precautions.
Security, from burglar alarms on houses to special locks on the doors of ships' bridges, is
sadly a growing and increasingly uncomfortable part of life. It cannot and should not be ignored.
This book fulfils an important role in creating a realistic sense of awareness. Society and all
concerned with maritime affairs owe the seamen a better epitaph than 'the loneliness of
command. '



CHAPTER ONE

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON PASSENGER SHIPS
The murder of one old crippled man in 1985 during the hi-jacking of the Achille Lauro
caused the cruise industry in the Mediterranean to come to a total and abrupt halt.
Passenger ships found themselves either anchored indefinitely off Piraeus, or joining a
queue of fifteen others trying to get a berth in St Thomas in the US Virgin Islands. The
official Greek Government figures following this single murder revealed a direct loss of
$US300 million; $200 million from tourism and $100 million from cancelled cruise ship
bookings. This enormous impact on the maritime industry was not caused by large scale
mayhem and bloodshed, but by the actions of four men carrying out a terrorist attack.
At the height of the Gulf War in 1991, when the military might of the coalition forces
were devastating Iraqi forces with battleships and bombers, people of all nationalities

stopped travelling. Flights were cancelled, cruise ship bookings fell dramatically, and
ferries throughout Scandinavia and the Mediterranean were laid up to reduce costs.
The reason for this immediate and devastating impact on the passenger industry,
was not the fear of Iraqi tanks, missiles or poison gas, but the fear of perhaps five or six
men or women carrying out a terrorist attack.
Every day in New York City there are over one hundred violent deaths, yet many
murders hardly get a mention in the newspapers. In 1989 however, when a group of
insignificant men in a backstreet in Beirut murdered Colonel Higgins, an American, the
President of the United States, who is the most powerful man in the world, turned his
aircraft around and returned to Washington to 'deal with the crisis.' Cruise bookings fell
immediately and seamen lost their jobs.
There can be no doubt therefore that acts of terrorism do have a great impact on the
passenger industry and passenger ship profitability. Deciding what a passenger ship
company should do to avoid potential acts of terrorism, or what a passenger ship should
do to prevent acts of terrorism, is nevertheless a complicated issue. Providing protection
from acts of violence is the natural function of a military ship, but it is a very unnatural
function for a ship designed to provide relaxed holidays or fast ferry travel.
It is also relevant that whilst passenger ships have been the main focus for terrorist
activity, threats have been made against offshore installations.
The Gulf War
demonstrated a new and unacceptable threat which was to discharge oil from tankers
and shore side tank farms into the Arabian Gulf as a form of environmental terrorism.

The nature of terrorism
Why is it that this technique called 'terrorism'has had such an impact on maritime life?
Why is it that this tactic can have such an immediate and drastic effect on profitability
and the level of crew redundancy?
The answer lies in the unique nature of terrorism as opposed to other acts of
violence. Terrorism is a criminal act, yet the world seems to have accepted that a
terrorist crime somehow obscures guilt. A man who murders his neighbour, or blinds a

woman in a robbery, is clearly seen to be a criminal. But if he does the same thing while
alleging that it is for political, religious or even ecological reasons, then it seems to
create the illusion that he is not really a criminal and there may even be some
justification for his wickedness. The excuse given, is that terrorism is an act carried out
for a 'Cause' rather than for personal gain, and that in pursuit of this non-financial
'Cause,' the participants are special because they are risking their lives for a motive
unconnected with monetary profit.
This combination of 'Cause' and apparent self sacrifice, is not in itself sufficient to
achieve the aim of seizing the attention of the whole world. It needs other elementsinnocent victims-horror-and
of crucial importance-good
communications. If there
were no media coverage there would be no terrorism.
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9


Some cruise ships employ
10

local people to help security.

THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE


It is by using this combined formula of Cause, innocence, horror and
communications that we have arrived at a situation whereby a very small number of
men or women armed with a limited amount of weapons or explosive can immediately
capture world-wide interest. Eight million people were made aware of the Palestinian
problem following the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in

1972 where the media of the world were concentrated and available to give intense
coverage of the tragedy.
It would be foolhardy to expect therefore that this uniquely powerful and often
successful tactic will not continue to be used by a growing variety of people who feel
abnormally strongly about their own particular convictions and want to gain world-wide
publicity. Acts of terrorism are not going to stop. Terrorism is with us for ever, and must
be dealt with in a routine and undramatic manner. This also applies to the maritime
industry.

