The Relevance of International Law: A Hegelian Interpretation of a Peculiar SeventeenthCentury Preoccupation
Author(s): Erik Ringmar
Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 87-103
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review

of International

The

Studies

(1995),

21, 87-103

Printed

in Great

Britain

law: a
of international
of a peculiar
interpretation

relevance

Hegelian

seventeenth-century
ERIK

preoccupation*

RINGMAR

scholars of international
tell us, is a useless
International
law, traditional
politics

or they do so only when it
fiction. Statesmen either do not follow legal stipulations
law plays no independent
role in world
is in their interest to do it. International
can
more
to
the
of
since
it
be
reduced
fundamental
considerations
always
politics
not
to
do
bow
National
interests
power politics.
legal requirements.
simply
to be
Although many scholars take this relationship between law and self-interest
a

an axiom valid regardless
times and different
of different
cultural
settings,
analysis will inevitably unearth a number of problems with the thesis.
statesmen often
for example,
the
sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries,
During
at
issues
seriousness
and
discussed
often
with
great
great length. One example
legal
II Adolf
the
Swedish
and the
of such statesmen
is provided
Gustav
by

King
of
In
which
the
Swedish
Council
the
Realm.
the
discussions
of
members
preceded
in the Thirty Years War
in 1630 the Swedish
leaders would
Sweden's
intervention
return to legal arguments
again and again. But how, then, should we explain this
historical

with matters
of international
law? Historians
peculiar early modern
preoccupation
in reply to this question. The Swedes
have given two radically different answers

to international
law, it has been argued, either because they had a
paid attention
or because they needed a moralistic
of morality,
genuine interest in the stipulations
guise behind which they could conceal their policy of imperialism.
In this article I will present an alternative
which differs from both
explanation
status and the relevance
these traditional ones, and which defends the independent
like 'realism' and
law. As I will argue, twentieth-century
of international
concepts
discussions
and they obscure the real
'idealism' fit badly with these early modern
era was a time of state
issues at stake. The reason
is that the early modern
at such times legal
creation?a
time when state identities were being formed?and
are likely to play a different role than at times when state identities
considerations
can be taken for granted. Although
not bow to legal
national

interests may
are crucial when
it comes to creating and sus
requirements,
legal requirements
two features of the law which
are, to wit,
taining a national
identity. There
to this end: the law gives substantive content to the actions that political
contribute
a standard by which political
but in addition,
it also provides
entities perform,
entities may be recognized as entities of a certain kind.
To

*

talk about

law, recognition,

and

identity

formation


in the same breath

to Jens Bartelson,
Steven
I am grateful
Fredrika
Lagergren,
J?rgen Hermansson,
for their comments
and criticisms.
Alexander
and Hans Christian Wind
Wendt,

87

Saxonberg,

is of


88

Erik Ringmar

course

a very Hegelian
In fact, and as I will argue, G. W. F.
vocabulary.

of international
law can help us to throw new analytical
Hegel's
interpretation
light
not only on the legal discussions which took place in the early modern
era, but also
on the ways in which international
law may be rel?vent in our contemporary
world.
to invoke

The Swedish

Council

debates

26 June 1630, Swedish
of King Gustav
II Adolf
troops under the command
on the northern coast of Germany.1 This was the beginning of a
in Usedom
in several respects was nothing
short of extraordinary.
A
military
campaign which
on

to
northern
had
decided
take
poor, sparsely populated,
country
Europe's
fringe
the mightiest
up arms against the Habsburg
emperor of the Holy Roman Empire,
ruler on the Continent.2
The
to the
war?the
Years
War'
subsequent
'Thirty
On

landed

to bring both successes and failures to the Swedes. After
historians?was,
however,
on 7 September
the Swedish victory at the battle of Breitenfeld
1631, Gustav Adolf

was greeted as the saviour of the Protestant
as
new head of the
and
the
religion
a
was
German
he
found dead on
corpus evangelicorum. Only
year later, however,
a
to maintain
of L?tzen,
the battlefield
Sweden
And
continued
Saxony.
although
in Germany
presence
to rely on subsidies

after the death of the king, Swedish troops increasingly had
from Cardinal Richelieu's
in France. Despite
this

government
was
was
somewhat mixed
when
concluded
in
Sweden
record,
peace
1648,
finally
as a fully fledged imperial power and as a major player in
nevertheless
recognized
European
politics.
Even though the Swedish
intervention may have been a spectacular enterprise,
it
no
means
a
or
an
rash
action.
Before
was, however, by
unpremeditated

they finally
the Swedish
made
leaders had discussed
the question
of the
up their minds,
'German war' for a number of years and in a number of diff?rent fora. Already
in
the early 1620s, Gustav Adolf had warned his countrymen
of the impending danger
forces which were advancing
towards the Baltic sea coast.
posed by the Catholic
on the
from the beginning
of 1628 he held repeated and lengthy consultations
with
the
estates
members
of
the
Council
of
the
with
the
of
the

Realm,
Diet,
topic
as well as with his personal
of this material
advisers. Much
still remains in the
archives and it provides us with a very good view of the deliberations
undertaken

And

by the Swedish decision makers.3
A particularly
striking feature
1

of the debates

held

in the King's

Council

recent writers who have refrained
I will follow
from latinizing
the king's name,
to 'Gustavus Adolphus'.

For a full explanation
'Gustav Adolf
of the Swedish
prefer
see Erik Ringmar,
Words
A Narratological
that Govern Men:
intervention,
Explanation
of the
Intervention
into the Thirty Years War (under review).
Swedish
2
see Michael
For an overview
in Germany
'The Political
of the Swedish
Roberts,
campaign
In this article

is the

i.e. I

will


in Germany,
in Swedish History
of Gustav
Adolf
in his Essays
1630-2',
1967).
Objectives
(London,
As well as the classic study by C. V. Wedgwood,
[1938], The Thirty Years War (London,
1963),
pp. 269-332.
3
om svenska krigens och krigsinr?ttningarnes
In print as: Arkiv
till upplysning
historia
1A (Stockholm,
vol. 1, edited by N. A. Kullberg
Protokoll,
1854); Svenska Riksr?dets
(Stockholm,
1878); Konung
tal och skrifter, edited by C. Hallendorff
translation
Gustaf II Adolfs
(Stockholm,
1901). An English
can be found

of some of the relevant material
in Michael
Roberts
(ed.), Sweden as a Great Power,
1611-1697:

Government,

Society,

Foreign

Policy.

(London,

1967).


The relevance of international

law

89

law. This body of law was of
of international
given to matters
repeated attention
a

new
course relatively
at the time and
field of scholarship which attracted much
in 1539 a number of thinkers and
de Vitoria
attention. Beginning with Francisco
on
how relations between states were to
had expanded at great lengths
philosophers
a
was
be regulated, and
put on the question of how to regulate
particular emphasis
to be
conditions
under which wars were
stipulated
legal scholars
as just and unjust; put forth the circumstances
under which
inter
considered
and prohibited;
and discussed how neutrals should relate
ventions were permitted
on these issues was
to warring

influential
pronouncement
parties. The most
in his treaties De iure belli ac pads, The Law of War
provided by Hugo Grotius

war.

