pursuing elements of a possible weapons pro-
gram and was ignoring demands of suspending
production of uranium. Additionally, North
Korea had not only withdrawn from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty but had also tested two
nuclear devices. With Washington laying out its
largest defense spending in a quarter century,
arms control and disarmament were clearly
perceived to not be a priority of the Bush
administration.
Under President
BARACK OBAMA, the United
States once again changed its focus back toward
arms control and non-proliferation. In an April
2009 speech, Obama outlined a number of
concrete steps that the United States was
planning to take in order to address the threat
of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the United
States introduced a resolution on nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament during the
UNITED NATIONS Security Council meeting
chaired by President Obama on September 24,
2009. The Security Council unanimously ap-
proved Obama’s resolution, which set forth a
series of goals to eliminate nuclear weapons,
ban the production of fissile material used to
make such weapons, outlaw atomic tests and
safeguard stockpiles of weapons. Additionally,
the resolution advocated actio ns to be taken
against nations that violate the International
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY by having their

military use civilian nuclear technology. Oba-
ma’s appearance at the United Nations Special
Session of the Security Council was the first
time any U.S. president had ever presided over a
full-scale summit of the Security Council. This
action sent a powerful signal to the world that
the United States plans to reestablish being a
leader on arms control. The United States is also
planning on hosting a global nuclear security
summit in Washington in April 2010, which
will focus on raising the global standard for
effective nuclear securit y.
FURTHER READINGS
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 2009.
“President Obama Making Good on Nuclear Weapons
Promises.” Press Release, September 23, 2009. Available
online at />media/092309_obama_good_on_nuclear_promises/
website home page:
(accessed September 26, 2009).
Dunn, Lewis A., and Sharon A. Squassoni. 1993. Arms
Control: What Next? Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Laird, Melvin R. August 23, 2001. “Why Scrap the ABM
Treaty?” Washington Post, A25.
Mufson, Steven. December 16, 2001. “ABM Treaty May Be
History, But Deterrence Doctrine Lives.” Washington
Post, A37.
Parsons, Christi. September 25, 2009. “Security Council
Backs Abolishing Nuclear Arms.” latimes.com. Available
online at />world/la-fg-obama-nuclear25-2009sep25,0,6589404.
story website home page: (accessed

September 26, 2009).
“Project on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonprolifera-
tion.” Center for Arms Control and non-Proliferation.
Available online at http://www. armscontrolcenter.org/
resources/strengthening_nonproliferation/ websitehome
page: (accessed S eptem-
ber 25, 2009).
Sheehan, Michael. 1988. Arms Control: Theory and Practice.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Varner, Bill. September 25, 2009. “Obama Gets UN Nuclear
Accord as U.K., France Put Heat on Iran.” Bloomberg.
com. Available online at />apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aiiuAu6px_Cw website
home page: (accessed September
26, 2009).
Weisman, Steven R. March 23, 2003. “A Nation at War: A
New Doctrine, Pre-emption, Idea with a Lineage whose
Time Has Come.” New York Times, 1B.
CROSS REFERENCES
Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972; Blockade; Hot
Line Agreement, 1971; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty; International Law; NATO; Nixon, Richard
Milhous; Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Nuclear Weapons;
Terrorism; War.
ARRAIGNMENT
A criminal proceeding at which the defendant is
officially called before a court of compet ent
jurisdiction, informed of the offense charged in
the complaint, information, indictment, or other
charging document, and asked to enter a plea of
guilty, not guilty, or as otherwise permitted by law.

Depending on the jurisdiction, arraignment may
also be the proceeding at which the court determines
whether to set bail for the defendant or release the
defendant on his or her own recognizance.
Although the initial appearance of the
arrested person before a magistrate is sometimes
referred to as an arraignment, it is not a true
arraignment, which only comes after the
DEFEN-
DANT
has been both arrested and formally
charged. In all but extremely rare cases, arraign-
ment also takes place before any suppression
hearings and the trial itself. The interests at issue
in an arraignment are the defendant’s right to
know of the charges against him or her and the
defendant’s right to have adequate information
from which to prepare a defense. The state also
has an interest in having the defendant make a
PLEA so it can prepare accordingly.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
368 ARRAIGNMENT
The SIXTH AMENDMENT to U.S. Constitution
guarantees that defendants shall “be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them.” But the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee defendants the right to be informed
of the charged offense at an arraignment.
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that
arraignments are a necessary pre-condition to