Maritime terrorism
Fortunately, although there have been many maritime acts of criminality and piracy and
these are increasing in number and brutality, apart from the sinking of a Greek cruise
liner which blew up in 1973 after hitting a mine placed by the Black September Terrorist
Organisation in Beirut, there have only been three major acts of terrorism at sea-the
Santa Maria in 1962, the Achille Lauro in 1985 and the City of Poras in 1989. We will
look at these three attacks in some detail, but it is interesting to note that none of them
achieved the practical results originally intended by the perpetrators. All three were
militarily incompetent and 'professional' failures. However all three did achieve vast
and continuing world-wide publicity, which is not surprising because the sea provides
the perfect setting for a terrorist drama.
Sailing has always been glamorous and exciting but passengers travelling by sea
often feel vulnerable; after leaving home they feel they have lost a degree of their
sovereignty and are in other people's hands, certainly they feel at the mercy of the
elements. We thus have the ideal ingredients for a terrorist attack; an exciting and
potentially hazardous situation, innocent people in a vulnerable position, and excellent
communications.
For the past decade, with the exception of internecine terrorist operations, e.g. the
IRA in Ireland, the Basques in Spain and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Americans and
American interests have been the most attractive terrorist target. Given the volatile
situation in the Middle East, American travellers will continue to be at risk.

For a terrorist selecting his target, there is
attacking wealthy rather than poor victims, and of
faith are sadly the most vulnerable. A cruise ship or
large numbers of rich American Jews must therefore

a proven psychological benefit in
all peoples, members of the Jewish
ferry which is known to be carrying
be placed in a higher risk category.

But it is important to keep this in perspective. The actual risk is low. There is far
more likelihood of a ship having to use its inert gas system to quench an engine-room
fire, or launch its lifeboats after a collision, than in having to deal with a terrorist
incident. No passenger
should ever decide against travelling by sea on the
unsubstantiated
feeling that a terrorist attack might occur.
The conclusion must be that acts of terrorism are going to continue, and the
maritime industry, like every other transportation industry, will continue to be affected.
The risk of attack is low, but it is now a fact of maritime life that the shipping industry
has to take sensible measures to reassure travellers and crews that proper steps are
being taken to protect them. Just as inert gases and lifeboats are routine and
undramatic features of every ship, so security measures must in the same way become
similar, non-controversial,
totally unexciting, features of every ship's design and
management.

SECURITY AT SEA

11




CHAPTER TWO

MARITIME TERRORIST

A TT ACKS

Although limited in number, the three main maritime terrorist incidents do have many
features in common. An examination of the incident is useful therefore in determining
protective measures.

Attack on the Achille Lauro
On 1st October 1985 Israel commandos carried out a raid on the Headquarters of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Tunisia and killed many Arabs. The PLO
wanted revenge.
During 1985 a member of the Abu Abbas Palestinian Liberation Front using a Greek
passport had taken a voyage on the Achille Lauro in order to examine the security
arrangements on board. He had reported that the ship called at the Israeli tourist resort
of Ashdod, and that from where it docked it would be possible to kill many people as they
lay on the beach sunbathing. He also reported that it should be relatively easy to
smuggle weapons on board.
For a terrorist, it was an attractive plan. Faced with the highly developed defensive
measures instituted by the Israelis, this would be an ideal way of getting into Israel with
weapons. It also provided the other elements necessary for a successful terrorist attack.
It would kill innocent people, the ship would provide excellent communications, and, by
taking American hostages there would be world-wide publicity and a good chance of
negotiating a safe withdrawal. It was decided therefore to implement the plan.
Four men were selected for the operation. One went to the vessel owner's office in

Genoa and purchased four tickets. He went to the office on tw:o occasions. The
receptionist was a little reluctant but the man was insistent, and even though it was a
very late booking the receptionist took the money and allocated a four bed, low grade
cabin.
The terrorists all had false passports. These included Norwegian passports, but
neither the photographs nor the personal details had been altered. They carried folded
machine guns, revolvers and hand granades in their 'expensive looking' hand baggage.
During the voyage they kept very much to themselves and mainly used room service for
their meals.
The cabin staff were suspicious. One Italian chamber maid voiced this suspicion and
remarked-'If you are Norwegian-I am an African.' But no one mentioned this suspicion
to the Hotel Director or Captain.
At about 1330 hours on 7th October, shortly after leaving Alexandria, a steward
entered the cabin unexpectedly believing that the occupants had gone to lunch. To his
horror, instead of an empty cabin he saw four men busily cleaning automatic weapons.
The terrorists
were equally startled, but immediately agreed to implement an
alternative plan and instead of going to Ashdod to kill Israelis, they decided to seize the
ship and exploit the situation as it developed.
The four ran into the restaurant where the majority of the passengers were having
lunch and they started shouting and firing shots in the air. They herded all the
passengers and staff to the rear of the restaurant, then one ran to the bridge and one
to the engine room. The one who entered the engine control room shouted at the
engineers that they had to obey the bridge and then left. No terrorist ever returned to
the engine room. On the bridge they threatened the Captain and navigating officers and
ordered them to change direction. Acting under duress the Captain made an
announcement stating that everyone should-'Go to the restaurant, be calm and no-one
will be shot.'
Six British dancers were sunbathing on the Lido Deck when they heard the shots and
after a quick discussion with an officer they went to a crew cabin and locked themselves

in. When they heard the Captain's announcement they also moved to the restaurant. It
proved a difficult period. The terrorists asked for an interpreter and then demanded that
any Israelis, British or Germans should make themselves known.