The

in 1625.4
and Peace, published
the protocols
of the Council meetings
the Swedish
As
clearly demonstrate,
to these stipulations.
leaders attached
The Swedes were very
great importance
as the king put it, make
concerned
that the action they contemplated
them
would,
but also to justify it
able to 'not merely fight it [the war] with a clear conscience,
before the whole world'.5 Do we really have sufficient reasons for our war to be
called just?, they asked themselves. Do we have the right to support the Protestant

in Germany
emperor, their lawful ruler? Should
principalities
against the Habsburg
or should we go to
to Vienna,
we, as the law stipulates, dispatch a peace mission
war without
from
At
the autumn of
after
any prior negotiations?
meeting
meeting
as
as
contra each
well
1628 until the time of the intervention
itself, arguments pro
were
adduced
and
considered
and
position
carefully
weighed
against each other.

Often

these debates
references
both
easy
The extent of this
all appearances was

were

held
to ancient

in Latin rather than
and to contemporary

in Swedish

in order

to allow

legal authorities.6
to
is
also
attested
by the fact that the king by
preoccupation

an avid reader of legal treaties. According
to reports, he spent
on the subject, and
some time each day studying ancient and rriodern authorities
'the work of Grotius,
and in particular his tractatus lure belli ac pads'.
especially
was said to rest his head on the
The king always carried his Grotius with him?he
book at night, to keep it in his saddle bag during the day, and a copy of the work
was

found in the royal tent after his death.7
to matters
this attention
To later generations
of historians
of international
law
has of course been somewhat perplexing. We are not used to legal arguments being
on the mind
not foremost
in a politician's
mind
and especially
of a
foremost

4


in excerpts as Hugo Grotius
Published
in M. G. Forsyth,
[1625], 'On the Law of War and Peace',
H. M. A. Keens-Soper
and P. Savigear
Texts
Relations:
Selected
(eds.), The Theory of International
to Treitschke.
law background
of Grotius'
(London,
1970), pp. 37-85. The natural
from Gentili
in Richard
is discussed
Their Origin and Development
Tuck, Natural
thought
Rights Theories:

1979), pp. 58-81.
(Cambridge,
as
to the Council,
'One of the days December
Gustav
Adolfs

address
9-12,
1628,' published
om
to Nils Ahnlund,
i
Historisk
riksr?det
1628-1630,'
tyska
appendix
kriget
'?fverl?ggningarna
p. 114.
tidskrift, 34(1914),
6
i den tidigare stormaktstidens
sv?rmeri
Lars Gustafsson,
Virtus Pol?tica: Politisk
etik och nationeilt
litteratur
1956), pp. 105-6.
(Uppsala,
7
in the Study of
Virtus Pol?tica p. 85; Hedley
'The Importance
of Grotius
Gustafsson,

Bull,
in Hedley
International
and Adam Roberts
Bull, Benedict Kingsbury
Relations',
(eds.), Hugo
Grotius and International
Relations.
the Swedish
leaders
1990), p. 75. The relations between
(Oxford,
in fact even closer after the death of the king. Between
and the Dutch
1634 and
scholar became
was Swedish
see C. G. Roelofsen,
to the French
court. For a discussion,
1644 Grotius
ambassador
5

'Grotius

and

the International


Politics

of

the Seventeenth

Century,'

in Hugo

Grotius,

pp.

127-30.


Erik Ringmar

90

for a foreign war. Why,
leaders
then, did the Swedish
politician who is preparing
a
on
such
lot

of
time
these
There
issues?
are, we could say, two different
spend
of this fact.8 To nationalistic
Swedish
who have seen
historians,
explanations
as
a
defender of his country and of his Protestant
Gustav Adolf
faith, the attention
law demonstrated
the king's great concern for the stipulations
paid to international
of morality.
The Swedes were not only good Evangelical
it is pointed
Christians,
of the law.9 Other historians?often
of a radical
out, but also staunch defenders
bent or of a Catholic
however, been far less impressed. To this
background?have,

were nothing
latter group of scholars
these legal arguments
but the rhetorical
moves
to conceal the
of cynical Machiavellians.10
The pretty words were designed
at home. The
abroad
and political
imperialism
repression
reality of military
intervention
of 1630 was propelled
and social causes, and moral
by economic
imperialism an idealistic face.
we decide
two groups
to trust,
of historians
Regardless
a puzzle
nor the cynical
still remains. What
neither
the sympathetic
however,

can explain
is why matters
of international
law occupied
such a
interpretation
in
the
Swedish
discussions.
did
reappear
prominent
place
Why
legal arguments
in one Council meeting
after another during the course of more than one
repeatedly
considerations

only served to give
of these
of which

and a half years? And why were they a central topic, not of public declarations
but of top-secret discussions
held between
delivered on solemn occasions,
the king

and his closest advisers?
a political
a
What
would
scientist
this question? How would
say regarding
scholar
readily
cussions

assess the Swedish Council
debates? The most
politics
us. The dis
to these questions
is likely to disappoint
scholars
of
international
among contemporary
politics have

of international
answer
available

taking place
those taking place among historians. What

historians
have talked
closely mirrored
in terms of the dichotomy
about
'moralism'
and 'cynicism', political
between
the idealists
scientists have talked about in terms of 'idealism' and 'realism'. While
on which world peace is to be built, the
have regarded law as the very foundation
the world. Like
realists have pointed out that it is power, not law, which governs
room
nuance
for
all dichotomies,
the realism/idealism
leaves
little
and subtlety.
split
as a distinction
If it is understood
between the world as it ought to but cannot be,
as it really is and must
to
is whether
and the world

be, then our only choice
or
our
to
in
in
the
of
illusions.
games
power politics
hopes
place
participate
International
law, as Hans Morgenthau
concluded,
delivers the enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of power between
the violator of the law and the victim of the violation. It puts a premium upon the
violation of the law as well as upon the enforcement of the law by the strong and,
consequently, puts the rights of the weak in jeopardy.11
8

on the Swedish
see Sverker Oredsson,
of the historiographical
debates
intervention,
och trettio?riga
och kult (Lund,

Sverige
kriget: historieskrivning
1992), as well as Erik
Adolf
II Adolf,
and Rewriting:
Gustav
the French Revolution
and the
'Historical Writing
Ringmar,
Journal
Scandinavian
18, no. 4 (1993).
Historians',
of History,
9
like C. T. Odhner, Martin Weibull
and Ludvig
the work of historians
Stavenow,
Compare
in Oredsson,
discussed
Gustav Adolf, pp. 97-114.
10
6 (1933); Axel Strindberg
och
See e.g. Curt Weibull,
'Gustav II Adolf,'

Scandia,
[1937], Bondenod
stormaktsdr?m
(Stockholm,
1988), pp. 17-18.
11
The Struggle for Power and Peace
Politics
Hans Morgenthau,
among Nations:
(New York,
1948),
p. 229.
For

a summary

Gustav


The relevance of international

law

91

to Morgenthau,
law is irrelevant since it is utterly decen
international
According

and enforcement.12
tralized in its legislation, adjudication,
reasons
to be sceptical
this traditional
there are good
scientific
Yet
about
As a number of recent writers have pointed out, it is simply not true
dichotomy.
that states act as the realists have predicted.13 Realism,
is not very
ironically,
realistic. Norms,
rules and legal considerations
do, for example, have much more of
an independent
role than traditional
scholars have granted.14 Inter-state politics
realm, but rather as a
might perhaps best be described not as a pure anarchical
social

system, or as an 'anarchical
society'.15 In fact this societal view of world
is often associated
with
the name of Hugo Grotius.
As Hedley

