Unlike the family’s home or station wagon,
the husband’s earning power has not yet
reached its full value, but it promises to grow.
It seems especially unfair for the wife not to
receive a share of it since after helping the
husband attain his education she agreed to
FORFEIT her earning power to invest time in the
family. The several years she spent out of the
workforce continue to handicap her earnings.
Alimony is the only means available to the court
to avoid a potentially unjust division of assets.
The judge in this case may award alimony
or may award a token amount—such as $1 a
year—so that the wife has the option to request
an increase later on (modifying an award is
easier than winning one after the divorce). Or
the judge may award no alimony; judges are not
required to award alimony.
The
HUSBAND AND WIFE in this example are
unlikely to find a single solution they both
consider equitable. In trying to reach an order
that is fair, judges must balance spouses’ con-
tributions and sacrifices during the marriage
with their needs after the divorce. Although the
result may not match both spouses’ ideas of
what is fair, one of alimony’s biggest virtues is
its flexibility: it can always be changed.
Alimony can be modified or eliminated
as the former spouses’ needs change, if those
needs are the result of decisions they made as a

married unit. Awards and increases in alimony
are meant to address only needs that are caused
by the divorce itself, not unrelated needs. If the
wife’s elderly mother becomes ill and dependent
on her after the divorce, for example, the wife’s
need increases, but the increase is unrelated to
the divorce and will not increase her eligibility
for alimony. However, a significant change in
circumstances—such as a rise in the recipient’s
income or a drop in the payer’s income—can
cause the court to reduce or end alimony. Occa-
sionally, courts increase alimony to keep up with
inflation.
Many courts have indicated that situations
such as maltreatment are not
VALID triggers for
alimony. Courts have clarified that allegations
of physical or other harm done by one spouse
must be brought in a civil lawsuit, to be heard
and decided by a jury. In successful cases,
compensatory and
PUNITIVE DAMAGES would be
awarded, not alimony.
Even in less egreg ious cases, alimony is not
awarded as a punishment, especially in states
that have adopted no-fault divorce laws—that
is, laws providing that neither spouse has to
prove wrongdoing on the part of the other.
Gaps in earning power that tend in general
to favor men over women create another

situation that many courts believe they cannot
resolve using alimony. Such gaps are often the
reason married couples decide that if it is ap-
propriate for only one spouse to be the wage
earner, it should be the husband. But courts do
not base individual alimony awards on this
trend alone, in part because an individual spouse
cannot be held responsible for social injustices.
In fact, state laws specifying the gender of
the paying spouse and of the receiving spouse
have been ruled unconstitutional. In deciding
Orr v. Orr 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 59 L. Ed.
2d 306 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that Alabama state law, which specified that
husbands may be ordered to pay support to
wives, but not vice versa, violated the
EQUAL
PROTECTION
Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT
. The case arose when William Orr, who
had been ordered to pay alimony, was taken to
court by his ex-wife for failure to pay. Orr’s
defense included a motion requesting that the
Alabama alimony statute be declared unconsti-
tutional. Although Orr was not seeking alimony
from his ex-wife, he argued that the award to
her would decrease if his circumstances were
considered in addition to hers. The Supreme
Court decision supporting Orr meant that

gender could not be considered in awarding
alimony (although even in 1990s very few
alimony awards are made in favor of men).
Modern underpinnings for alimony have
little to do with gender, but this was not always
so. The U.S. model of alimony is based on
ecclesiastical law (guidelines of the Christian
RELIGION), dating from a time in England’s
history when divorce did not exist. Unhappily
married couples could live separately, but the
husband was still obliged to support the wife
financially. This arrangement was known as a
divorce
A MENSA ET THORO (“from bed and board,”
in Latin), and was not really a
TERMINATION of
the marriage. This limited divorce did not allow
the parties to remarry, for example, and did not
affect
INHERITANCE rules. The wife remained her
husband’s dependent, and alimony was seen as
his ongoing marital obligation to her.
When full divorce became available, the idea
of alimony continued, but with some important
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
238 ALIMONY
differences. In the early 2000s, alimony awards
were being made based not on men’s and
women’s roles, but on relative needs arising from
decisions made during the marriage. Alimony is

not an aspect of marriage, as it was in divorce a
MENSA ET THORO, but only becomes necessary—
and available—from the time of divorce. Because
the considerations that enter into a divorce
award are sometimes compl ex, courts usually
clarify the award’s purpose and may place a
time limit on it.
No mathematical guidelines exist to tell
courts how to calculate alimony. In addition,
each state legislature sets its own policy regarding
whether and when alimony may be awarded. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),
which many states use as a model, recommends
that courts consider the following factors: the
financial condition of the person requesting
alimony; the time the recipient would need for
education or job training; the standard of living
the couple had during the marriage; the length
of the marriage; the age, physical condition, and
emotional state of the person requesting ali-
mony; and the ability of the other person to
support the recipient and still support himself
or herself.
Courts have at times awarded alimony when
an unmarried couple separates, if the relation-
ship closely resembled marriage or in other
circumstances, s uch as in k eeping wi t h the c ouple’s
intentions and verbal agreements. Awards of
this type are informally called palimony. Private
separation agreements negotiated between di-