trial under federal law, the Court has also ruled
that failure to arraign a defendant is not a
reversible error where the failure is inadvertent,
the defendant knows that he is the accused, the
defendant is apprised of the charged offense, the
defendant is able to assist in preparing a defense,
and the defendant is not otherwise prejudiced by
the lack of an arraignment. Thus the importance
and necessity of being arraigned before trial
varies from case to case and from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The law governing arraignment
procedures is spelled out by statutes and court
rules at both the state and federal levels.
The Federal Rules of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
provide that during the arraignment federal
courts must read the indictment or information
to the defendant or state the substance of the
charge to the defendant and ask him or her to
enter a plea thereto. FR Crim P, Rule 10. The
defendant must also be given a copy of the
indictment or information before he or she is
called upon to plead. Generally speaking, the
federal rules require defendants to be present at
the arraignment. However, in prosec utions for
offenses punishable by fine or imprisonment for
not more than one year, the court, with the
written consen t of the defendant, may permit
arraignment in the defendant’s absence.
The court rules in some states only require

that arraignments be held for felony-level charges,
but not for misdemeanor-level offenses. Other
states require arraignments for felonies, gross
misdemeanors, and misdemeanors punishable
by
INCARCERATION or a fine greater than a certain
amount. In addition to requiring that defen-
dants be called before the court, informed of the
charged offense, and asked to enter a plea, several
state jurisdictions also require that defendants
be informed of certain constitutional rights
during arraignment, including the right to trial
by jury, the right to assistance of counsel, and
the right against
SELF-INCRIMINATION. If the law of
a particular state makes the arraignment a critical
stage of the prosecution, such as when the court
rules require the defendant to raise any defenses
to the charged offense at the arraignment or
WAIVE them, then the defendant must be afforded
the
RIGHT TO COUNSEL under the Sixth Amendment
(Hamilton v.Alabama, 368U.S. 52,82 S.Ct. 157, 7
L.Ed.2d 114 [U.S.Ala. 1961]).
Defendants in both state and federal courts
must be arraigned in a timely fashion. Ordinar-
ily the accused must be arraigned before the
impaneling of the jury or at least before the
introduction of evidence. If an unreasonable
delay occurs between the time a defendant is

arrested and charged with an offense and the
time the defendant is arraigned, state and
federal courts will dismiss the criminal procee d-
ings as having violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial .
Many jurisdictions require that defendants
be arraigned within seventy-two hours of arrest.
As a result, defendants arrested over the
weekend are usually arraigned on Mondays,
which can make for a packed courtroom. To
speed up the arraignment process on busy days,
defendants are often arraigned in groups, which
is constitutionally permissible so long as each
person being arraigned identifies himself or
herself to the court and the court advises all
defendants in attendance that the remarks of the
court apply to each person individually. Courts
conducting group arraignments must also
ascertain on the record that each defendant
was present throughout the entire course of the
arraignment, heard the remarks, and under-
stood them.
The right to be arraigned may ordinarily be
waived, even when the charge is for a felony-
level offense, provided the accused knows the
nature of the charge offense and has a full
opportunity to present a defense. The power to
waive an arraignment must usually be exercised
by the accused in person. Where the right of the
accused to waive an arraignment is recognized,

an express
WAIVER in OPEN COURT is sufficient. An
arraignment may also be waived in a less formal
manner, such as by the voluntary entry of a
plea, by failing to call the court’s attention to a
defect in the proceedings at the proper time, by
announcing readiness for trial, by going to trial
without objection, or by filing motions and
obtaining rulings on issues of law in the case.
CROSS REFERENCES
Hearing; Incarceration; Sixth Amendment; Trial.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ARRAIGNMENT 369
ARRAY
The entire group of jurors selected for a trial from
which a smaller group is subsequently chosen to
form a petit jury or a grand jury; the list of
potential jurors.
Virtually all states have enacted statutes
delineating requirements for jury service. In
most states, convicted felons and insane persons
cannot be jurors. Professional persons such as
judicial and govern ment officials, lawyers,
ministers, and medical personnel may be
exempted by statute from jury service.
As a general rule, a group of local officials
acting within the statutory framework select the
persons who will make up the array.
ARREARS
A sum of money that has not been paid or has

