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2. A transformative theoretical approach
It is impossible to predict and map the probability of all accidents and crises. However,
both public and private organizations are frequently faced with a demand to do just that.
This means that governments have to handle both uncertainties and risks. Beck (1992)
argues that there is an increased perception of a lack of safety in modern societies, related
to the development of a risk society. In this perspective, advances in technology will
potentially lead to disasters of great magnitude. A corresponding increased awareness of
such catastrophic events will create even more challenges for responsible authorities. As
people become more aware of risks and adverse consequences, the perceived level of risk
will rise. Failure to manage risks might generate a potential for an even wider crisis.
(Smith, 2006).
A general theory on how and why crises happen, and how they best can be managed does not
exist. However, the work of for instance Perrow (Natural Accident Theory) (Perrow, 1984)
and La Porte (High Reliability Theory) (La Porte, 1996) are highly valued and have been
widely discussed. In different ways they try to to explain how crises arise and might be
avoided. In many cases, a crisis can be traced back to organizational failure or poor risk
management. Our theoretical point of departure is that different types of coordination and
specialization will have important consequences for actors within public bodies, for the public
bodies themselves, and for the policy field affected (March & Olsen, 1989; Egeberg, 2003;
Egeberg, 2004). We argue that the organizational lay-out of the internal security and safety
field is of crucial importance to risk management (Fimreite et al., 2011). Organizational forms
affect which issues get attention and which are ignored, how the issues are grouped together
and how they are separated. Organizational arrangements will therefore have vital
importance for risk management. Furthermore, external pressures, developments and shocks
(crises), may well be influential and result in new perceptions, and organizational or
procedural changes.
Following this argument, organizational structure and operation can neither be viewed merely

as a response to externally motivated influences and shocks, nor merely as a result of
deliberate political choices. The organization of public administration, the relationship
between the state and local level and between different sectors is not a mere technincal-neutral
question. Organizations, seen as institutions, have an autonomous and influential authority
based in established structures, rules, procedures, culture, traditions and dynamics (Olsen,
2010). Public authorities are characterized by a complex interaction, between political and
administrative steering, design, negotiation, diverse interests, cultural bindings, and adaption
to external pressures and influences (Christensen et al., 2004). In order to fully understand the
content of public politics and policies, we need to analyze organizational structures and
organizations as well as policy content. The scope of action and notions of approriate
behavior for civil servants is affected by organizational affiliation. This also affects the content
of policies (March & Olsen, 2006). The understanding of problems, instruments, consequences
and behavioural patterns are affected by internal features of an organization, and the
relationships and connections to other organizations. Based on this, we assume that different
forms of specialization and coordination are decisive for organizational behaviour as well as
policy outcomes (Fimreite, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2011).
In order to explain the development of the internal security field in Norway, we adopt a
transformative approach, combining an instrumental and institutional perspective on public
policy reform (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). The organizations within the field are not

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merely seen as instruments, but as institutional actors that not necessarily will adapt to new
signals from political executives or to shifting demands in the environment (March & Olsen,
1983). The institutional dynamics of reforms can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of
environmental pressure, polity features and historical institutional context.
The instrumental perspective directs our attention towards formal arrangements, while the
institutional perspective focuses on informal norms, values and practices that have
developed over time. Informal social roles are seen as impersonal, they exist independently

of people within the organizations at any given point of time (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002).
The institutional perspective takes as a starting point that organizations are carriers of
values, and have a distinct identity (Selznick, 1957).
The instrumental perspective perceives organizations as disposable tools for the leaders
involved. Within this perspective, rationality is related to the formal organizational
structures, and creates limitations on actors’ options. The institutional perspective, on the
other hand, opens up for a perception where organizations incorporate routines, rules and
values that independently influence actors and their behaviour.
Within an instrumental perspective, the underlying behavioural logic is a logic of
consequence, based on rational actors that are assumed to be able to accurately predict
consequences of choices, and find the means to reach their goals. Change is perceived as
rational adaption to new goals or changing external demands. The concept of rationality has
been modified somewhat by Simon (1976), who launched the concept of bounded
rationality. This concept emphasizes limitations to the abilities to account for all possible
choices and outcomes.
Within the instrumental perspective we distinguish between a hierarchically oriented
variant, where the leaders’ control and analytical-rational calculation is central, and a
negotiation-based variant, which allows for the articulation of interests and for compromise
and negotiation between organizations and actors whose goals and interests are partially
conflicting (Christensen et al., 2004). An institutional perspective is, on the other hand,
based on a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989). Here, human action is driven
by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. This implies
that action is based on experience, and on what is perceived as reasonable and acceptable
within the specific context. Goals and means are discovered, explored and developed
within the specific organization, and can be interpreted differently from formally
established goals and ends. Thus, intrinsic organizational values may obstruct
fundamental change. Organizations are seen more robust and change is usually
incremental. Moderate changes will meet less resistance than major reforms. Frequent and
extensive changes will generate extensive transaction costs, referred to as historical
inefficiency (Ibid.). However, the possibilities for change are greater if reform proposals are

in accordance with the existing organizational traditions and established culture
(Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). These processes can be understood as path dependent, where
former choices constrain later options (Krasner, 1988).
A third perspective sees organizational structures mainly as a response to external pressures
(Olsen, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This implies adaptation to
established norms, beliefs and prevailing doctrines within a wider community, the
incorporation of NPM values being one relevant example. It may also imply adaptation to a
changing technical environment or to challenges and vulnerabilities created or revealed by
external shocks and/or crises.