vorcing individuals also can contain alimony
provisions. For these reasons, it is difficult to
estimate accurately the size and frequency of
awards through the most common method, U.S.
census data.
If awards are hard to estimate,
COMPLIANCE
with awards is nearly impossible to gauge.
Alimony enforcement is unlike child support
enforcement, which has the “teeth” of wage
GARNISHMENT, liens, and other mechanisms. Re-
turning to court with contempt-of-court charges
is usually the only option a would-be recipient
has to enforce an existing alimony order.
If the divorce
DECREE does not specify an
ending date, an order to pay alimony usually
remains effective until the court that awarded
it changes or ends it. Alimony usually ends
when the recipient remarries; this is known as
terminable alimony. In the case of the
recipient’s remarriage, the payer sometimes
must return to court to have the court change
the alimony order, but often the termination is
automatic.
The payer’s death is not necessarily enough
to end payments: some orders allow the reci-
pient to inherit funds from the payer’s estate or
require the payer to maintain a life insurance
policy that will continue to support the reci-

pient after the payer’s death. These provisions,
when made, often involve a recipient whose age
or health makes it too difficult for the recipient
to enter or reenter the workforce.
On September 1, 1995, Texas became the
last state in the country to authorize the award
of alimony payments in divorce proceedings.
TX FAMILY § 8.001. Until then, Texas courts
had ruled that the state constitution prohibited
alimony awards because alimony was not marital
property existing at the time of the divorce. Ins-
tead, Texas courts said that alimony awards
necessarily involved calculations based solely on
the future, post-divorce earnings of the ex-spouse
who would be making the alimony payments.
Texas courts also observed that spouses who
sacrificed educational or career opportunities
during the marriage to raise children so their
spouses could pursue ed ucational or career
opportunities of their own could be adequately
compensated for their sacrifice by receiving a
larger share of the marital property than spouses
who had not made such a sacrifice. In other
words, Texas courts believed that since they had
the power to give one spouse a larger share of
the marital property to compensate for any
career or educational sacrifices that spouse made
during the marriage, there was no need to award
alimony too. Courts also questioned why ex-
spouses should be under any obligation to

support each other after divorce, when the
whole purpose of divorce is to end the costs and
benefits of marriage.
But judges, lawyers, and scholars increas-
ingly criticized the Texas statutory scheme as
being unrealistic. For example, before 1995
Texas courts routinely ordered ex-spouses to
pay child support from their so-called post-
divorce “future earnings,” and these orders
survived scrutiny under the state constitution.
Critics of Texas law saw no reason why state
courts could not order ex-spouses to also pay
alimony out of wages and salary they earned
after the marriage terminated.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALIMONY 239
Additionally, critics assailed the absence of
alimony provisions in Texas FAMILY LAW as being
unduly harsh. In a large number of divorces
where neither spouse had acquired substantial
assets during the marriage, Texas courts were
powerless to compensate spouses who had
sacrificed educational and career opportunities,
since in such situations there were essentially no
assets to divide in the first place. As a result,
spouses who successfully pursued educational
or career opportunities at the expense of their
partner were allowed to walk away from the
marriage “scot-free.”
Despite the late twentieth-century univer-

sality of alimony laws in the all 50 states,
lawmakers in some jurisdictions continued to
propose legislation that would abolish it. In 1999
several Iowa legislators proposed a bill to abolish
alimony, arguing that alimony laws provide
incentive to get divorced. The bill never passed.
Because alimony is an award for support
and maintenance that one spouse may be
compelled to pay to another after
DISSOLUTION
of the marriage, it would seem to follow that no
alimony could be awarded to a spouse follow-
ing an
ANNULMENT, which treats the marriage
relationship as if it had never existed. In fact,
alimony is not awarded to spouses under any
conditions following the annulment of a mar-
riage in most jurisdictions. However, in some
jurisdictions the enforcement of a flat
PROHIBITION
of alimony awards to spouses whose marriages
have been annulled has sometimes been found
to impose unnecessary hardship on a spouse,
usually the wife, especially where the parties
have lived together for a considerable period of
time. Consequently, judicial and legislative
exceptions have been created to the basic rule
of treating an annulled marriage as if it had
never existed, for the purposes of determining
whether an alimony award is appropriate.