only been paid in part at the time it is due.
A person who is “in arrears” is behind in
payments due and thus has outstanding debts or
liabilities. For example, a tenant who has not
paid rent on the day it is due is in arrears.
Arrears may also refer to the late distribution of
the dividends of cumulative
PREFERRED STOCK.
ARREST
A seizure or forcible restraint; an exercise of the
power to deprive a person of his or her liberty; the
taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal
authority, especially, in response to a criminal
charge.
The purpose of an arrest is to bring the
arrestee before a court or otherwise secure
the administratio n of the law. An arrest serves
the function of notifying the community that
an individual has been accused of a crime
and also may admonish and deter the arrested
individual from committing other crimes.
Arrests can be made on both criminal charges
and civil charges, although civil arrest is a
drastic measure that is not looked upon with
favor by the courts. The federal Constitution
imposes limits on both civil and criminal arrests.
An arrest may occur (1) by the touching or
putting hands on the arrestee; (2) by any act
that in dicates an intentio n to take the arrestee
into custody and that subjects the arrestee to

the actual control and will of the person making
the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to
be arrested. There is no arrest where there is no
restraint, and the restraint must be under real or
pretended legal authority. However, the deten-
tion of a person need not be accompanied by
formal words of arrest or a station house
booking to constitute an arrest.
The test used to determine whether an
arrest took place in a particular case is objective,
and it turns on whether a
REASONABLE PERSON
under these circumstances would believe he or
she was restrained or free to go. A reasonable
person is one who is not guilty of criminal
conduct, overly apprehe nsive, or insensitive to
the seriousness of the circumstances. Reason-
ableness is not determined in light of a defen-
dant’s subjective knowledge or fears. The
subjective intent of the police is also normally
irrelevant to a court’s determination whether an
arrest occurred, unless the officer makes that
intent know n. Thus, a defendant’s presence at a
police station by consent does not become an
arrest solely by virtue of an officer’s subjective
view that the
DEFENDANT is not free to leave,
absent an act indicating an intention to take the
defendant into custody.
An arrest constitutes a

SEIZURE under the
FOURTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution,
and thus the procedures by which a person is
arrested must comply with the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment or the
arrest will be invalidated and any evidence seized
during the arrest or confessions made after
the arrest will typically be suppressed. The
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that arrests made
without a valid
ARREST WARRANT based on
PROBABLE CAUSE are presumptively invalid under
the Fourth Amen dment. Similarly, arrests made
pursuant to a warrant that is later ruled defective
may also be declared invalid, unless the officer
in procuring the warrant and making the arrest
acted in
GOOD FAITH.
However, warrantless arrests do pass con-
stitutional muster under some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has ruled that warrantless
arrests can be made when the circumstances
make it reasonable to do so. For example, no
warrant is required for a
FELONY arrest in a
public place, even if the arresting officer had
ample time to procure a warrant, so long as the
officer possessed probable cause that the suspect
committed the crime. Felony arrests in places
not open to the public generally do require a

warrant, unless the officer is in
HOT PURSUIT of a
fleeing
FELON. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
370 ARRAY
87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), The
Fourth Amendment also allows warrantles s
arrests for misdemeanors committed in an
officer’s presence.
The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement are based on the court’s
reluctance to unduly impede the job of law
enforcement officials. Courts attempt to strike
a balance between the practical realities of
daily police work and the privacy and freedom
interests of the public. Always requiring police
officers to take the time to obtain an arrest
warrant could result in the destruction of
evidence, the disappearance of suspects, or
both.
When an officer does seek an arrest warrant,
the officer must present evidence to a neutral
judge or magistrate sufficient to establish
probable cause that a crime has been commit-
ted. The Supreme Court has said that probable
cause exists when the facts within an officer’s
knowledge provide a reasonably trustworthy
basis for a person of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been committed or