Bull
was the first writer to point out that states simultaneously
are
Grotius

politics
explains,

sovereign and independent of each other and yet also parts of the greater society of
all of mankind,
the magna communitas generis.16
name pops up first in connection with a puzzle pertaining
The fact that Grotius'
to political debates carried out in early seventeenth
century Sweden, and next as a
indicates that
way to improve on a traditional,
overly rigid, analytical vocabulary,
between the two issues. Could
it be that
there might be some kind of a connection
same
reason
the Swedes of the early seventeenth
read
Grotius
for
the
that
century

we might
on the social character of
of his emphasis
read him today?because
inter-state relations? This is of course an intriguing question,
yet a question which
to answer
is difficult
in a straightforward
fashion. To a contemporary
reader,
even na?ve,
Grotius' writings will inevitably appear as analytically
underdeveloped,
on international
for the simple reason that most writings
politics followed upon,
own contribution.17
rather than preceded, Grotius'
It is, for example, not at all
his thought relates to the realism associated with the post-Hobbesian
And hence, as long as we are
tradition or to the idealism of the post-Kantians.18
to
defend
the
Grotian
view
of
world

trying
politics with the help of arguments
we
are
not
drawn from Grotius
himself,
likely to get very far. The Grotian
can all too easily be portrayed
as an insignificant
on the
alternative
elaboration
as yet another futile attempt to defend an idealistic
realist view or, alternatively,
clear how

'ought-to-be'.19

a more
secure philosophical
the Grotian
view needs
is consequently
a
was
a
It
to react both to
needs

of
the support
writer who
in position
grounding.
someone
a
to
and
with
clear notion of why
post-Hobbesian
post-Kantian
thought;
What

12
Politics
among Nations,
p. 211.
Morgenthau,
13
inMartin
the discussion
Hollis
and Steve Smith, Explaining
and Understanding
Compare
International
Relations

1991), pp. 25-6.
(Oxford,
14
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and
Greenwood
See, e.g. Nicholas
Onuf, World of Our Making:
International
Relations
V. Kratochwil,
Friedrich
Rules, Norms,
(Columbia,
1989), esp. pp. 228-57;
and Decisions:
in International
On the Conditions
and Legal Reasoning
and
Relations
of Practical
Domestic
1989).
Affairs
(Cambridge,
15
A Study of Order
in World Politics
Bull, The Anarchical
(New York,

Hedley
1977).
Society:
16
of Grotius',
and Bull,
'The
Bull,
p. 72. See also Bull, Anarchical
esp. 24-27,
'Importance
Society,
Grotian
of International
in Herbert
Butterfield
and Martin Wight
Conception
Society,'
(eds.),
in the Theory of International
Politics
Investigations:
Essays
Diplomatic
(London,
1966), pp. 51-73.
17
in Martin Wight
and Hedley

Bull (eds.), Systems
(Leicester,
Compare Wight's
complaints
of States
1977), p. 127.
18
Bull associates
Hobbes
with realism and Kant with
idealism.
See Bull Anarchical
pp. 24-5.
Society,
19
as Political
R. B. J. Walker,
Inside IOutside:
International
Relations
1993),
Theory
(Cambridge,
pp. 69-70.


92

Erik Ringmar


a self-interested
statesman would ever pay attention
to matters of international
law.
The obvious
choice
here
is Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich
that notorious
Hegel,
of constraining,
Yet Hegel was highly
dichotomies.
arch-enemy
simple-minded
law as it had been understood
sceptical of international
by Immanuel Kant and the
Kantians.

In fact, when turning to the topic at the end of the Philosophy
of Right
like a Cold War realist of the Morgenthauian
mould.20 The
very much
between
reminded his readers, is a relation between autono
states, Hegel


he sounded

relation
mous
entities which make mutually
beneficial deals with each other, but which at
the same time always are superior to those deals.21
This hard-line
does of course make Hegel
into a somewhat
position
unlikely
source of a construction
of a defence of the relevance of international
law. Yet as
we

shall

of right does contain components,
see, Hegel's
which, when
philosophy
us
will
both
takes
moralism
and
The trick

assembled,
properly
beyond
Realpolitik.
here hinges on the notion of a 'right' and on the fact that the law fulfils more
functions
than those concerning
and enforcement which a
legislation, adjudication,
realist thinker like Morgenthau
As
emphasized.
Hegel argued, the law is not only a
tool for telling right from wrong, but also a tool for determining
the class of subjects
to whom the law itself applies. The law not only provides a basis for the punishment
of transgressors,
but it also allows for the constitution of individual identities. The
to our wills and thereby also to our lives, and it
law allows us to give content
allows others to recognize us as persons, or as states, of a particular kind.

Hegel

on recognition

of right is in many
to
respects best read as a rejoinder
Hegel's

philosophy
as
a
to
Immanuel Kant
and
reaction
the events of the French
philosophical
Revolution.
in his assessment
of Kant.
Hegel was characteristically
ambiguous
as a major achievement,
While
he regarded Kant's
he never failed to
philosophy
in some crucial
remained fundamentally
point out that this philosophy
incomplete
as
was
Kant's
would
have
his
it,

aspects.
great insight,
Hegel
rejection of all
traditional backings of morality?religion,
nature or monarchical
decrees?and
his
on
reason.
to
establish
the
basis
of
the
freedom
of
human
attempt
morality
to Kant,
'the categorical
According
which human beings must conform

to
imperative' presents a standard of rationality
if they want to affirm their free will and their


a
constitute
since it would
autonomy.22 To break this law would be self-defeating
denial of one's capacity for freedom.
Kant's
ethics were thus an important
step forward, Hegel was pro
Although
of the Kantian
foundly
sceptical of what he regarded as the empty formalism
20

or a mediator,
states at best there may be an arbitrator
'There is no Praetor to judge between
and
even he exercises his functions
on the particular
i.e. in dependence
wills of the
contingently
only,
trans. T. M. Knox
G. W. F. Hegel,
[1821], Philosophy
of Right,
disputants.'
1952), ?333,

(Oxford,
pp. 213-14.
21
to ?330, p. 297.
addendum
1821/1952,
Compare
Hegel,
22
as the affirmation
The moral
law can be understood
of an inherent human potential
and the
of this potential
is to be found
in the Kantian
formula which
that a person
guarantee
stipulates
as means
use by this will or that; but ... be regarded at
should be treated
'not merely
for arbitrary
trans.
the same time as an end.' Immanuel Kant
[1785], Groundwork
of the Metaphysics

of Morals,
H. J. Paton
(New York,
1964), 428, sect. 46.