SECURITY AT SEA

13



The temperature became very hot and when a girl asked if she could use the toilet
facilities, she was told to take a bowl from the buffet table and squat behind the counter.
Men were told to urinate on the carpet.
The terrorists constantly moved about and changed positions, so that for the whole
period neither the crew nor the passengers were ever quite sure how many were on
board. To maintain the pressure the terrorists claimed to have placed explosive charges
throughout the ship and forced the crew to bring plastic containers of fuel which they
placed around the passengers. The thirteen Americans and the six British dancers were
then separated and moved outside under the bridge wing. More fuel containers were
placed near them.
Some of the younger deck officers suggested to the Captain that they should get the
skeet guns, used for clay pigeon shooting, and launch an attack to rescue the ship. The
Captain refused and the weapons were handed over to the terrorists.
During the afternoon Mr Klinghoffer, who was an elderly crippled Jewish passenger,
was taken outside and shot. Two crew members were forced to throw his body and his
wheel chair over the side.
The passengers were not told of the death, but the terrorists informed the Captain
of the killing and said that another American passenger, Mrs Hodes, would be the next
to be shot. The Captain offered himself in place of Mrs Hodes, suggesting that his death
would have greater international impact, but the offer was refused.

Forty eight hours later, during which period four men had been able to capture a
large cruise ship, dominate 400 people, murder an American citizen and seize the
attention of the whole world, the ship arrived off Port Said. The terrorist 'Commander'
Abu Abbas, then negotiated an agreement and the four terrorists left the ship as free
men. They would have remained free if it had not been for the audacity and skill of the
US Armed Forces, who successfully identified and intercepted the Egyptian aircraft
carrying the terrorists and their supporters, and forced it to land in Sardinia where
Special Forces captured all involved.
From the terrorists' point of view, it had been a well executed operation which had
achieved wide publicity for their Cause. Their failure was in believing that the United
States Government would never blatantly break International Law and force down the
aeroplane of another country in international airspace. They did not believe President
Reagan's statement-'You
can run. But you can't hide.'

Attack on the

55

Santa Maria

On the 22nd January 1962 when the dead body of the Third Officer and a wounded
crewman were placed ashore in St Lucia from the Portuguese flagged ship ss Santa
Maria, Portugal called on the world for help in capturing the perpetrators of this act of
'piracy. '
As it was known that 42 American citizens were on board, American and British
ships which had been training in Puerto Rican waters were rapidly diverted for a rescue
operation. It seemed a straightforward case of murder. But when the Santa Maria was
contacted, to everyone's surprise the 'pirate,' Captain Henrique Galvao, claimed that he
and his group of 71 Portuguese and Spaniards were not committing a criminal act, but

were taking part in a political action aimed at the overthrow of the 'Portuguese
Dictatorship of Antonio Salazar.' The attitude of the American and British Govemments
suddenly then changed, and, instead of using armed force, to the frustration and anger
of the Portuguese Government, negotiations were begun and the ship was not seized but
merely followed, eventually arriving at Recife in Brazil. The British naval vessels were
then ordered away.
The incident now became international
head-line news and there were many
attempts to get the 'scoop' story. Two enterprising reporters even attempted an
unsuccessful sky-dive to get aboard.
As is usual in a terrorist incident, confusion emerged as various countries tried to
influence the outcome. In the end however, with the tacit agreement of the American
Government, the Brazilians offered asylum to Captain Galvao and his crew, and the
passengers were safely disembarked.
SECURITY AT SEA

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The pattern of events is very similar to the Achille Lauro. A ship was taken over by
force, murder was committed, passengers were intimidated, political demands had been
made and then the perpetrators of the crime negotiated their release. No prosecutions
followed the killing of the Third Officer.