is about to be committ ed. Courts will deny
requests when the warrant fails to describe in
particularized detail the person to be arrested.
The evidence upon which a warrant is based
need not be ultimately
ADMISSIBLE at trial, but it
cannot be based on
KNOWINGLY or intentionally
false statements, or statements made in reckless
disregard of the truth. However, inaccuracies
found in a warrant due to ordinary
NEGLIGENCE
will not typically jeopardize a warrant’s validity.
Police officers need no justification to stop
someone on a public street and ask questions,
and individuals are completely entitled to refuse
to answer any such questions and go about their
business. However, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits police officers from detaining pedes-
trians and conducting any kind of search of
their clothing without first possessing a reason-
able and articulable
SUSPICION that the pedes-
trians are engaged in criminal activity.
TERRY V.
OHIO, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 21 L. Ed. 889
(1968). Police may not even compel a pedestri-
an to produce identification without first
meeting this standard. Similarly, police may
not stop motorists without first having a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
driver has violated a traffic law. If a police
officer has satisfied this standard in stopping a
motorist, the officer may conduct a search of
the vehicle’s interior, including the glove com-
partment, but not the trunk, unless the officer
has probable cause to believe that it contains
CONTRABAND or the instruments for criminal
activity.
Investigatory stops or detentions must be
limited and temporary, lasting no longer than
necessary to carry out the purpose of the stop or
detention. An investigatory stop that lasts too
long turns into a
DE FACTO arrest that must
comply with the warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. But no bright line exists
for determining when an investigatory stop
becomes a de facto arrest, as courts are reluctant
to hamstring the flexibility and discretion of
police officers by placing artificial time limita-
tions on the fluid and dynamic nature of their
investigations. Rather, the test is whether the
detention is temporary and whether the police
acted with reasonable dispatch to quickly
confirm or dispel the suspicions that initially
induced the investigative detention.
An anti-war protester
is arrested on charges
of disorderly conduct

and obstruction of
government
administration by
a New York police
officer. The
procedures by which
a person is arrested
must comply with
the protections
guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.
AP IMAGES
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ARREST 371
A sample arrest
warrant
F.C.A. §§153, 153-a
Arrest Warrant
General Form 3
(Warrant of Arrest)
FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF

In the Matter of
Petitioner(s)
against
Respondent(s)

IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

TO ANY (POLICE)(PEACE) OFFICER IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
A petition under Article __________ of the Family Court Act having been filed in this Court, a copy of which is annexed hereto,
and it appearing that one of the grounds for issuance of a warrant as specified in the Family Court Act exists,
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED forthwith to arrest [specify name(s)]:
and bring said person(s) before this Court to be dealt with according to law.
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED, under the Family Court Act, to bring before this Court the following child or children:
Name(s) Date(s) of Birth
THIS WARRANT [check applicable box(es)]:

ٗ may ٗ may not be executed on Sunday.

ٗ may ٗ may not be executed at night.

ٗ is subject to the following restriction(s) [specify]:
Dated: _______________________________________ , ____.
Docket No. __________________
WARRANT OF ARREST
[continued]
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
372 ARREST
Not all arrests are made by members of law
enforcement. Many jurisdictions permit private
citizens to make arrests. Popularly known as
citizen’sarrests,the circumstances under which
private citizens may place each other under arrest
are normally very limited. All jurisdictions that
authorize citizen’s arrests prohibit citizens from
making arrests for unlawful acts committed
outside their presence. Most jurisdictions that
authorize citizen’s arrests also allow citizens to

make arrests only for serious crimes, such as
felonies and gross misdemeanors, and then only
when the arresting citizen has probable cause to
believe the arrestee committed the serious crime.
Witnessing the crime in person will normally
establish probable cause for making an arrest.
Both private citizens and law enforcement
officers may be held liable for the tort of
FALSE
ARREST
in civil court. An ACTION for false arrest
requires proof that the process used for the
arrest was void on its face. In other words, one
who confines another, while purporting to act
by authority of law which does not in fact exist,
makes a false arrest and may be required to pay
money damages to the victim. To make out a
claim for false arrest, the
PLAINTIFF must show
that the charges on which he or she was arrested
ultimately lacked justification. That is, the
plaintiff in a false arrest action must show that
the arrest was made without probable cause and
for an improper purpose.
CROSS REFERENCES
Accusation; Charge; Civil Procedure; Contraband; Criminal
Action; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; De Facto;
Evidence; Felony; Fourth Amendment; Hot Pursuit;
Liability; Probable Cause; Seizure; Tort Law.
ARREST OF JUDGMENT