The relevance

of international

law

93

to an abstract
self?a
had attached moral
obligations
'pure
But as
of all cultural traits and historical or social characteristics.
rights may be
Hegel argued, there simply is no such a- or /?re-social self to whom
on this basis will therefore be
to establish a morality
and all attempts
attached,
There can be no such thing as an abstract free will since 'to will'
self-defeating.
always implies 'to will something', and for this reason Kant's

categorical
imperative
will always remain indeterminate
in terms of subjective content.24 In particular,
the
in times of
little practical or political guidance
categorical
imperative will provide
in what he regarded as the excess
crisis, and Hegel found proof of this conclusion
system.23 Kant
reason'?divested

of the French revolution.25 During
the reign of the Jacobins, moral
self-legislation
had given free reign to the arbitrary wills of despotic dictators. For the same reason
it was Utopian to believe, with Kant,
that states ever could join together in zfadus
a
and
about
pacificum
bring
'perpetual peace'.26 If push came to shove, the primary
of each state would always be towards its own welfare and not towards
obligation
an abstract and universal code. '[S]o far as international
relations are concerned we

'27
can never get beyond an "ought."
labelled the abstract,
notion
of ethics
'Moralit?f
and
empty, Kantian
Hegel
of ethics in terms of Sittlichkeit. While
it with his own definition
contrasted
Moralit?t
referred to abstract principles and to ought-to-be's,
Sittlichkeit
referred to
of actual communities.
To act in accordance with
to follow the given social code and to perpetuate
seem to make ethics into an inherently
this would
existing.28 Naturally
we
but
reach
before
any such conclusion we should take a
enterprise,

the existing moral

obligations
Sittlichkeit was thus necessarily

the already
conservative
own definition
of freedom
closer look at the relation between ethics and Hegel's
to the development
of personal
and its connection
identities.
As we said, Hegel praised Kant for his break with traditional sources of morality
and for his attempt to establish ethics on the basis of freedom and reason, while
remaining

profoundly
implied. If freedom was
a different,
and more

that Kant's
of the empty
formalism
solution
sceptical
to be protected
it would consequently
have to be placed on
than that of Kantian

secure, foundation
self-legislative

reason.

human beings from animals, Hegel
distinguishes
began this alternative
us
and
what
from
is the
determination
freedom
deduction,
gives
through nature,
we
can
can
want
to
form
want
fact that
second-order desires.29 We
things and desire
to desire. While
animals only seek comfort and safety and the most

immediate
satisfaction of their urges, human beings can organize their desires and thereby also
their selves. But as Hegel
of his or
stressed, one person's organization
repeatedly
can
out
cannot
her self
in interaction with others. We
be whatever
only be carried
What

23

in Context
section draws on Steven Smith, Hegel's
of Liberalism:
Rights
Critique
(Chicago,
1989), pp. 103-31.
24
Smith, Hegel's
pp. 108-9.
Critique,
25
on The

see Joachim Ritter
For a discussion,
and the French Revolution:
[1956], Hegel
Essays
trans. Richard
Dien Winfield
1984), pp. 35-89.
Philosophy
of Right,
(Cambridge,
26
Peace: A Philosophical
in Immanuel Kant, Perpetual
Immanuel Kant
Sketch',
[1795], 'To Perpetual
trans. Ted Humphrey
Peace and Other Essays,
1983), pp. 107^3.
(Indianapolis,
27
?333, pp. 213-214.
Hegel,
1821/1952,
28
As Taylor
in Charles Taylor, Hegel
and Modern
Society

1979), p. 83. For
emphasizes
(Cambridge,
use of this term, see Laurence Dickey,
context of Hegel's
of the intellectual
discussion
Hegel:
29

This

and the Politics
Economics,
Religion,
Smith, Hegel's
pp. 116-17.
Critique,

of Spirit

1770-1807

(Cambridge,

1987).

a



Erik Ringmar

94

we want to be, but only somebody as we are recognized by people around us.30 The
not just another desire, but instead the core
is consequently
desire to be recognized
our
sense
of who we are. Only as recognized by others do
human desire, central to
we fully come to exist as persons since it only is as recognized
that we can separate
as
as
us
our
from the nature that surrounds
well
from
natural desires.
ourselves
forth
But Hegel
also stressed that recognition
by others is never immediately
In the
for which
individuals would have to fight.

coming, but instead something
in the Phenomenology
of Spirit he imagined a
chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage'
situation where two individuals were facing each other, neither of them recognized
them a struggle for recognition
the other.31 Between
ensued through which one of
them came to be recognized as superior?both
by himself and by the other?while
from the
the other came to be regarded as inferior. The 'master' gained recognition
'slave' by 'going all the way' and risking his own life, while the slave, cautiously,
preferred to save his life and to accept his inferior position.32
to be satisfied with
the master was unlikely
As Hegel went on to say, however,
his victory for very long. The slave was only a slave after all, and the recognition
he granted was simply not enough. What
the master craved most of all was not just
someone
from
but
respect granted by
recognition,
recognition
equal to himself;
someone he himself
in turn respected. The difference between
the master

and the
was
to
which
take
slave had to be overcome,
and the mechanism
this
through
place
was the slave's capacity to develop himself through the force of his own labour. As
'someone' as he worked
Hegel argued, the slave could educate himself and become
on his capacities
around him. In this way
and
and on the world
recognition
came
seen
as
to
be
which
achievements
could
take
identity
only
place in

personal
social relations as becoming
the course of time. Hegel envisioned
increasingly equal
as more
both from the determination
and more
freed themselves
individuals
by
nature

and from the subjugation
imposed upon them by others.
is recognized
where
each
individual
by all others and treated with
society
as
an
to
In such a community
what
referred
'ethical
is
respect
Hegel

community'.
but
the
that a person
is
the law is not a conservative
instead
force,
guarantee
the right to develop
his or her personality
and
treated decently
and granted
a right to
to Hegel
is fundamentally
individual
'right' according
capacities. A
as
to
of a per
and
such
it
is
related
the
recognition,

intrinsically
development
A

To Hegel,
the law is thus
sonality and to freedom from natural determination.33
a
as
a
Kant
would
have
of
indivi
not,
it,
guarantee
pre-constituted,
underlying
a
as
merit
but
which
result
of
instead
human
the

struggle
duality,
something
beings
as an
in which
is constituted
for recognition
they engage. Only once a person
can
to
autonomous
self
her. Law acknowledges
this
rights properly be attached
30

exists in and for itself when
and by the fact that, it
put it: 'Self-Consciousness
famously
G. W. F. Hegel,
for another;
that is to say, it exists only in being acknowledged.'
[1807],
translated
by A. V. Miller
(Oxford,
1977), ?178, p. 111.

Phenomenology
of Spirit,
31
pp. 111-119.
??178-196,
1807/1977,
Hegel,
32
to the
the celebrated
by Alexandre
[1974], Introduction
Compare
interpretation
provided
Koj?ve,
on the Phenomenology
trans. James H. Nichols
Lectures
(Ithaca,
1980),
Reading
of Spirit,
of Hegel:
and Human-Beings;
I. Integrity and
Politics,
pp. 3-70. See also Axel Honneth,
'Morality,
of Morality

of Recognition',
of a Conception
Based on the Theory
Political
Disrespect:
Principles
um Anerkennung:
zur moralischen
Grammatik
20, no. 2 (1992); Axel Honneth,
Kampf
Theory,
33

As Hegel
so exists

sozialer
Compare
in Hegel,

Konflikte
Merold

1992).
(Frankfurt-on-Main,
Idealism:
Westpahl,
'Hegel's Radical
and Modernity

Freedom,
(Albany,
1992), pp.

and State as Ethical Communities',
Family
37-54; Smith, Hegel's
pp. 122-31.
Critique,