Attack on the MV City of Poros
Throughout 1989 America had been exerting great pressure on the Greek Government
to extradite a Palestinian alleged to have been involved in the bombing of a TWA
aircraft. In March 1989 the US warship USS Vincennes had misidentified a civilian
aircraft, Iran Air Flight 655, and had shot it down with the total loss of all on board. Two

weeks later a German-born Palestinian had been sentenced in Athens for driving a car
loaded with weapons and explosives on board a ferry sailing to Israel.
Early in July, the American Defence Attache in Greece, Captain Nordeen, was
murdered, and three hours before the MV City of Poras, a Greek ferry, was due to land
at Paleon Faliron, a car suddenly blew up near the port. Inside were found the
dismembered bodies of an Arab man and an Arab woman and evidence of a large amount
of explosive and terrorist related documents.
On the City of Poros, 540 passengers had been enjoying the end of a delightful day's
sailing. Suddenly, without warning, a group of Arabs leapt to their feet and began
killing. The killing was quite indiscriminate. Men, women, children, officers and crew
were shot with automatic weapons or blasted by hand grenades. Within minutes, nine
people were dead and forty six were wounded. On the ship the explosions started a fierce
fire and terrified passengers, including English schoolgirls from Worthing Convent
School, leapt over the side into the water. Escaping in the confusion were the two or
three men and women who had done the killing.
Again there are similarities with the Achille Lauro attack. A passenger ship was
taken over by a group of Arab terrorists, innocent people had been murdered, a political
statement had been made concerning the extradition of the Palestinian in gaol, and then
the perpetrators
had escaped to their freedom. Unlike the Achille Lauro incident
however, this time, sadly, there was no opportunity to put the terrorists in prison.



CHAPTER THREE

FACTORS IN DECIDING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL
OF PROTECTION
Having accepted that there is a terrorist threat to the maritime industry and that it is
sensible to take preventative measures to reduce the effect of an attack, before they can

decide on the most appropriate measures to counter the threat, the ship operator and
master now have to consider a number of factors.

The moral responsibility
First there is the moral responsibility of management to provide adequate protection for
their passengers and crew. This is a clear requirement, and is no different from the
traditional responsibility of all ship operators and masters to provide the correct safety
measures in case of fire, collision or bad weather. In this case the ship operator and
master need to know what is the likelihood of a terrorist attack, what is the probable
nature of the attack, and how best to provide practical protection within a commercial
budget.
The problem is that, whereas there are a multitude of SaLAS (Safety of Life at Sea)
regulations and laws of the sea concerning safety, there are no SaLAS or international
laws of the sea dealing with security. All ship operators and masters well understand
that, in order to fulfil their safety obligations, they have to meet clearly defined and well
known safety standards and this they do to an internationally recognised standard. But
when trying to fulfil their security obligations, in the absence of clearly defined and
internationally
agreed SaLAS or laws of the sea, there has been a great deal of
divergence and many different standards.

Passenger and crew perception
The second factor affecting the level of protection to be installed, and one which is
steadily increasing in importance, is the perception of passengers and crew as to what
consitutes credible and good protection; and it is an intriguing but extremely important
fact that this perception can often be very different from the reality of the actual threat.
Travellers have become used to high levels of security when they travel by air and are
now increasingly expecting similar standards of protection when they travel by sea.
It took a little time for the passenger industry to recognise the importance of this
'passenger perception'. Initially, marketing managers were reluctant to see overt

security measures installed as they felt this would increase apprehension about going
on holiday. It is now accepted that this is not the case. On the contrary, people will be
deterred by poor security and are not upset by well managed and competent security.
Passengers now notice which shipping lines have good security, and which lines do not.
Travel magazines are also highlighting the standard of security protection on different
ships as a guide to potential passengers on the selection of their holiday. Security, or
perhaps more significantly, the bad application of security, has become a marketing
factor. Good security comforts passengers, bad security upsets passengers.
In deciding therefore what level of security protection to apply, ship operators
cannot base their decisions solely on the likelihood of an actual attack, which is
probably very remote, but on this unjustified perception of passengers and crew that
such an attack may occur while they are on board.
This difference between the actual danger and the perception of danger, also affects
the types of security equipment that must be acquired. It is impossible to create a viable
security protection system without using a certain amount of equipment. Given the
volume of passengers embarking and disembarking and the very short times of turnround, without specialised equipment there is no way that credible checks can be made
for illegal weapons or explosive.

Governmental involvement
A new factor affecting the required level of maritime security results from the
growing tendency throughout the world, and particularly in the United States and
SECURITY AT SEA

19


United Kingdom, to pass maritime security legislation, and then to create special units
to check to see that their legislation is being implemented. For the ship operator and
master, there is thus emerging yet another set of regulations to join the mass of paper
concerning safety, pollution, garbage and hygiene etc, where failure to meet required

public standards can mean delays, costs and bad publicity.
All the evidence is that this involvement by Government in maritime security is
going to continue. Following such incidents as the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, senior politicians were severely censured and criticised for not having taken
sufficient steps to detect and deter terrorist activity. Now, there is ample evidence of a
clear determination in Governments to ensure that in future they have provisions on
their Statute Book which clearly specify required security standards, establish a
capability to ensure the standards are being met and gives them the legislative authority
to punish those who do not comply.