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We use these theoretical perspectives in a supplementary manner (Roness, 1997), and argue
that the organizational processes within the field of internal security and safety can neither
be viewed one-sidedly as a result of instrumental processes and leader strategies, nor
merely as a product of history, existent informal norms, or adaption to external pressure.
Processes of policy formation and change are characterized by complex interaction between
different factors. This is vital when one wants to understand the organization and
development of risk management.
3. Context
3.1 Ministerial responsibility, strong line ministries and autonomous municipalities
Individual ministerial responsibility is a core concept within the Norwegian central
government. The Minister, as head of a given Ministry, bears the ultimate responsibility for
actions within that Ministry, including those of subordinate agencies. Ministerial
responsibility in the Norwegian case implies strong sector ministries and a strong vertical
coordination, resulting in a corresponding weaker horizontal coordination between policy
areas and sectors (Christensen & Lægreid, 1998). Specialization by sector or purpose/tasks
is a dominant principle, making it difficult to establish coordinative arrangements across
traditional sectors. Consequently, sector ministries have been substantially stronger than

ministries responsible for sector-crossing activities and coordination. This indicates that
ministries operate as separate ‘silos’ with limited ability to apprehend cross-cutting policy
issues (Bouckaert, Ormond & Peters, 2000).
Another central feature of the Norwegian polity is the concept of local self government.
Local democracy and authority is a relatively strong value (Fimreite et al., 2002; Flo, 2004).
Following the expansion of the welfare state after World War II, local authorities became
responsible for providing a broad range of services. Greater municipal responsibility also
meant a closer integration across government levels, and, at least until 1992, a sectorized
organization mirroring central government institutions (Tranvik & Fimreite, 2006). A series
of reforms aimed at municipal devolution was implemented from the 1980s and culminated
with the Municipal Act of 1992. The new legislation aimed at joined-up (non-sectoral)
government structures at the municipal level in order to counter the strong sectorization of
Norwegian public government and the centralizing forces that allegedly reduced local
government autonomy. Whether or not the reforms succeeded, is still debated (Ibid.)
3.2 Internal security and safety
The attention towards internal security and safety is quite new, both in academia and
politics. The concept covers terms like ‘domestic security’, ‘civil defence’, ‘homeland
security’, ‘societal security’ and ‘civil emergency’ (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006), and has
gained currency since the beginning of the 1990s – even more so the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
the US in 2001 (Kettl, 2004).
At present, there exists no agreed-on international definition. The term ‘societal security’
(samfunnssikkerhet) is a specific Norwegian term. It is a rather broad concept, and does not
differentiate between safety and security, or between natural disasters beyond human
control and conscious destructive acts (Burgess & Mouhleg, 2007). Thus, it straddles the
rather blurred boundary between civil society and internal affairs on the one hand, and the
military and defence sector on the other. According to Olsen et al. (2007, pp. 71), a viable

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definition of the concept of ‘societal security’ could be “The society’s ability to maintain critical
social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens’ basic
requirements in a variety of stress situations”. It comprises all categories of actions intended to
hinder unwanted events or conditions and to reduce the consequences should these occur,
covering both preventive and proactive actions pursued in order to reduce adverse effects
(St.meld nr. 17 (2001–2002), pp. 3). This covers both extraordinary events (e.g. hurricanes,
terrorism, etc.) and more ‘ordinary’ events (e.g. traffic accidents, fires, etc.), and includes
both internal security and civil protection and safety. It further communicates that national
security is more than military defence and border control, and thus finds outlet for the
Norwegian conception of ‘total defence’ (Serigstad, 2003).
In this chapter, we have settled on the term ‘internal security and safety’. This has mainly a
practical reasonIt is a conception that is more common and easily accessible for the
international reader. By focussing on both security and safety, we emphasize that the
outlook is not delimited to mere security issues, or to mere safety issues. Although the
typical Norwegian approach covers both extraordinary and more ‘ordinary’ accidents, we
will focus more on the importance of extraordinary events and risks.
Inherent in this definition, and in our focus, is an explicit attention to the question of how
government manages risk. At its heart, the policy field of internal security and safety
concerns risk management and ‘the politics of uncertainty’ (Power, 2004). The problem
both public and private organizations face, is that of responding to both anticipated and
unanticipated risks. A particular difficult question is how to prepare for low-probability
and high-impact events (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Organizations and organizational
arrangements play a crucial role in the prevention of and response to risk (Lægreid &
Serigstad, 2006, pp. 1379). Within this framework, reorganization can also be seen as
means for managing risk.
3.3 Central principles: liability, decentralization and conformity
In Norway, three crucial principles for internal security and safety guide authorities
involved in risk and crisis management. These are a principle of liability, a principle of
decentralization and a principle of conformity (St.meld. nr. 22 (2007–2008)).
The liability principle implies that every ministry and authority has responsibility for