The relevance of international

law

95

a structure
and establishes
it can be secured and
achievement
through which
tenet of Hegel's
It is a fundamental
that such a community
sustained.
thought
would have to be coextensive with the state; only in the state was a true ethical life
possible.
If we


or with
notion
of the law with Kant's,
the notions
Hegel's
idealists and realists, we consequently
find that
by both contemporary
presupposed
to two additional
functions
besides
those concerning
Hegel
points
legislation,
The law is first of all a structure of meaning with
and enforcement.
adjudication,
to individual wills and thereby also to
the help of which content can be attached
individual lives. Secondly,
the law is a structure of rules through which people can
be classified, recognized,
and in this way identified as persons of a certain kind.
If we focus on the first of these two functions,
the law will come to have very
much the same status as any other rule, norm, or custom which exists in a society.34
compare


use

the law as we use other rules that our society provides
in order to give
our
we
a
to
to
submit
ourselves
certain
of
and as a result
lives;
way
life,
meaning
we come to see ourselves
as persons of a certain kind. Here the law is similar to
what George Herbert Mead
referred to as the point of view of the 'generalized
other'.35 Only in so far as each individual takes the attitudes of all other members

We

a complete
will she be able to develop
self. By

own
to
out
of
she
is
able
of
her
view,
shoes', as it
'step
point
see
as
not
and
herself
the
others
would.
To
abide
the
law
is
thus
were,
by
primarily

a matter of 'being good', but rather a matter of submitting oneself to a rule which
makes
it possible
'to be' in the first place. Here abstract and universal rules will be
irrelevant and empty since there is no such thing as an abstract and universal
of her community
taking a generalized

into account

self is a no-bo?y rather than a some-body.
person. A Kantian
as
If we focus on the second of these two functions,
the law can be understood
a system through which a person can be given recognition by others. Rules provide
standards by which actions can be judged and assessed, and thereby also standards
through which we can draw conclusions
regarding the persons who perform them.
is used not only to judge actions, but also to identify
standard, in other words,
actors
to
the
whom
the standard itself applies. On the basis of this argument we
could perhaps
that a person who
is insecure regarding
her own

hypothesize
a
new
a
or
member
of
other
social
club,
any
identity?say,
profession,
system?is

The

faithful rule-follower.
the rules in their
likely to be a particularly
By following
on the people around her to
minutest
details such a person
is making
demands
of their group.
recognize her as a legitimate member

Hegel


Having
34

on international

established

35

As Hegel
understood

law

these

general

it: 'In speaking
of Right
civil
by the word,
namely
to ?33, p. 233.
addendum

put

1821/1952,

H. Mead
George

points
[Recht]
law, but

we

are now

... we mean
also morality,

in a position

to return

not merely what
is generally
ethical
life, and world history.'

Hegel,

and Society: From
the Standpoint
[1932], Mind,
Self
of A Social Behaviorist

see
to international
of Mead's
1964), p. 155. For an application
arguments
(Chicago,
politics,
Alexander
of It: The Social Construction
isWhat
States Make
of Power Polities',
Wendt,
'Anarchy
International
46, no. 2 (1992).
Organization,

to


96

Erik Ringmar

treatment of international
insistence that
law.36 As we might expect, Hegel's
Hegel's
the state is the only entity in which a sittlich life can be lived determined

his views
also of the relations obtaining
between states. Since the world could never become
an ethical community,
the inter-state
law could never play the role it did in
individuals.
Still this did not mean
that Hegel was indifferent to
relations between
the nature of inter-state relations. In fact, it was a crucial part of his argument
that
the state is not only a product of the consent given to it by its citizens, but also a
in its own right. Also
the state had to be recognized
subject, or a person,
political
it could come into existence.
states
This conclusion may perhaps seem uncalled-for. Why, we may ask, would
answer was
have to become
'selves' or 'persons'? Hegel's
that this conclusion
To play a role in the historical
from the notion
followed
of sovereignty.
and
state

to
of
had
be
the
both
in
mankind,
philosophical
development
sovereign
It was only if the
relation to other states and in relation to its own inhabitants.
before

state had a right to defend itself against foreign enemies that its ethical life could
and it was only as independent
that it could
be protected,
from civil society
a sphere where
constitute
individuals
could be turned into citizens and ethical,
to the
could only come to be established
non-self-serving,
beings.37 This sovereignty
extent that the state was recognized by other states as well as by the state's own
the state be sovereign and only as such

inhabitants.
Only as recognized would
would
it be free and a person in its own right.38
to be gained? Here, again, Hegel
But how was this recognition
stressed the role
of conflict, or more precisely, of war. As far as the internal relationship between the
state and its inhabitants was concerned
it was war that brought out the civic virtues
of the bourgeois
class. Only at a time of great danger could the bourgeoisie
be
convinced

to

collective.

While

their petty private pursuits
for the
and sacrifice themselves
to
state
the
illusion
that
the

rise
existed
peace gave
prolonged
war
a
men
for
the
sake
of
for
united
the
of
interests,
purpose
merely
private
common
ideals.39 Yet a state had to be recognized not only by its inhabitants,
but
also by other states, and also in the external relationship
between one state and
was granted.40 The
another was war the mechanism
which
through
recognition
itself

in
'master and slave dialectics'
inter-state
relations.
is
repeated
Recognition
never immediately
a
if
to
and
collection
of
is
repeated,
forthcoming,
Hegel
people
to
gain it, they must first fight for it. As proof of this conclusion,
Hegel pointed
how

leave

had
Republic
which
surrounded

regimes

the young

monarchical
36

French

been

and
disrespected
but
how
it,
Napoleon?at

humiliated
the head

by the
of the

on inter-state
affairs are discussed
'The Problem
Shlomo Avineri,
by, among others,
in Hegel's

Journal
'Hegel's
of the History
of Ideas, 22, no. 4 (1961); Steven Smith,
Thought',
on War,
the State and International
American
Science Review,
11 (1983).
Views
Political
Relations',
37
F. R. Cristi,
'The Hegeische
Mitte
and Hegel's Monarch',
Political
11, no. 4
Compare
Theory,
Hegel's
of War

38

views

Smith,

pp. 156-64.
(1983), pp. 601-22;
'Hegel's Views',
state is mind
'The nation
in its substantive
and immediate
and is therefore
rationality
actuality
that every state is sovereign
absolute
and autonomous
its
power on earth. It follows
against
to be sovereign
in the first place and without
from their
It is entitled
neighbours.
qualifications
i.e. to be recognized
by them as sovereign.'
?331, p. 212.
point of view,
Hegel,
1821/1952,

the


39
Smith, Hegel's
p. 628.
Critique,
40
to other states as an individual
'A state is as little an actual
individual without
relations
is actually
a person without
If states,
in the
rapport with other persons.'
?331, pp. 212-213.
Hegel,
1821/1952,
to exist, as Avinieri
there could not, by definition,
remain a state in the
comments,
plural, ceased
'Problem of War',
pp. 468-69.
singular. Avineri,


The relevance
French army?had

to grant freely.

them to grant

forced

of international

the recognition

the country

97

law

they had failed

When Napoleon
said before the Peace of Campoformio
[1797, the treaty which concluded
Napoleon's first Italian campaign] that the French Republic needs recognition as little as
the sun requires it, what his words implied was simply the strength which carries with it,
without

verbal

any

or


the guarantee

expression,

recognition.41

individuals, perpetual
just as in relations between
in world politics Hegel
the end of the story. Also

war

But

between

states was

not

envisioned
that relations of
The world could never become a full-fledged
mutual
respect could be developed.
to be sure, but it could become a kind of 'quasi-community'
ethical community
of

states that mutually
recognized each other's sovereignty. Perhaps we could call this
the 'mature phase' of world politics to which states would gain admission once they
had established
domestic
ethical communities
of their own and once their external
for recognition
had abated. Among
these states, conflict would
still
struggles
rare
remain a possibility,
but Hegel believed wars would become
and
increasingly
of Vienna,
1815, and the European
increasingly humane. No doubt the Congress
were the empirical points of
this settlement
Concert
system which
inaugurated,
of this philosophical

departure

argument.42 As Hegel


out:

pointed

The European peoples form a family in accordance with the universal principle underlying
their legal codes, their customs, and their civilization. This principle has modified their
international
of

...

conduct

in a state

of

affairs

otherwise

dominated

by

the mutual

infliction


evils.43

In this mature, post bellum, quasi-community,
there was indeed a role to play for
not as an aprioristic
that
international
law. International
is, understood
law,
as
kind
of
but
inter-state
The
international
law which mattered
custom.44
morality,
of the practices developed
between
On
this
conduct
codes
of
basis,
recognition.
valid also in the case of conflict.


states who

consisted

fact

that

states

state

of

affairs

when

each

counts

The

something

to

the


which

reciprocally
rights
rest as

ought

recognize
and

disappear
something

to pass

each

other

force

and

absolute.