Insurance and compensation
A final factor to be considered when deciding the appropriate level of protection is that
of insurance and compensation. This was highlighted in a most interesting manner
following the attack on the Achille Lauro. The vessel and her owners were insured
against marine risks and P & I risks (including war risk) with Italian insurance
companies. There was a limit of US$240,000 per passenger and an aggregate limit on
the vessels of approximately US$10,000,000.
The underwriters were expecting massive claims, considering that more than 100
passengers had been held hostage and another 600 had been through a very unpleasant
and uncomfortable experience. In fact whereas all 72 US passengers filed claims
totalling 1.6 million dollars against everybody concerned-the tour operators, the Lauro
Company, Chandris Celebrity Cruises, the Port of Genoa etc, non~ of the non-US
passengers filed any claims for 'pain and sufferings' claiming only for loss of property
and various expenses. The non-US passengers claims were settled for approximately
US$100,000 plus US$100,000 for valuables allegedly stolen from the ship's safe. *
The claims were debated in American Courts for several years and a major issue was
whether the Lauro Company had taken 'reasonable steps' to prevent the hijacking from
taking place. A typical quotation from one of the hostages was:"There was no protection or security at Genoa, either at the dockside or on the ship,
nor at any of the subsequent ports of call. Neither persons boarding the vessel, nor
their belongings nor their luggage were subjected to any examination,

search
detection or any security device."

The owners were specifically accused of:"Failing to provide adequate protection for passengers and failing to conduct a
reasonable search or inspection of passports, luggage and belongings of people
coming aboard. Failing to conduct an investigation into the suspicious appearance
and activities of the passengers and otherwise failing to take any reasonable steps to
protect the passengers against harm and the dangers and risks of a terrorist attack,
all of which was well known to the transportation
industry, particularly
in the
Mediterranean area".

In response to these allegations the Lauro Company pleaded that they had taken
incidents against
passenger ships, their protective measures had been sensible, reasonable, and were up
to the standard to match the threat that existed at the time.
'reasonable measures'. That, as there had been no previous terrorist

This was a legitimate defence in 1985 when there were no internationally agreed
standards for maritime security and this line of defence had a significant influence on
the amount of the final financial settlement. The fundamental difference today is that
this defence will never be acceptable again. Now,. we have the publication of the
International Maritime Organization's Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea.
Everything has changed.
20

THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE



Ferry security
From the very first meetings held in the upstairs room of the IMO in London, it was
strongly pointed out that there were significant differences between the security
problem of a cruise ship and a ferry. The original stipulation was that the IMO
Guidelines should only apply to voyages over 24 hours. This was because the Norwegian
and Italian representatives pointed out that in their countries 'ferries were used like
buses' and a different standard of security was necessary.
The doubts expressed by the IMO Committee are valid. Ferry turn-round time is
extremely tight and, unlike other passenger ships the variety of both passengers and
freight is considerable. Passengers arrive on foot, by bicycle, in cars, in caravans and
in coaches. Freight is carried by hand, by van, in containers and in refrigerated lorries,
often under TIR rules, thus posing great problems of search.
Having expressed all the difficulties however, it does not mean that nothing can be
done. If basic principles are applied, security can be raised significantly, and again this
requires a degree of knowledge and determination. The IMO Guidelines provide the
knowledge, and the recent legislation, particularly the UK Aviation and Maritime
Security Act, provides both the knowledge and the legal incentive to stimulate the
necessary determination.
In simple terms, there has to be a restricted area around the ferry to prevent
unauthorised access. To get into the restricted areas there have to be a number of
openings. These openings must be guarded and to distinguish who has the right of
access there has to be a workable pass system.
The matter of searching must be treated with common sense. If it becomes
necessary, every person, every vehicle and many units of freight can be searched. But
this is an almost unimaginable scenario, complicated still further by the implications of
the TIR protocols.
A great fear often expressed is the one which concerns the danger of a car-bomb. It
is possible, however, to implement simple and effective measures to. ensure that those
who bring a vehicle on to a ferry, cannot get off, have to travel with that vehicle and have
to disembark with it. This can provide a considerable degree of deterrence; few terrorists

plan to go up, or in this case down with their own bomb.
The fact is clear, that to plead ferry security is too difficult, is now unacceptable. The
travelling public and their governments now demand that responsible security
procedures are in place. Again, it is interesting that pressure to improve ferry security
is being matched by pressure to improve ferry safety. It is sensible therefore to combine
the two requirements; for example, for safety reasons it is becoming necessary to make
sure that the ferry company knows the names of all passengers on board, and this needs
a checking system which also satisfies the security requirement.
There are, too, sensitive areas in a ferry which should be made inaccessible to the
travelling public, and notices forbidding access will probably not be sufficient in the
future. Safety considerations require, however, that these areas, including bridge and
radio room, machinery spaces and car decks are capable of evacuation in emergency.
Before money is spent therefore, both safety and security requirements should be
considered together.