Under these exceptions, temporary as well as
permanent alimony have been awarded.
FURTHER READINGS
“Alimony Strategies” 2003. Family Advocate 25, vol. 4 (spring).
American Law Institute. 2002. Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. Newark, NJ:
Bender.
Sheldon, John C., and Nancy Diesel Mills. 1993. In Search of
a Theory of Alimony. Orono, ME.: Univ. of Maine
School of Law 45.
Storey, Brenda L. 2003. “Surveying the Alimony Landscape:
Origin, Evolution and Extinction.” Family Advocate
25 (spring).
CROSS REFERENCES
A Mensa Et Thoro; Child Support; Damages; Divorce;
Family Law; Husband and Wife; Marriage; No Fault
Divorce; Sex Discrimination.
v
ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR.
SAMUEL ALITO is a conservative justice appointed
to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006. Upon his
confirmation, he became the 110th associate
justice in the Court’s history and only the
second Italian- American. He replaced Sandra
Day O’Connor on the Court.
Alito was born on April 1, 1950, in Trenton,
New Jersey. His father emigrated from Italy as a
boy and became a high school teacher. His
father later changed careers in the 1950s to
work as the research director of a nonpartisan

agency that analyzed legislation for state legis-
lators. Alito’s mother was an elementary school
principal. Alito excelled as a student, deciding
on a legal career after discovering a special
affinity for in-depth research and finely honed
argument on the high school debate team. He
graduated as valedictorian of his class and
headed off to Princeton University in 1968.
After receiving his undergraduate degree in
1972, Alito pursued a law degree at Yale Law
School, where he graduated in 1975. At Yale he
served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal and
quickly became known as a traditionalist with a
quick intellect. It was a reputation that he was to
carry with him throughou t his working life. In
1976 Alito was hired as a law clerk by Third
CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals Judge Leonard I. Garth
(who eventually became a colleague when Alito
was named to the same bench). Af ter clerking
for Garth, Alito spent 1977 to 1981 as an
assistant U.S. attorney in New Jersey. He then
went to Washington, D.C., to work for the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, first as an assistant to the
SOLICITOR GENERAL from 1981 to 1985 and then as
a deputy assistant attorney general from 1985 to
1987. In the former position, he argued several
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. By 1987
Alito returned to New Jersey as U.S. attorney, in
which role he handled cases from
ORGANIZED

CRIME
to CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
Alito took a seat on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1990. While
his time there undisputedly marked him as a
solidly conservative
JURIST, it also showed a man
unwilling to express his politic al views openly.
He was widely respected by Democrats and
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
240 ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR.
Republicans alike, and few saw him as either
rigid or an ideologue. Still, one of Alito’s
controversial opinions was his lone
DISSENT in
a 1991 case that struck down a Pennsylvania law
requiring married women seeking abortions to
inform their husbands Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F. 2d
682). He also concluded in a 1998 opinion that
a holiday display that included secular symbols
along with religious ones did not violate the
FIRST AMENDMENT. By contrast, Alito voted with
the majority to find a ban on late-term
abortions unconstitutional where there is no
exception co nsidering the health of the mother.
These, and the broad array of other published
opinions stemming from 15 years on the bench,
were to come under intense scrutiny when Alito
was nominated to replace retiring U.S. Supreme

Court Justice O’Connor in October 2005.
Alito’s nomination came in the wake of
the withdrawal of previous nominee Harriet
E. Miers, whom many believed was unqualified
for the position. It also came at a time when
President
GEORGE W. BUSH was lagging in the polls
and there was increasing acrimony between
parties in the Senate. The situation was further
sharpened by O’Connor’s pivotal role as a
centrist justice on a fairly divided Court, thus
making the stakes particularly high for both
parties in finding a suitable replacement. In
short, there was little doubt that Alito’s
confirmation hearings were destined to be
difficult and time-consuming, with conservative
and liberal agendas likely to take precedence.
Several groups, including the
AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
, strongly opposed Alito’s nomi-
nation. According to the ACLU, Alito had
displayed a “willingness to support government
actions that abridge individual freedoms.” In
reviewing Alito’s professional qualifications,
though, a committee of the
AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
concluded that Alito was “well-
qualified” to serve on the Court.