The postponement or stay of an official decision of a
court, or the refusal to render such a determination,
after a verdict has been reached in an action at law
or a criminal prosecution, because some defect
appears on the face of the record that, if a decision
is made, would make it erroneous or reversible.
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT PARENT(S) IN CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT CASES:
PLACEMENT OF YOUR CHILD IN FOSTER CARE MAY RESULT IN YOUR LOSS OF YOUR RIGHTS TO YOUR CHILD. IF YOUR CHILD STAYS
IN FOSTER CARE FOR 15 OF THE MOST RECENT 22 MONTHS, THE AGENCY MAY BE REQUIRED BY LAW TO FILE A PETITION TO
TERMINATE YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS AND MAY FILE BEFORE THE END OF THE 15 MONTH PERIOD. IF SEVERE OR REPEATED ABUSE
IS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THIS FINDING MAY CONSTITUTE THE BASIS TO TERMINATE YOUR PARENTAL
RIGHTS.
Family Court Act §155(1) provides that: “ If an adult respondent is arrested under this act when the family court is not in session, he or
she shall be taken to the most accessible magistrate and arraigned. The production of a warrant issued by the family court, a certificate of
warrant, a copy or a certificate of the order of protection or temporary order of protection, an order of protection or temporary order of
protection, or a record of such warrant or order from the statewide computer registry established pursuant to section 221-a of the
executive law shall be evidence of the filing of an information, petition or sworn affidavit, as provided in section 154-d of this article. Upon
consideration of the bail recommendation, if any, made by the family court and indicated on the warrant or certificate of warrant, the
magistrate shall thereupon commit such respondent to the custody of the sheriff, as defined in subdivision 35 of section 1.20 of the
criminal procedure law, admit to, fix or accept bail, or parole him or her for hearing before the family court, subject to the provisions of
subdivision four of section 530.11 of the criminal procedure law concerning arrests upon a violation of an order of protection.”
Family Court Act §155-a provides that: “A desk officer in charge at a police station, county jail or police headquarters, or any of his or her
superior officers, may, in such place, take cash bail for his or her appearance before the appropriate court the next morning from any
person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the family court; provided that such arrest occurs between eleven o'clock in the morning
and eight o'clock the next morning, except that in the city of New York bail shall be taken between two o'clock in the afternoon and eight
o'clock the next mornin
g
. The amount of such cash bail shall be the amount fixed in the warrant of arrest.”
Arrest Warrant
________________________________________________

FAMILY COURT JUDGE
BAIL IN THE SUM OF ($ ) DOLLARS IS RECOMMENDED.
___________________________________________________
FAMILY COURT JUDGE
A sample arrest
warrant (continued)
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ARREST OF JUDGMENT 373
Although the Federal Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE
make no such prov ision, state codes of civil
procedure should be c onsulted concerning the
issuance of an arrest of judgment in actions at law.
In criminal proceedings, a
DEFENDANT must
make a motion for an arrest of judgment when
the indictment or information fails to charge
the accused with an offense or if the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged. State and
federal rules of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE govern an
arrest of judgment in criminal prosecutions.
ARREST WARRANT
A written order issued by authority of the state

and commanding the seizure of the person named.
An arrest warrant must be based on a
complaint that alleges
PROBABLE CAUSE that the
person named has committed a specific offense,
and it must be issued according to the formalities
required by the rules of the court. The Federal
Rules of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE specify that the
warrant must be signed by the magistrate and
must describe the offense charged. The
DEFEN-
DANT
must be named or described in such a way
that he or she can be identified with reasonable
certainty. The warrant must also command that
the defendant be arrested and brought before the
nearest available magistrate.
ARROGATION
Claiming or seizing something without justifi ca-
tion; claiming something on behalf of another. In
civil law, the adoption of an adult who was legally
capable of acting for himself or herself.
ARSON
At common law, the malicious burning or
exploding of the dwelling house of another, or
the burning of a building within the curtilage, the
immediate surrounding space, of the dwelling of
another.
Modern legislation has extended the defini-

tion of arson to include the burning or exploding
of commercial and public buildings—such as
restaurants and schools—and structures—such
as bridges. In many states, the act of burning any
insured dwelling, regardless of whether it belongs
to another, constitutes arson if it is done with
an in tent to
DEFRAUD the insurer. Finally, the
common-law rule that the property burned must
belong to another person has been completely
eliminated by statute in some states.
Elements
The main elements necessary to prove arson are
evidence of a burning and evidence that a criminal
act caused the fire. The accused must intend to
burn a building or other structure. Absent a
statutory description of the conduct required
for arson, the conduct must be malicious, and
not accidental. Malice, however, does not mean
ill will. Intentional or outrageously reckless con-
duct is sufficient to constitute malice. Motive, on
the other hand, is not an essential element of
arson.
Unless a statute extends the crime to other
property, only a house used as a residence, or
buildings immediately surr ounding it, can be
the subject of arson. If a house is vacated, is
7,986
692
7,600