Conclusion
On the assumption that acts of terrorism are going to continue, ship operators and
masters now have to look at security requirements as a routine part of running ships.
Whether it is because of a real danger, a perceived danger, because of governmental
legislation, or insurance risk, security procedures covering the protection of passengers
and crews have to become an integral part of passenger ship operations.
Two or three years ago, failure to implement adequate security was an act of
irresponsibility. Now, failure to implement adequate security is a failure of standard
ship management. Fortunately the IMO Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea have
been agreed to help ship managers and masters decide what is an appropriate level of
protection.
[*Note: Given the emphasis the terrorists continually placed on the political, rather
than the criminal nature of their actions, one wonders if the theft from the ship's safe
left a European rather than an Arab richer after the event.]
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21


CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION'S
GUIDELINES TO PREVENT ILLEGAL ACTS AT SEA
AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
The work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)in the area of preventing
unlawful acts at sea goes back to 1979, when the growing problem of maritime fraud
was considered by the Assembly and they adopted a resolution relating to 'Barratry and
the unlawful seizure of ships and their cargoes'.
In 1983, the precedent was continued when the Assembly adopted another
resolution dealing with 'Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships'. This was initiated by Sweden and referred to cases where ships awaiting berth
many miles offshore had been attacked by pirates who were well equipped with
motorboats and launches. Sweden pointed out that a distance of 20 miles from the coast
no longer gave any protection. The Assembly called upon all Governments, port
authorities, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to take steps to review
and, as necessary, strengthen port and on-board security. They took their involvement
one stage further by agreeing that the IMO should act as a focal point to record acts of
piracy, so that ship managers and masters could be informed of danger areas and
pattems of attack.
All member countries felt there was an advantage in having an international forum
for debate and agreement concerning security at sea, and the IMO naturally, and
successfully, filled this vacuum.
When therefore the Achille Lauro was attacked in October 1985 and the United
Nations in New York expressed their outrage and concern, it was a natural step for them
to ask the IMO to consider the matter. The request was simple, 'To study the problems

of terrorism aboard or against ships, with a view to making rec.ommendations on
appropriate measures'.
On receipt of this request the IMOacted with speed and expertise. The Secretariat of
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)prepared a paper drafted by the US Coast Guard
and submitted it to a specially selected sub-committee for their consideration. Seven
men then sat together in an upstairs room in the IMO in London and hammered out a
draft resolution which has become one of the most significant resolutions ever produced
by the IMO.
The Sub-Committee was chaired by a Norwegian, and he was supported by a Greek,
an Italian, a Canadian and a Dutchman. The United States representatives took a very
low posture as it was his country's paper being considered and, as Perestroika and
Glastnost were just emerging, the Russian representative was positive and strong in his
approval.
The document they passed to the Maritime Safety Committee was titled 'Measures

to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their
passengers and crews'. To everyone's surprise the Resolution was immediately
approved, unanimously, by the 136 member countries. It was a major achievement for
the Sub-committee and the Secretariat.
The MSC though pleased to vote for the proposal were very careful to pre-fix the
resolution with the word 'Guidelines', which meant that although their Governments
were happy to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate in working against terrorists,
there was no legal requirement for them to provide money. The task of implementing the
'Guidelines' was to be left to port authorities and shipowners.
It all happened very quickly, but it was indeed momentous. Since the moment that
the resolution was adopted, it has meant that there is, in existence, an internationally
recognised and approved formula which fully, and clearly, sets out what ports and ships
have to do in order to provide proper protection against terrorists' acts. Since the 26th
September 1986 there has been a document, MSC 53/24, Annex 14 (See Annex One),
which can be used by politicians, lawyers, newsmen and the general public to judge

whether the port or ship has indeed been taking 'reasonable measures' to protect their
passenger and crews.
Following the sinking of the Titanic, international cooperation resulted in the
production of agreed safety standards. Following the attack on the Achille Lauro
international cooperation resulted in the production of agreed security standards. It is
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truly said-'What

the Titanic didfor

Safety, the Achille Lauro has donefor

Security.'

Leglislation
Although the IMO 'Guidelines' are extremely influential, they are only 'Guidelines'.
Certain countries have decided to strengthen them by adding the force of law.