As expected, the ideological battle between
the parties caused great friction and talk of
filibustering the Alito nomination. Despite
Democratic attempts to block a vote on the
nomination by filibustering, a Sen ate closure
motion ended debate by a 72-25 vote. The
closure motion forced a vote on the nomina-
tion, and the Senate confirmed Alito by a 58-42
vote, the smallest margin since
CLARENCE THOMAS
Samuel Alito.
STEVE PETTEWAY,
COLLECTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
▼▼
▼▼
1950
2010
1970 1990
◆
◆◆ ◆◆◆ ◆◆◆
Samuel Anthony Alito Jr. 1950–
1950 Born,
Trenton,
N.J.
1972 Received
B.A. from Princeton
1975 Graduated
from Yale

Law School
1977–81 Served as assistant
U.S. attorney in New Jersey
1981–85 Moved to Washington, D.C.;
served as assistant to the solicitor general
1985–87 Served as
deputy assistant
attorney general
1987 Named
U.S. attorney
in New Jersey
1990 Appointed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit
1991 Dissented
in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
2006 Appointed to U.S.
Supreme Court with
a 58–42 Senate vote
2007 Voted with the majority
in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003
2008 Wrote
majority opinion
for Gomez-
Perez v. Potter
1950–53
Korean War

1961–73
Vietnam War
2001 September 11
terrorist attacks
❖
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR. 241
was confirmed in 1991. Alito was sworn in on
January 31, 2006.
Since his confirmation, Alito has generally
voted with t he Court’s conservative block, though
he has voted differently in some cases from other
conservative justices, including
ANTONIN SC ALIA .
During his second year on the Court, Alito voted
with the majority in Gonzales v. Carhart (550 U.S.
124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 [2007]),
where the Court upheld a challenge to the federal
Partial-Birth
ABORTION Ban Act of 2003. This
marked the f irst abortion case the C ourt heard
since Alito and Chief Justice
JOHN ROBERTS became
members of the Court. Alito and Roberts joined
the majority opinion of Justice
ANTHONY KENNEDY,
along with Scalia and Thomas.
In 2008 Alito wrote the majority opinion in
Gomez-Perez v. Potter (128 S. Ct. 29, 168 L. Ed. 2d
806), where the Court held that a federal e mployee

could assert a claim for retaliation resulting from
the employee’s filing of a complaint for
AGE
DISCRIMINATION
. Significantly, the more liberal
justices on the Court joined Alito’smajority,
while Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas d issented.
Alito is married to the former Martha-Ann
Bomgardner, and they have two children.
FURTHER READINGS
Babington, Charles. 2006. “Alito Is Sworn in on High
Court.” Washington Post. February 1.
Davis, Elliott M. 2007. “The Newer Textualism: Justice
Alito’s Statutory Interpretation.” Harvard Journal of
Law and Public Policy. 30 (Summer).
ALL FOURS
Identical; similar.
All fours specifically refers to two cases or
decisions that have similar fact patterns and
raise identical legal issues. Because the circum-
stances leading to their individual determina-
tions are virtually the same, the decision ren-
dered by the court in each case will be similar.
Such cases or decisions are said to be on all fours
with each other.
ALLEGATION
The assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a
party to an action, setting out what he or she
expects to prove.
If the allegations in a pl aintif f’s complaint are

insufficient to establish that the person’slegal
rights have been vio lated, the
DEFENDANT can make
amotiontothecourttodismissthecomplaintfor
failure to state a
CAUSE OF ACTION. If the allegations
in the defendant’s answer do not contradict the
allegations in the complaint, the
PLAINTIFF can
make a motion for
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
ALLEGE
To state, recite, assert, or charge the existence of
particular facts in a pleading or an indictment; to
make an allegation.
ALLEGIANCE
In English law, the duty of loyalty and obedience
owed by all persons born within the king's realm
that attaches immediately upon their birth and that
they cannot be relieved of by their own actions.
In U.S. law, allegiance is the obligation of
fidelity and obedience that is owed by native born
and naturalized U.S. citizens to the United States
that cannot be relinquished without the consent of
the government expressed by a statutory enactment.
The act of swearing allegiance to the country,
its laws, and its government is a bedrock
requirement of U.S. citizenship reflected in both
state and federal law. Before foreign citizens may
lawfully immigrate to the United States, they

must take an
OATH renouncing their allegiance to
all foreign sovereigns and swearing their alle-
giance to the laws and constitution of the U.S.
government (8 USCA § 1448). The U.S.
Constitution itself requires state and federal
legislators, judicial officers, and
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
officials to take an oath or affirmation to support
itsprovisions(Article6,clause3).
Swearing allegiance to the government is not
always the most i mportant value recognized by U.
S. law. Having won its independence and liberty
from England t hrough a blo ody revolution, the
United States has a long history of respecting
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,freedomofRELIGION, and the
right to
DISSENT in its participatory democracy. In
fact, one reason many Americans remain stead-
fastly loyal to the United States is that U.S. laws
protect their right to dissent,
PROTEST,demon-
strate, and criticize the government.
Public school children in many states learn
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Slightly fewer
than half of the states plus the
TERRITORY of
Guam require public school teachers to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance in class. The majority of
states make recitation discretionary.