Hence

freely granted each other

be established which remained

could

as

states

chance
in war,

remain

hold
war

sway?a
itself

even

in war?the
bond

wherein
as

is characterized

away.45


For Hegel,
in other words,
contra
international
law and war are not as much
and
its
processes which
dictory moments?'morality'
negation?as
complementary
state
each
A
other.
for
and once this
presuppose
begins by fighting
recognition,
states
it
is
ranks
of
that
the
may join
recognition

granted
mutually
recognize each
a
as
contracts
is
it
in
in mutually
and
such
and
other,
legitimate partner
only
deals.
advantageous
After this summary of Hegel's
let us return to the puzzle with which
argument,
41

to ?331, p. 297.
addendum
1821/1952,
Hegel,
in the early nineteenth
On the European
Concert

in the International
States: Reform
and Resistance
43
to ?339, p. 297.
addendum
1821/1952,
Hegel,
44
. . .
states
between
'[Relations
depend principally
42

inner universality
Avineri,
Compare
45
1821/1952,
Hegel,

see e.g. Ian Clark, The Hierarchy
century,
Order (Cambridge,
1989), pp. 93-130.

of


customs
the customs
of nations,
upon
being the
of behaviour
in all circumstances.'
maintained
?339, p. 215.
Hegel,
1821/1952,
'Problem of War',
p. 469.
?338, p. 215.


98

Erik Ringmar

we began. Why, we asked, were the Swedish leaders responsible
with matters
of international
of 1630 so peculiarly preoccupied

The Swedish

for the intervention
law?


discussions

the magnitude
of the transformations
Perhaps we should begin by emphasizing
which
took place as the world of the Middle
Ages was replaced by that of the
In political
of these changes was
Renaissance.
the
terms, the most
important
as the only legitimate
the state came to be established
process
through which
states was formed which
political unit, and through which a system of interacting
its own.
had norms and rules which were exclusively
The world

in scope. While
Ages had been both local and universal
in
lived
and
worked

communities
traditional,
local,
governed by
people
and political world had been universal
in
feudal lords, the religious,
intellectual,
course
in
All
of
and
also
fact.
this
in
the
of
often
enough
spirit
changed, however,
the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries as the institution of the state was wedged
in-between the local and the universal
levels, and as it appropriated?and
monopo


most

of the Middle

had

carried out elsewhere. As a result, economies were
previously
a
on
was divided
state
scale; the unitary body of Christianity
increasingly organized
and
the
Reformation
also
dismembered
into
intel
often
state-churches;
through
came
to
out
in
be
vernacular

rather
in
lectual pursuits
carried
than
the
increasingly
was
to the new Renaissance
state
the
Latin. According
doctrine,
sovereign,
no authority
above
it and none below.46 Much
of early modern
acknowledging
lized?the

functions

to Cardinal
Hobbes
Niccol?
Machiavelli
and Thomas
thought?from
political

as
to
to
be read
Richelieu
and the first mercantiles?can
attempts
give legitimacy
new
the power vested in this
institution.
political
came to see themselves as interacting
in a
The sovereign states also increasingly
was
states.
most
This
in
of
other
evident
the
conduct
system
perhaps
diplomatic
and later also in the rest of Europe.47
which emerged first in the Italian city-states

one state's capacity for warfare
soon came to be seen in the context of
Naturally,
all
the similar capacities possessed
other
states, and while this made the question
by
it also turned it into an intellectual
of war
into a primary
concern,
political
in
While
it
had
been
obvious
the
Middle
Ages where
justice lay in a
problem.
between a Christian
and a heathen
ruler, it was not as easily determined
two
law as it
Christian princes that fought for the just cause. International

among
was developed
course
in the
of the sixteenth century sought to address precisely this
conflict

question.

that the problem of war not only concerned
however,
were to be allocated,
but also questions
of how
responsibilities
to end war, but
law was never designed
should be defined. International
the class of actors who legitimately
could fight wars. In this
instead to designate
two lines that had to be drawn: one between
the state
connection
there were
It is important
of how

to notice,


questions
identities

46
47

in Jens Bartelson,
The Geneaology
discussions
Compare
(Stockholm,
of Sovereignty
A Geneaology
On Diplomacy:
James Der Derian,
78-122;
of Western Estrangement
in International
B. Bozeman,
Politics
and Culture
See e.g. Adda
History
(Princeton,
Renaissance
Garrett Mattingly,
457-513;
(London,
1955).
Diplomacy


1993) esp. pp.
1987).
(London,
1960), pp.


The relevance of international
sub-state actors?feudal
lords, for example, or
the other between the state and super-state
communities?and
the Catholic Church and the post-Roman
Empire. By making
denied the same
subject, this new body of law simultaneously
actors. As an instrument
for buttressing
and sub-state
the
law thus served exactly the same purpose as the
international

and various

law

99

peasant

independent
institutions?notably
the prince its legal
status to both supra
status of the state,

arguments presented
such as Machiavelli
and Hobbes.48
by political philosophers
law, a state did thus not only do what
By adhering to the rules of international
was wrong or right, but, more
it gave content to its life as a social
importantly,
being in a world of other states, and itmade demands on other states to recognize
it in accordance with these rules. By adhering to the precepts of international
law,
of the system of states and
itself as a legitimate member
each state defined
as such from those states that already were
demanded
legitimate
recognition
in De iure belli ac pads that
members
of it. This is the force of Grotius'
argument
a state must adhere

her own society.
For

just

as

law just as a citizen must

to international

the national,

who

law

the

violates

of his

immediate advantage, breaks down that by which
are for all future
posterity
cuts away
and of nations

time

also

assured,

so

the

in order

to obtain

an

the advantages of himself and his

state

which

the bulwarks

country

to the laws of

adhere

which
safeguard


transgresses
its own

the
future

laws

of

nature

peace.49

to behave
here should not be read as an idealistic exhortation
position
as
a
but
of
factual
information
rather
the
'morally',
piece
requirements of
regarding

a
of
formation.
social order
within
viable
international
any process
identity
Only
can a state establish
a
serves
state
itself as a legitimate
whatever
does
actor;