The United States 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act
(See Annex Two)
Throughout the 1980s there was growing concern in the United States that protection
provided for sea travellers had fallen behind the protection provided for air travellers
and there had been a series of hearings before Mr Mario Biaggi's Subcommittee of the
House of Representatives. In October 1985 they published their report. This emphasised
that although many cruise ship companies were taking security measures on a
voluntary basis, some were not, and that as the Coast Guard did not have the necessary

statutory or regulatory authority to require preventative measures to be carried out,
there was a need for legislation. The 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act and the
Aviation Security Improvement Act 1990 were the result.
The 1986 Act stated established the desired objectives:
1. Seaport screening of cargo and baggage similar to that done at airports.
2. Security measures to restrict access to cargo, vessels and dockside property to
authorised personnel only.
3. Additional security on board vessels.
4. Licensing or certification of compliance with appropriate security standards.
5. Other appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews
on board vessels.
The 1986 Act also gave the President power to suspend the right of any passenger
vessel to operate to and from the United States if that ship came from a nation which
used its territory as a base for terrorist operations, or as a sanctuary for terrorists, or
which knowingly used the illegal seizure of passenger vessels as an instrument of policy.
Finally the Act gave great impetus to the production of more relevant and
comprehensive Travel Advisories.

Travel advisories
Given the fact that so many cruise passengers are Americans, the emergence of a much
more comprehensive US Travel Advisory service is a very significant development for
ship managers.
The US State Department Travel Advisory is designed to inform Americans
travelling abroad of conditions which may affect them adversely. In officiallanguage:"They are not generated by isolated international terrorist attacks, but describe a
potential for violence and physical danger reflecting a trend or pattern over a period
of time, during which the US State Department consider the local Government is
unwilling or unable to afford normal protection".

Thus, in February 1991, during the Gulf War, in anticipation of possible terrorist
attacks, the US State Department published a Travel Advisory stating that 23 countries

were now on their Proscribed List. The countries, which included India and Thailand,
were thousands of miles away from the actual combat zone, and are traditional holiday
areas, where tourists are welcomed and protected. No actual incidents of anti-American
violence has occurred, but within days, nine major cruise lines had abandoned Far
Eastern cruises, sailors were asking for 'danger money' and insurance premiums were
being reviewed upwards.
Other Governments also issue Travel Advisories and, when they do, they are
fulfilling a legitimate function. Citizens expect their Governments to keep the world
situation under review, and publish warnings to prevent them from wandering
innocently into troubled areas. It would be wrong if Government Departments took
commercial factors into account when deciding which countries to include on the
Proscribed List, but they do cause great resentment in the country concerned. Local
agents, local tourist representatives and almost certainly the local Government, will
react vigorously and will claim that it is grossly unfair and bears no relation to the
actual situation. They will legitimately point to safe anchorage, calm seas, sunshine,
SECURITYAT SEA

23


warmth of hospitality and lack of any significant violence.
For a ship manager and master, the dilemma is whether to ignore the Travel
Advisory and continue with the scheduled itinerary, or try to find a suitable and if
possible equally attractive alternative port. The decision is not easy because, if the
Travel Advisory is ignored and ships do travel to proscribed ports, and an incident then
occurs, it will increase the possibility of substantial compensation claims.
A Travel Advisory is however only a piece of advice, it always has to be borne in mind
that the raison d'etre of a ship is to carry passengers or cargo. If, therefore, there is still
a demand to sail and it is good business to do so, the existence of a competent security
system does give the ship manager and master greater flexibility of choice in that they

can take the risk and sail, knowing they have installed a capability for protection.
Expense on security should not therefore be regarded solely as a negative financial
liability. Applied with imagination security protection can attract more passengers and
cargo, and enable itineraries to be fulfilled in spite of the fear of possible violence, or
even travel advisories.

The Aviation and Security Improvements Act-1991
On 16th November 1990, President Bush signed into law the Aviation Security
Improvement Act which created the position of Director of Intelligence and Security
within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation.
The task of the new Office is to advise the Secretary of Transportation on domestic
and international intelligence and security matters as they apply to transportation, and
to develop programmes affecting the security of the travelling public.
The Office is intended to ensure the highest standards of security, not only on
aircraft, but also on ships including foreign flag passenger vessels which carry US
citizens, and ships which dock in United States ports.
The first Director is Admiral Clyde E. Robbins. He was appointed one day after
finishing 36 years with the US Coast Guard and soon gathered a team of eleven, all with
experience in transportation security.
It is the publicly stated intention both of the Department of Transportation and the
US Coast Guard eventually to make the IMOGuidelines mandatory. Members of the new
Office are therefore currently assessing the standards of security both in ports and on
cruise ships, in order to decide when it should be done. The members of the Office of
Intelligence and Security are well aware of the difficulties of cruise ship security and are
punctilious about carrying proper Governmental credentials and requesting the
permission of the Master to board. At this initial stage their visits are not intended to
be punitive, but it is clearly not advisable for them to gain the impression that security
on the ship is poor, and inevitably as time goes on their aim of raising security standards
is going to affect the industry.