714
8,529
664
8,861
775
Property Loss in Intentionally Set Fires, 2003 to 2007
9,905
733
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Property loss, in millions of dollars
Intentionally set structural fires
Structural fires
SOURCE: National Fire Protection Association, “2006 U.S. Fire Loss,” NFPA
Journal, November 2007 and prior issues, and Fire Loss in the United States,
Au
g
ust 2008.
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE

LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
374 ARREST WARRANT
closed up, or becomes unfit for human habita-
tion, its burning will not constitute arson. A
temporary absence from a dwelling will not
negate its character as a residence.
Generally, the actual presence of a person
within a dwelling at the moment it is burned is
not necessary. It may, however, be required for
a particular degree of the crime. The fact, and
not the knowledge, of human occupancy is what
is essential. If a dwelling is burned under the
impression that it is uninhabited when people
actually live in it, the crime is commi tted.
Absent a statute to the contrary, a person is
innocent of arson if that individual burns his or
her own property while living there. The
common exception to this rule is the burning
of one’s own property with an intent to defraud
or prejudice the property insurer. In addition,
under statutes that punish the burning of a
dwelling house without expressly requiring it to
be the property of another, a person who burns
his or her own property might be guilty of
arson. An owner, for purposes of arson, is the
person who possesses the house and has the
care, control, and management of it. In those
states that have maintained the common-law

rule that the property burned must belong to
another person, an owner who burns his or her
house while it is in the possession of a lawful
tenant is guilty of arson.
Degrees
In many states arson is divided into degrees,
depending sometimes on the value of the
property but more commonly on its use and
whether the crime was committed in the day
or night. A typical statute might make the
burning of an inhabited dwelling house at night
first-degree arson, the burning of a building
close enough to a dwelling so as to endanger it
second-degree arson, and the burning of any
structure with an intent to defraud an insurer
thereof, third-degree arson. Many statutes vary
the degree of the crime according to the
criminal intent of the accused.
Punishment
Arson is a serious crime that was punishable
by death under the
COMMON LAW. Presently, it
is classified as a
FELONY under most s tatutes,
punishable by either imprisonment or deat h.
Many jurisdictions impose prison sentences
commensurate with the seriousness of the
criminal intent of the accused. A finding,
therefore, that the offense was committed inten-
tionally will result in a longer prison sentence

than a finding that it was done recklessly. When a
human life is endangered, the penalty is most
severe.
ART LAW
The Framers of the Constitution acknowledged
the importance of the arts when they wrote
that Cong ress shall have the power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and use ful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries” (Art. I, § 8). Despite
this provision, or perhaps because of its very
limited nature, the federal government offered
little assistance to artists until the 1930s. Early
unsuccessful attempts to aid the arts included
an effort by President
JAMES BUCHANAN to
establish the National Commission of Fine Arts,
a project that failed within a year when
Congress did not appropriate funds. President
Number of Intentionally Set Fires, 2003 to 2007
Year
Number of fires, in thousands
0
100
2003 2004 2005 2006
38
482
37
489

32
479
493
31
498
32.5
2007
200
300
400
500
600
SOURCE: National Fire Protection Association, “2006 U.S. Fire Loss,” NFPA
Journal, November 2007 and prior issues, and Fire Loss in the United States,
Au
g
ust 2008.
Intentionally set structural fires
Structural fires
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ART LAW 375
THEODORE ROOSEVELT also encountered a reluctant
Congress half a century later when he proposed

the Council of Fine Arts, but success came when
his successor,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, persuaded
Congress to create the National Commission of
Fine Arts.
Even after the National Commission of Fine
Arts was established, the federal government
continued to play a minor role in funding the
arts, but several municipal programs attempted
to fill the void. In New York City the Civil
Works Administration (CWA) sponsored paint-
ings, murals, and art education. The primary
goal of the CWA was to create employment for
artists receiving government relief. With the
only requirement for employment being an
assertion that the applicant was an artist, the art
produced under the CWA was often the work of
unskilled amateurs.
Federal funding for the arts took off during
the Great Depression with the creation of the
Federal Art Project, a branch of the Works
Progress Administration (WPA). The Federal
Art Project was modeled on some of the earlier
municipal attempts but avoided their problems
by emphasizing the production of wor ks of
high technical competence, utilizing defined
hiring guidelines, and encouraging creativity
and experimentation. The Federal Art Project
paid a security wage, an amount that was
calculated to fall between the prevailing wage