Grotius'

or disrupt,
as
If states are to constitute
that order.
themselves
must
the
law
be

independent,
upheld.
sovereign entities,
If we return to the Swedish
of 1630 with these considerations
in
intervention
an
to
of why
it becomes
alternative
the
mind
provide
interpretation
possible
Swedish decision makers
To wit, the
spent such a lot of time on legal discussions.
discussed
international
law neither
because
king and his advisers
they were
nor
'moralistic'
for
particularly

they sought 'legal justifications'
primarily because
their actions, but instead because
for their country as a
they sought recognition
of the emerging
system of states. Only by playing by the rules
legitimate member
could they be identified as the kind of actor to whom these rules applied. But as we
to maintain,

shall see, these attempts were ultimately
all in vain, and as it became obvious
that
not
be
recognition would
granted freely, the Swedish leaders decided to gain it by
military means.
In order to drive home this argument we should begin by noticing the ambiguous
in relation to its neigh
Sweden occupied
position which early seventeenth-century
of the European
inter-state
bours. The country was, at best, a marginal member
system.
country
48


In fact, Sweden's diplomatic
and its ruler were the main

was ironically
to remark
toujours le droit par le fait. On
aux tyrans.' Jean-Jacques
plus favorable
uvres compl?tes,
vol. II (Paris, Seuil,
49
1625, Prolegomena,
Grotius,
?18.
As Rousseau
d'?tablir

isolation
themes

and the lack of respect granted to the
of Swedish foreign policy discussions

'Sa plus constante mani?re
de raisonner est
Grotius:
une m?thode plus cons?quente, mais non
employer
pourrait
Du contrat social [1762], book I, chapter 2, in

Rousseau,
1967), p. 519.

regarding


Erik Ringmar

100

the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.50
'Why and from what
throughout
cause is it', as Gustav Adolf asked the Diet in 1625, 'that our realm and fatherland
by so many and so often is attacked and sought after?' The only reason I can find,
he said,
'is that we
nations
they

and
argue

cannot
peoples,
that we

out


carry
and
can

this
count

as other
with
the same
and power
enterprises
strength
our neighbours,
so
causes
and contempt
from
disrespect
to suppress
for very
little and become
and dominate
ready

our

that

us.'51


to give proof of this 'disrespect' and 'contempt'
the insecure Swedish
to a number of different controversies
leaders pointed
and 'affairs'. One such affair
concerned
the question of the 'Three Crowns'. During
the Middle Ages, Denmark,
a
in
and
had
been
united
with three crowns as its
Sweden
Norway
triple monarchy
When
the
Swedes
broke
from
this
alliance
in
the 1520s, the Swedish
away
insignia.

to the dismay
of the Danes?continued
the crowns as a
leaders?much
using
state.
also
of
their
its
emblem
the
Swedes
By using
symbol
sovereign
naturally
that the Scandinavian
had
sought to lay claim to all the legitimacy
monarchy
as
not
As
the
the
late
1600s
the
affair

still
had
years.
acquired
throughout
early
to
refused
the
Swedish
been settled and as a result the Danes
stubbornly
recognize
In order

king as a fully legitimate ruler.52
the
Swedish dynastic struggles also added to these problems. Family feuds within
not
and
in
house
successive
d'?tat
1599
had
1570
and
coups
1523,

ruling royal
only
the country, but also suspicion abroad. When Gustav
II
created dissension within
to the throne in 1611 it was simply not very clear with what right
Adolf
ascended
he governed. This was especially
the case since the former king, Sigismund, who
was also king of Poland, kept on demanding
the return of his Swedish throne. As
a Catholic
he wielded
considerable
influence with the Habsburg
emperor as well as
on
with other Catholic
and
the
still regarded
Continent
rulers,
many
princes
as
not
A
Gustav

the
Swedish
clear
indication of
Adolf,
legitimate
king.
Sigismund,
was
in
the
which
the
addressed.
When
this fact was provided
way
peace
by
king
in 1629, they immediately
stalled since the Poles
began with Poland
negotiations
someone who referred to himself as 'Gustav II Adolf,
refused to negotiate with
were addressed not to the
of
Sweden.'
Letters

which
arrived in Stockholm
King
or
to
to
the
Swede'
'the
Duke
of
Finland.'53
but
'Gustavus
king,
In addition, diplomatic
and military
relations between Sweden and its neighbours
to
to be its allies
Even
be
that were supposed
strained.
those
countries
continued
hesitation
when
Sweden

and
its
ruler.
showed
dealing with
Despite
vigorous efforts,
the country
remained
for a
isolated and all Swedish proposals
diplomatically
were
states
liked
alliance of Protestant
rejected. Although
they in principle
military
and England
nevertheless
refused to
the idea of an anti-Catholic
front, Holland
grant

the Swedish

powerful?Evangelical
50


king

the role of commander

of such a joint?and

potentially

very

force.54

are provided
A number
historia:
of examples
1:2,
Tham, Den svenska utrikespolitikens
by Wilhelm
1560-1648
(Stockholm,
1960), pp. 101-202.
51
to the Opening
Adolfs
Address
Gustav
of the Diet, March
10, 1625, Gustaf Adolfs

skrifter, p. 213.
52
was cited as a causus belli for the Nordic
in
In fact the issue of the Three Crowns
Seven Years War
90.
the 1560s. See Tham,
1960, pp. 35-36,
53
Nils Ahnlund,
Gustav Adolf den store (Stockholm,
1932), p. 51.
54
Gustav Adolf, p. 318.
Ahnlund,


The relevance of international

law

101

What,
then, were the Swedes to do in this situation? How could they break out
of their isolation and gain recognition
for their country and their king? One option
was to seek the support of the rules that had been developed
in order to regulate

the rules of international
inter-state conduct. By following
law, the king and his
saw their country as a legitimate member
of the inter-state system and
advisers
it as such. Sweden cared about international
asked other princes to recognize
law,
nor because
neither
because
its elites were particularly
moralistic,
they were
particularly

cynical,

but

because

they

sought

recognition

as


a

legitimate

state

others.

among

In fact, it turned out to be impossible
These attempts failed, however, abysmally.
for a non-recognized
country such as Sweden to rely on the rules which governed
an inferior
ones. Since the Swedes occupied
relations between already recognized
never
to their
the
rules
be
vis-?-vis
used
their
established
could
position
neighbours,

to
This
for
colour
all
the
dis
realization
Council's
came,
advantage.
example,
or
a
to
not
to
in
cussions
whether
send
mission
the
peace
emperor
regarding
law would
have it, all peaceful means
international
should first be

before a country embarked upon war, and while
the Swedish
leaders
a
in
of
this
fact
number
different
Council
nevertheless
acknowledged
meetings,
they
a
to dispatch
that it would
be a sign of weakness
concluded
unanimously
et
not
will
Our
'securitas
allow
the
it
it,

reputado"
delegation.
king concluded;
we
were
a
as
to
would
for
the
send
Indeed
appear
though
'begging
peace'.55
As

Vienna.

exhausted

if the Swedes were not
delegation would
simply be to risk being humiliated. What
an
were
once
if

audience
Or
what
arrived?
admitted, but treated
they
given
they
with insults? And what would happen if they, for example, were handed letters of
of 'Gustav II
accreditation made out to someone else but not to the representatives
Adolf, King of Sweden'?56
none of this is of course
If we take a Hegelian
view of these discussions,
or
a
not
state
An
individual
who
is
recognized by others cannot rely on
surprising.
an individual or a state first must do
their law in order to gain recognition. What
can only be granted through war. And this was of course also
isfight; recognition
the conclusion which eventually was reached by the Swedish leaders. 'If we do not

in the fall of 1629, 'we will lose all reputation
concluded
go across,' as the Council
If we want to come to a settlement
and the blessing of God.'
'with reputation and
honor,'