US Coast Guard
Members of the US Coast Guard, not part of the Office of Intelligence and Security, also
have a mandate to ensure that passenger ships meet a satisfactory standard of security
before they enter a US port. To avoid problems when an inspecting officer comes on
board, it is essential therefore that the ship has a well constructed Ship Security Plan
which demonstrates
awareness and compliance with the IMO Guidelines and US
legislation. Failure to have a proper Ship Security Plan can cause problems and delays.
It is safe to predict that in the forseeable future, security inspections by CG officers will
be as routine as safety inspections.

The United Kingdom Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990
In 1988 the UK Government became more concerned that 'car and passenger ferries will
present attractive and vulnerable targets' and began a series of discussions with the
shipping industry to try and achieve a set of voluntary standards which the industry
could successfully implement. The Government's aim was 'To educate the Industry into
accepting that protective security issues were going to be a permanent feature in its
thinking' .
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After the tragic bombing of Pan-Am 103 occurred, the Government decided to
increase its powers and formulate an Aviation Security Act. It seemed a logical step
therefore, as far as the Department of Transport were concerned, to expand the scope
of the Bill and incorporate the maritime sector. The result was the Aviation and
Maritime Security Act 1990.
The legislation essentially provides the Secretary of State with power to set
requirements and standards. Its important aspects are:• There must be a person appointed to be responsible for all security matters.

• Port Security Committees must be formed.
• Comprehensive contingency plans must be written and staff trained and tested in
the plans.
• Restricted zones must be designated.
• Pass systems must be established.
• Physical protection measures must be in place.
• There must be strict control of access and exits and a searching capability must
be available.
'A team of Maritime Security Inspectors have been established to inspect ships and
ports, and to serve enforcement notices where the standards are not being met.'
Offenders may be prosecuted, andfined
or imprisoned.
The Act takes precedence over all contracts and over almost

all other legislation.

The requirements can be applied to any UK port and to any ship. The burden falls
on the operators of ships and ports to take the measures required and to bear the costs.
The Bill also sets out the responsibilities of ship operators and masters using the IMO
Guidelines as a model.
These standards are now legal requirements which apply to all UK ports and all
passenger ships that enter these ports. The Inspectors began their surveys in 1991 and
have submitted initial reports. At the moment there is heavy emphasis on getting the
industry to understand the new legislation and begin work on improvements. But it is
quite clear that as the months pass, the 'steel hand in the velvet glove' will become more
evident, and failure to comply could result in legal action. The first Chief Inspector
Transport Security, MrH Ditmas, has been appointed and has issued a set of 'Directions'
to explain the requirements. (See Annex Three.)

The United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 and

The Sea Carrier Initiative Programme
Although not an anti-terrorist piece of legislation, the Anti Drug Abuse Act and Sea
Carrier Initiative Programme are very relevant as they also bring new responsibilities
to the ship manager and master to improve security procedures.
The United States Government has made it overwhelmingly clear that they are
determined to prevent illegal drugs being smuggled into America. In 1986 they passed
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act which greatly increased penalties against ship owners found
to have transported drugs. Currently the fine is US$1000 per ounce for heroin and
cocaine, and US$500 per ounce for marijuana and derivatives. It was a 20% increase
over previous penalties. The Act became famous for its declaration of 'zero tolerance'
which meant quite simply-'We want NOillegal drugs imported into our country'.
Given the huge quantities of drugs being smuggled, there were quickly cases
whereby shipowners found themselves fined several million dollars and had their ships
impounded.
The effects of these draconian fines were considerable, and in an imaginative move
by the US Customs Service they launched the Sea Carrier Initiative Programme
whereby, if the shipowners signed an agreement with the US Customs and agreed to
enhance security both at the terminals and on board their ships then, should illegal
drugs be found on board-'The degree of compliance with the terms of the Agreement
will be considered as a mitigating factor in the seizure or penalty decision'. The measure
makes a great deal of sense and has been actively supported by the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO).By June 1991, 400 members of BIMCOhad
joined the scheme and there were a total of over 1800 individual agreements.
This Carrier Initiative Programme suits the overwhelming majority of sea carriers,
but for a small number of carriers which operate regularly between drug source or
SECURITYAT SEA 25


transit countries and which have experienced continuing difficulties with illegal drugs
in spite of their full participation in the standard programme, the US Customs have

developed revised agreements for ships operating in 'medium and high risk' drug areas.
One of these is the 'Super Carrier Initiative' Programme. This Programme is for:'Companies who are already in the standard Carrier Initiative Programme and
have fully implemented the terms of their agreements to the extent feasible; have
received several penalties for transporting illegal drugs, or feel that it is necessary to
take extraordinary,
and expensive, measures to attempt to preventfuture
violations'.

The benefit of the Super Carrier Initiative Programme is that companies who
undertake this further commitment, are given practical support to help reduce the risk.

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