IF SOMEONE HAS
BEEN THE SUBJECT OF
ILLEGAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIVI-
TIES
, THEY SHOULD
HAVE A DAY IN
COURT
.AND THAT’S
WHAT THE COURTS
ARE THERE FOR
, TO
PROTECT THE RIGHTS
OF INDIVIDUALS
AGAINST THE GOV-
ERNMENT OR ANYONE
ELSE WHO VIOLATES
THEIR RIGHTS
.
—SAMUEL ALITO
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
242 ALL FOURS
The U.S. Supreme Court, in striking down a
state law that compelled public school students
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, drew upon
this history when it wrote that if “there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force

citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein” (West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87
L. Ed. 1628 [U.S. 1943]).
After the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Barnette, neither the state nor federal
government could lawfully compel public
school children to recite the pledge, though
they could require school teachers and admin-
istrators to lead the pledge, so long as they
allowed students the right to abstain from
reciting it themselves. But the Barnette decision
did not end the controversy over the Pledge of
Allegiance. In 1954 Congress changed the
official version of the pledge to include a
statement that the United States is “one nation
under God” (4 USCA § 4).
The reference to a deity in the pledge promp-
ted several constitutional challenges. Many of
these challenges were raised under the establish-
ment clause of the
FIRST AMENDMENT,whichgene-
rally forbids the state and federal governments
from “establishing” an official religion within
their jurisdiction.
In 2002, one day after a three-judge
PANEL
for the Ninth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals released
a decision holding that recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance in public schools was unconstitu-

tional, the full court voted to stay the decision
pending further consideration. However, on
February 28, 2003, the full court reinstated its
holding that a school district’s policy of
requiring teacher-led recitations of the Pledge
of Allegiance violated the establi shment clause
of the First Amendment by impermissibly
coercing a religious act (Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 328 F.3d 466 [9th Cir. 2003]). At the
same time, in its amended opinion, the Ninth
Circuit declined to rule on the constitutionality
of the words “under God” in the federal statute.
U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson filed a
PETITION for WRIT of certiorari on April 30, 2003,
asking the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the
Ninth Circuit decision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit in Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow (9542 U.S. 1 [2004]).
However, the Court did not address the
constitutional merits of the case. Instead, it
reversed on a procedural technicality, ruling
that Sacramento, California, atheist and di-
vorced parent Michael Newdow lacked the legal
standing to sue on behalf of his daughter
because he did not have legal custody of her,
such custody having been granted to the
mother. (Standing is a legal requirement that
the
PLAINTIFF must have been injured or threat-

ened with injury by the action complained of and
focuses on the question of whether the plaintiff is
the proper party to bring the lawsuit.) In 2005
Newdow, to avoid the standing issue, joined with
three other anonymous parents/families and
again filed legal challenges. In these cases,
defendants included the Rio Linda Union School
District and the United States as a defendant-
intervenor, along with John Carey (the captioned
DEFENDANT), who sought to preserve the current
wording of the Pledge. This time around, the
Ninth Circuit consolidated the three defendants’
cases on appeal for oral arguments in December
2007. As of late 2009, it had not issued its
Children in a
California elementary
school recite the
Pledge of Allegiance.
In June 2002, a Ninth
Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals panel ruled
that the phrase
“under God,” as
contained in the
pledge, violated the
Establishment Clause.
AP IMAGES
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ALLEGIANCE 243

opinion (Newdow v. Carey, Nos. 05-17257,
05-17344, and 06-15093).
Also in 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing of its
2008 decision to let stand a Florida law that
required public school students to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance unless excused by a note
from their parents (Frazier v. Alexandre, 535
F.3d 1279 [2008]). However, the appellate court
struck a provision within the same law that
required students and other civilians to stand
during recitation. In Croft v. Perry (N.D. Tex.,
March 26, 2009), a federal district court threw
out an establishment challenge to the Texas
Pledge of Allegiance, which reads, in relevant
part, “Honor the Texas flag; I pledge allegiance
to thee, Texas, one state under God, one and
indivisible.”
FURTHER READINGS
Bergman, Jerry. 1997. “The Modern Religious Objection to
Mandatory Flag Salute in America: A History and
Evaluation.” Journal of Church and State 39 (spring):
215–36.
Canipe,Lee.2003.“Under God and Anti-communist: How
the Pledge of Allegiance Got Religion in Cold-War
America.” Journal ofChurch and State 45(spring): 305–23.
Ellis, Richard J. 2007. To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the
Pledge of Allegiance. Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. Press of
Kansas.
Sanford, Bill W., Jr. 2003. “Separation v. Patriotism:

Expelling the Pledge from School.” St. Mary’s Law
Journal 34 (winter): 461–502.
CROSS REFERENCES
Citizens; Dissent; Establishment Clause; First Amendment;
Freedom of Speec h; Immigration and Naturalization.
ALLOCATION
The apportionment or designation of an item for a
specific purpose or to a particular place.
In the law of trusts, the allocation of cash
dividends earned by a stock that makes up the
principal of a trust for a
BENEFICIARY usually
means that the dividends will be treated as
income to be paid to the beneficiary. The
allocation of stock dividends generally means
that such dividends will be added to the shares of
stock held as principal, thereby increasing its size.
ALLOCUTION
The formal inquiry by a judge of an accused
person, convicted of a crime, as to whether the
person has any legal cause to show why judgment
should not be pronounced against him or her or as
to whether the person has anything to say to the
court before being sentenced.
ALLODIAL
Free; not subject to the rights of any lord or
superior; owned without obligation of vassalage or
fealty; the opposite of feudal.
A description given to the outright ownership
of land that did not impose upon its owner the

performance of feudal duties.
CROSS REFERENCE
Feudalism.
ALLOGRAPH
A writing or signature made by one person for
another.
When a principal gives his or her agent the
power to pay creditors, the checks written by
the agent are allographs for the principal.
An autograph is the opposite of an allograph.
ALLONGE
Additional paper firmly attached to commercial
paper, such as a promissory note, to provide room
to write endorsements.
An allonge is necessary when there is
insufficient spa ce on the document itself for
the endorsements. It is considered part of the
commercial paper as long as the allonge remains
affixed thereto.
ALLOTMENT
A portion, share, or division. The proportionate
distribution of shares of stock in a corporation.
The partition and distribution of land.
v
ALLRED, GLORIA
Gloria Allred, born July 3, 1941, in Philadelphia,
is a flamboyan t, widely recognized lawyer,
feminist, activist, and radio talk show host.
Though her critics dismiss her as a publicity
monger and a dilettante, Allred has received

praise from others who believe that she is a
master at using the power of the news media to
draw attention to the day-to-day struggles of
ordinary people.
Born Gloria Rachel Bloom, Allred grew up
in Philadelphia with her parents, Morris Bloom,
a door-to-door salesman, and Stella Davidson
Bloom, a homemaker. Her conventional middle-
class childhood gave no hint of the outspoken
activist to come. Allred graduated with honors
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
244 ALLOCATION
from the University of Pennsylvania in 1963
with a bachelor’s degree in English. She moved
to New York to pursue a master’sdegreein
teaching at New York University. While there, she
became interested in the
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
which was beginning to gain momentum. After
earning her master’s degree in 1966, she returned
to Philadelphia to teach at a high school with a
predominantly black enrollment.
Allred says that her interest in the struggle
for equal rights arose from personal experi-
ences. While she was in college, she married,
gave birth to a daughter, and divorced. Unable
to collect
CHILD SUPPORT from her forme r
husband, she was forced to return to her
parents’ home. She also recalls being paid less

than a man for what she considered equal work.
The reason given was that the man had a family
to support, but at the time, Allred as the single
mother also had a dependent to support.
Perhaps the experience that most galvanized
her commitment to equal rights was being
raped and then having to undergo an
ABORTION
at a time when the operation could not legally
be performed by a doctor. She nearly died after
the operation. According to Allred, the experi-
ence made her realize the need for safe and legal
abortions and precipitated her lifelong commit-
ment to the fight for reproductive freedom.
Allred moved to Los Angeles and married
again in 1968, this time to Raymond Allred;
they were divorced in 1987. Allred taught in the
turbulent Watts section of Los Angeles and
became the first full-time female staff member
in United Teachers of Los Angeles, the
union representing Los Angeles’s teachers. The
experience stirred her interest in
CIVIL RIGHTS
and COLLECTIVE BARGAINING and prompted her to
go to law school. She received her law degree,
with honors, from Loyola Marymount Univ er-
sity, Los Angeles, Law School in 1974. Soon
after, she entered a law firm partnership with
her classmates Nathan Goldberg and Michael
Maroko. Allred, Maroko, Goldberg, and Ribak-

off grew during the 1970s and 1980s into a firm
with annual revenues exceeding $2.5 million.
The firm’s caseload has ranged from family and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW to business LITIGATION and
PERSONAL INJURY suits. The firm has won national
Gloria Allred.
AP PHOTOS.
Gloria Allred 1941–
▼▼
▼▼
❖
◆◆◆
◆◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
2003 Served as
president of
Women’s Equal
Rights Legal
Defense and
Education Fund
1994 Wrote
“Prosecution or
Persecution” for
L.A. Times,
advocating
legalization of
prostitution