The

we must

relevance

'meet him with

of international

an army

in his own

land.'57

law

is the relevance of international
law? Are the idealists justified in their hopes
law can contain war and force states to act morally? Are the
that international

realists correct in their dismissal of all legalistic reasoning and in their emphasis on
the power of power politics? As we know, this issue has traditionally
been settled

What

If we must choose between the world as it ought
in favour of the realists' position.
to be, but cannot be, and the world as it is, and must be, then both statesmen and
55
Minutes
56
On this
57
Minutes

December
of the Council,
IA, p. 23.
15, 1628, Arkiv,
last fear, see Tham,
1960, pp. 267-268.
of the Council,
October
IA, pp. 51, 58.
27, 1629, Arkiv,


Erik Ringmar


102

scholars have been forced to opt for the latter. Yet, as a number of students of
international
out, the very realism of the realists'
recently have pointed
politics
can easily be questioned.
States do not always follow the imperatives of
position
as a result
power politics, but often also the rules and norms that have developed
is best described
in
interaction.
the world
neither
of their common
Perhaps
state of nature, but instead
idealistic terms, nor in terms of a Hobbesian
Kantian,
and with Hedley Bull as an 'anarchical society'.
with Grotius
As we have pointed
this alternative
out, however, while
may be
description
so

in
it
far
in
The
has
lacked
Grotian
many
respects,
analytical
precision.
appealing
view

of world

between
the idealist and
somewhere
politics has hovered uneasily
as
an
on
too
elaboration
positions?all
easily portrayed
insignificant
as

an
to
another
defend
idealistic
or,
yet
attempt
Realpolitik
alternatively,
ought-to
the imperatives
of power politics
be. Given
and the futility of idealism,
it has
be interested
in international
remained unclear precisely why a statesman would
law in its own right.
in this article is that the writings
of G. W. F. Hegel can help us
My suggestion
the realist

this question. As Hegel would
stress, law provides us
but also with
between
and

wrong,
right
adjudicating
can be established,
and
identities
recognized,
developed.
content
to
broadly as a system of rules of conduct?gives
also to our lives, and by our submitting our actions to the
answer

of

not only with a means
a way
through which
The
law?understood
our wills, and thereby

of the law,
stipulations
to recognize us as persons, or states, of a certain kind.
as Hegel
but instead
stressed, is not automatically
recognition,

forthcoming,
to
In
will
for
which
each
individual
have
this
way, as far
fight.
typically something
as the state is concerned,
law and recognition will inevitably become
international
to warfare. As Hegel would have it, individual human beings can
closely connected
to full-fledged
from self-centred bourgeois
citizens only as they risk
be transformed
their lives for the state, and the state can become a legitimate member of the system
of states only as it wages war on those states that already belong to it. Although
a true ethical community,
of the world ever becoming
Hegel denied the possibility
of states could be
he did believe that what we called a 'mature quasi-community'
others

But

can come

states that mutually
formed which comprised
each other. In this post
recognized
rules and norms could be both established
and maintained
and
bellum community,
deals
agreed upon.
mutually
advantageous
an important
In conclusion,
let us briefly consider
of this Hegelian
corollary
are
at
If
is
times
when
it
international
law

relevant
identities
established,
argument.
over
to
is
time.
law
follows that the relevance of international
vary
Questions
likely
of identity are not always salient, or not always salient to the same degree. We
our identities are securely
believe we know who we are, and when
generally
we do not analyze or worry about them, we simply use them.5%Yet, as
even the most entrenched
of identities does eventually break down, and
relevant. International
this is of course where the law suddenly becomes
law, as it
was developed
in the Renaissance,
defined the class of entities who were subject to
if you were to be
of this class?and
it, and if you thought of yourself as a member
as

to
the
had
take
law
such?you
simply
seriously.
granted recognition
established
we know,

58

'Some Other Kinds
of Otherness:
Alessandro
Pizzorno,
Compare
in Development,
and the Art of Trespassing:
Theories',
Democracy
ed. Alejandro
Hirschman,
Foxley
(Notre Dame,
1986), p. 372.

A Critique

of "Rational
Choice"
in Honor
Essays
of Albert O.


The relevance of international

law

103

Does
has only a historical
interest? That
that our discussion
this, then, mean
law was relevant in the Renaissance,
but that this relevance now is
international
lost? As our Hegelian
interpretation makes us see, the answer to these questions
should be given in the affirmative to the extent that we believe that identities can be
to the extent that we believe that this is not
taken for granted, and in the negative
the case. As we began by pointing out, most historians
and political
scientists who
have touched upon this issue have settled for the first of the two options. During

the course of the last three centuries,
the state has become
reified; it
increasingly
has come to be seen as a natural part of a natural world
order?as
the only
activities can be
legitimate political
entity, and as the only arena where political
the
role
law
conducted. Not
has gradually
international
surprisingly,
played by
as a fully constituted
been forgotten. Once
the state was established
self, legal
as just so many
could easily by dismissed
arguments
empty words. The realism/
was the result of this process of reification
and during this
dichotomy
as

as
well
scientists, historians,
everyone else interested
century, statesmen, political
to
in international
been
have
stand
and
be counted as loyal
up
politics,
required
members
of either camp.
What
is taken as natural may, however, by ?fe-naturalized, and philosophy
is a
idealism

tool through which
As our
such a denaturalization
may be constituted.
good
us
to
of

allows
be
settled
conclude, questions
Hegelian
identity may
interpretation
or
sooner
in a temporary
later
will
fashion,
reappear. An
yet
they
inevitably
a
a
a
construct
not
social
and
natural feature of
natural world.
It is of
identity is
on
course precisely this realization which provided Hegel with a unique perspective

us with the ultimate
between
states, and it is this fact which provides
rationale for the Hegelian
time, just like
interpretation we have undertaken. Hegel's
was a time in which
that of Grotius,
identities were being
taken-for-granted
undermined
and new identities created. As the world of the anciens r?gimes was
to be a
it meant
started worrying
about what
suddenly
breaking down, people
to be a member
citizen in relation to the state, but also what it meant
of a state in
if Grotius'
relation to other states. Thus,
time was a time when
the state was
time was a time when the state was filled with a radically new
established, Hegel's
relations

to fulfil 'national destinies.' While

Grotius
sought
for sovereignty, Hegel
justification
sought a philosophical
for Napoleon
and for the revolutionary
French republic. Both of them
justification
were aware that new identities needed
support, and both of them in their own
to inter
way?but
Hegel with more obvious philosophical
sophistication?pointed
law as a means
national
through which such support could be gained.
then do we stand today? This question
is of course the topic of much
Where
content?with
citizens
sought a philosophical

who

Is the state 'dead'? Is it going to die? Or
very heated?debate.
contemporary?and

are we on the contrary about to witness
a neo-statist
revival? The wisest
thing to
is no doubt to defer judgement. Let
do as far as this particular
issue is concerned
us note in conclusion,
that
that the mere fact that the issue arises means
however,
identities no longer can be taken for granted quite in the same way that they used
to be. Since this is the case, we have a good prima facie reason to try to transcend
our old, constraining,
vocabularies
and to investigate
precisely why and how
law may also be relevant in today's world.
international