and the relief grants of the region involved
and was graduated according to skill level. The
WPA spent $35 million on the Federal Art Project
and supported the production of approximately
1,500 murals, 18,800 sculptures, and 108,000
paintings as well as other works of art. The onset
of
WORLD WAR II effectively ended the WPA.
Lucile Lloyd puts the
finishing touches on
a new mural in the
California State
Building in Los
Angeles in December
1936. The work was
completed under the
auspices of the Federal
Art Project.
BETTMANN/CORBIS.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
376 ART LAW
In the COLD WAR era following World War II,
the federal government funded cultural
exchanges to promote diplomatic ends. The
major cultural institutions were located primarily
in large cities, such as New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and Boston. In 1965 only five state arts
agencies existed. The quality of performances
and exhibitions was inconsistent, and support for

the best art depended on the discretion and
charity of a few patrons. As a result, opportu-
nities for artists were limited, and rural audiences
had few chances to see the best productions or
visit outstanding exhibitions.
In the mid-1990s, federal financial support
for the arts and humanities was provided
through several distinct agencies: the National
Commission of Fine Arts, the National Endow-
ment for the Arts (NEA), and the National
Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). The
Commission of Fine Arts, established in 191 0,
advises the president, Congress, and govern-
ment department heads on matters of architec-
ture, sculpture, painting, and other fine arts.
The commission’s primary function is to
preserve and enhance the appearance of the
nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. (40 U.S.C.A.
§ 104 [1986]).
The National Foundation for the Arts and
Humanities Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.A. §§ 951–
968 [West Supp. 1990]) established the NEA
and the NEH. The NEA provides grants to, or
contracts with, groups and individuals of
exceptional talent, and state or regional organi-
zations engag ed in or concerned with the arts.
NEA programs encourage individual and insti-
tutional development of the arts, preservation of
the American artistic heritage, wider availability
of the arts, leadership in the arts, and the

stimulation of nonfederal sources of supp ort for
the nation’s artistic activities. The goal of the
NEA is not to provide employment, as the WPA
did, but rather to make the arts more widely
available to U.S. citizens, to preserve the
nation’s rich cultural heritage, and to encourage
the creative development of the nation’s finest
artistic talent. By 2003 the NEA had made more
than 120,000 grants for theater, dance, sym-
phonic music, painting, and poetry.
As a major financier of the arts, the NEA has
been a significant influence on much of the
publicly exhibited art in the United States. For
many years it led a quiet administrative
existence, and although it was a force in the
artistic community, the general public knew
little about it. In late 1989, however, the
organization became the center of controversy
when some members of Congress questioned
whether some works of art and performances
funded by the NEA were
OBSCENE. The NEA had
provided funding for exhibits featuring the
works of artists including Rober t Mapplethorpe
and Andres Serrano. Mapplethorpe’s exhibit
included sexually explicit photographs of men,
and Serra no’s exhibit included a jar of urine
into which a photograph of a crucifix had been
placed. The uproar from the public, and from
members of Congress, was so strong that in

1990 Congress enacted a law that required the
NEA to take into consideration “general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public. ” This
became known as the decency test.
Over the next several years other controver-
sial grants were awarded and challenged, culmi-
nating in a case that went to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The case, National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley 524 U.S. 569, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 141
L.Ed. 2d 500 (1998), was brought by four artists
including Karen Finley. Finley became infamous
for a performance art piece in which she would
remove her clothing and smear chocolate on her
body. The work, she explained, symbolized the
way women were exploited in society. Finley and
her fellow plaintiffs argued that the 1990 statute
was unconstitutional and that the decency test
was a violation of the rights of free speech and
due process.
A district court agreed and the U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the district court ’s decision in
1996 100 F. 3d 671 (9th Cir.) In 1998 the
Supreme Court ruled 8 to 1 that the law was
constitutional, and that it violated no rights.
Grant-seekers, the court noted, were required to
submit their proposals to a panel representing
diverse points of view; as such, the risk that an
arbitrary ruling of indecency would be reached
was minimal. In his dissent, however, Justice

DAVID H. SOUTER warned that the law could force
artists to censor their own work to ensure that it
would not offend anyone in a position to
approve a grant.
The NEH funds activities are designed to
improve the quality of education and teaching
in the humanities, strengthen the scholarly
foundation for humanities study and research,
and advance understanding of the humanities
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ART LAW 377