1988 Sued
Friars Club
NY for sex
discrimination
1980 Sued L.A.
County to stop
shackling of
pregnant inmates
during labor
and delivery
◆
1974 Received J.D. from Loyola Law School; formed law
partnership with Nathan Goldberg and Michael Maroko
1973 U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Roe v. Wade, legalizing abortion
1961–73
Vietnam
War
1965 Watts riots
in Los Angeles
1955–68 Martin Luther King
active in civil rights movement
1950–53
Korean
War
1966 Received master’s
in teaching from NYU
1941 Born,
Philadelphia, Pa.
1939–45

World War II
◆
2000
1975
19501930
1968 Moved
to Los Angeles
to teach in
Watts
2008 Elected as delegate to
Democratic National Convention
2006 Fight Back
and Win published
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALLRED, GLORIA 245
prominence through many pre cedent-setting
cases over the course of more than 30 years,
working on such high profile cases including
those involving O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson,
Scott Peterson, and Robert Blake, as well as one
of the earliest
SEXUAL ABUSE suits against the
Catholic Church.
Allred has been perhaps the most flamboy-
ant and well known member of her firm. She
has achieved notoriety and name recognition
through staged press conferences and demon-
strations publicizing and dramatizing the causes
she has championed at various times. She has
also accepted controversial cases that naturally

attract media attention. During her years in
practice, she has successfully sued Los Angeles
County to stop the practice of shackling and
chaining pregnant inmates during labor and
delivery; put a halt on the practice by the city of
El Segundo of quizzing job applicants about
their sexual histories (Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 [9th Cir. 1986]);
represented a client who was turned down for
a job as a police officer after a six-hour lie
detector exam that included questions about her
sex life; and sued a dry cleaning establi shment
for discrimination because it charged more to
launder women’s shirts than men’s. Allred also
successfully sued on behalf of two lesbians who
had been denied entrance to the “romance
booth” at a Los Angeles restaurant (Rolon v.
Kulwitsky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 200 Cal. Rptr.
217 [Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984]). The
OWNER of the
restaurant vowed to close the booth if Allred’s
clients won. They did, and he made good on his
promise.
Allred relishes confrontation, and her showy
tactics have earned her both praise and criti-
cism. Defending what man y have called self-
promoting publicity stunts, Allred says she is
aware of the impression she makes and
contends that it is exactly the effect she wants.
She tries to use the few moments she is in the

spotlight to make her point as forcefully as
possible. Her detractors say that she wastes her
time and energy on trivial issues that do not
advance any worthwhile cause and deflect
attention away from serious issues. Yet, she
points out, she is often stopped on the street by
people who recognize her and want to thank her
for taking on the small fights that no one else
wants. Allred contends that what she is really
doing is tackling issues that are symbolic of the
day-to-day struggles people face. It is her way of
educating the public and the legal establishment
to move beyond stereotypes.
Asked whether she is an activist or a lawyer,
Allred replied that she is an “activist lawyer.”
She added that she believes in seeking change
and winning rights through the legal process
but that she does not shrink from utilizing the
political process when legal remedies prove
inadequate. She once held a press conference in
the office of California governor Jerry Brown to
cast media attention on his threat to
VETO a bill
authorizing payroll deductions for child support
payments. When the news media arrived, Allred
and a group of w omen and children had hung
diapers across the governor’s office. Brown
reversed his position and signed the bill. In
another case that drew media attention, Allred
held a press conference at the door of the all-

male Friars Club of New York to dramatize her
lawsuit challenging the club’s policy of not
allowing women members and not allowing
women to enter, even as guests, before 4:00 p.m.
She won her suit on the grounds that the club
did not me et the “substantially private” require-
ment under New York law that would have
allowed it to legally exclude women. Possibly
her most famous politically motivated demon-
stration was presenting California state senator
John Schmitz (R-Corona del Mar) with a
chastity belt at a hearing on a bill to limit
abortion and
BIRTH CONTROL. Schmitz retaliated
in a press release in which he called Allred
“a slick butch lawyeress.” Allred sued for libel
and won a damage award and an apology.
Allred has earned a rep utation as a champion
of those who have been sexually victimized. She
represented a woman who won a $5 million
civil suit ag ainst an accused rapist the
DISTRICT
ATTORNEY
declined to PROSECUTE; represented a
boy who claimed to have been sexually abused by
a famous rock singer (although she abruptly and
without explanation withdrew from the case
before it was settled); and tackled the thorny issue
of clergy sexual abuse. She says she wants people
to know that, even if the criminal justice system

fails them, they are entitled to file a civil suit.
Allred is an ardent feminist who believes that
all attorneys and all judges should be feminists,
because she feels anyone who is not a feminist is a
bigot. Some critics say she is all show and no
substance. She has been compared to legal
showmen such as Melvin M. Belli (“the King of
Torts”) and Marvin Mitchelson, who gained
THERE ARE ENOUGH
HIGH HURDLES TO
CLIMB
, AS ONE TRA-
VELS THROUGH LIFE
,
WITHOUT HAVING TO
SCALE ARTIFICIAL
BARRIERS CREATED
BY LAW OR SILLY
REGULATIONS
.
—GLORIA ALLRED
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
246 ALLRED, GLORIA
notoriety through a series of celebrity palimony
suits. However, even Mitchelson, not one to
shrink from publicity himself, describes her style
as rough. But Allred has many supporters as well.
Among them is Justice Joan Dempsey Klein of the
California
COURT OF APPEAL who credits Allred

with moving women’s issues forward. Klein also
points out that Allred saves her dramatics for
outside the courtroom and always observes
proper decorum while before the bench. Accord-
ing to Klein, Allred is always well-prepare d and,
for that reason, is quite successful.
In 1994 Allred wrote an editorial for the
December 6 issue of the Los Angeles Times, titled
“Prosecution or Persecution,” in which she
asserted that laws prohibiting
PROSTITUTION are
sexist and victimize women. She advocated
legalization and regulation of the sex trade in
order to reduce sexually transmitted diseases and
drug abuse. According to Allred, “Unprotected,
uninsured sex workers are the real victims who
deserve legal status and an end to government-
funded harassment. ”
In the 1990s Allred, whose law firm partners
were both t he chil dren of Holo caust s urvivors,
sued an organization that had promised a
monetary award to an Auschwitz survivor for
proving the existence of the Holocaust and then
reneged on the award. Allred won a six-figure
judgment that ultimately bankrupted the organi-
zation. In 1995 Allred sued the Boy Scouts of
America (BSA) over the organization’srefusalto
let a girl join the troop to which her twin brother
belonged. The tria l judge’s decision t hat the BSA
wasnotabusinessorganizationandwasnot

subject to the state Civil Right s Act was u pheld by
the Court of Appeals. The case was appealed to
California’s Supreme Court, but, when that court
upheld two similar cases, the
PLAINTIFF withdrew
her appeal.
In early 2003 Allred served as president of
the Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and
Education Fund, an organization she founded.
She hosted her own radio talk show on a Los
Angeles radio station and was selected as one of
the 25 most imp ortant talk show hosts by USA
Today. She has also been a columnist for the
National Law Journal and has been nominated
three times for television’s Emmy award for her
commentaries on KABC-TV.
During the early twenty-first century, Allred’s
career achievements include being elected as a
delegate to the 2008 Democratic National
Convention and receiving the Distinguished
Alumna Achievement Award from New York
University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Educa-
tion, and Human Development in May 2009.
Allred’s most recent case garnering media atten-
tion involved Nadya Suleman, the so-called
“Octo-mom,” who gave birth to eight babies in
2009. Allred asked for an investigation into what
she alleged were violations of labor laws and
regulations in the filming of the babies. California
State Labor officials issued numerous citations for

violations of the law as a result of the investigation.
Dressed in her trademark reds and electric
blues, Allred is a combination of scholarship
and theatrics. Her intelligence and shrewd
understanding of the power of the media have
made her a contemporary success story in the
world of law and politics. Gloria Allred has her
own Web site: www.gloriaallred.com.
FURTHER READINGS
Allred, Gloria (with Deborah Caulfield Rybak). 2006. Fight
Back and Win: My Thirty-Year Fight against Injustice
and How You Can Win Your Own Battles. New York:
Harper Collins.
Berry, Dawn Bradley. 1996. The 50 Most Influential Women
in American Law. Los Angeles: Contemporary Books.
Drachman, Virginia G. 1998. Sisters in Law: Women Lawyers
in Modern American History. Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press.
Gloria Allred. Available online at <www.gloriaallred.com>
(accessed August 12, 2009).
ALLUVION
See TERRITORY.
ALTER EGO
A doctrine used by the courts to ignore the
corporate status of a group of stockholders, officers,
and directors of a corporatio n i n reference to their
limited liability so that they may be held
personally liab le for their actions when they have
acted fraudulently or unjustly or when to refuse to
do so would deprive an innocent victim of redress

for an injury caused by them.
A corporation is considered the alter ego of
its stockholders, directors, or officers when it is
used merely for the transaction of their personal
business for which they want
IMMUNITY from
individual
LIABILITY. A parent corporation is the
alter ego of a
SUBSIDIARY corporation if it controls
and directs its activities so that it will have
limited liability for its wrongful acts.
The alter ego doct rine is also known as the
INSTRUMENTALITY RULE because the corporation
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALTER EGO 247