internal security and safety within its own sector. It is closely related to the doctrine of
individual ministerial responsibility, emphasizing strong sector ministries. According to our
empirical material, this has made the Ministry of Justice’s responsibility for horizontal
coordination more difficult. Furthermore, the principle of liability is modified by extensive
civil-military cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and its subordinate bodies.
The decentralization (or subsidiarity) principle emphasizes that a crisis should be managed
at the lowest operational level possible. This corresponds to the dominant doctrine of local
self-government and authority. Consequently, the County governors and municipalities are
given an important function in risk assessment and crisis management. At the regional level,
the County governors operate as mediators between sector interests as well as state and
local level administration (Rykkja, 2011). Traditionally, the Norwegian municipalities have
enjoyed widespread autonomy within the field of civil protection. Territory, or geography,
is therefore an important additional organizing concept Herein lays an important
(organizational) paradox: the principle of liability implies strong coordination within
specific sectors, but weak coordination across them. The decentralization principle, on the

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other hand, implies strong coordination across sectors on a low level and hence less
coordination between horizontal levels of government.
The principle of conformity (or similarity) stresses that the organization forms under a crisis
or a crisis-like situation should be as similar to the daily organizational forms as possible.
This can be particularly difficult to maintain during an ‘extraordinary’ crisis. As current
literature on crisis management emphasizes, when a major disaster happens, the necessity of
supplementing existing formal organizations with improvisation and temporary
organizations becomes crucial (Czarniawska, 2009).
These three principles comprise a central fundament for the organization of internal security
and safety in Norway. Nevertheless, several small organizational and policy changes
beyond these principles have taken place over the last years. This is the topic of the

following sections.
4. The reform process: Reorganization of the central administration for
security and safety
4.1 From the Cold War to a ‘vulnerable society’
In 1946, a government appointed defence commission established the concept of ‘total
defence’. This implied an integration of the Norwegian military and civil defence, with a
primary task to protect Norwegian territory, citizens, national values and sovereignty. At
the time, the orientation of the ‘total defence’ was mainly towards the threat of war, not
crises or more delimited accidents (Serigstad, 2003). However, changes in the perception of
threats and risks in the public sphere gradually led to the adaption of existing arrangements
to encompass solutions that were more suitable to a new situation. The end of the Cold War
created a new situation for both the military and the civil defence. Without a unitary and
stable enemy, assessing risks and threats became more complex. This resulted in the
adoption of a broader concept, embraced by both the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of
Defence. ‘Total defence’ came to imply mutual support and cooperation between the
military services and the civil society, covering war-like situations as well as more delimited
crises affecting the civil society. Today, it involves both contingency planning and more
operative matters in all types of crises (Høydal, 2007).
Internal security and safety was first conceptualized in a government White Paper presented
by the Ministry of Justice in 1993 (St.meld. Nr 24 (1992-1993)), and further recognized by the
Vulnerability Commission in 2000 (NOU 2000: 24). With these statements, the Government
signalized a broader definition of the field, with less emphasis on the military dimension
and more on the civil dimension and on crises that arise in peace-time (Lægreid & Serigstad,
2006; Olsen et al., 2007). This new conceptualization implied a transfer of responsibilities
from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Justice.
Internal security and safety is a relatively new task for the Ministry of Justice. The
construction of a Norwegian Civil defence started after the experiences from World War II.
In 1970, a Directorate for Civil Protection was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of
Justice. At the same time, a corresponding preparedness office within the Ministry was
created. Over time, there have been several attempts to strengthen the Ministry of Justices’

coordinating role (Høydal, 2007).
The White Paper presented in 1993 (St.meld. nr. 24 (1992–1993)) clearly articulated a need
for a coordinating ministry. However, the principle of responsibility was not abandoned.
Ultimately, responsibility was to be placed with whichever ministry had the administrative

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and sector responsibility, depending on the type of crisis. Constitutional ministerial
responsibility would still lie with the relevant Minister. Nevertheless, the interest of
assigning the over-arching responsibility to a single ministry was strong. The coordinating
ministry would take cooperative initiatives on behalf of other involved ministries in order to
ensure better coordination of resources in both peace and war.
Several candidate ministries were envisaged having a coordinative role. The Prime
Ministers Office and the Ministry of Justice were the most prominent (Høydal, 2007). The
Buvik Commission (1992) recommended a leading role for the Ministry of Justice, and this
was supported by the government. A central argument was that the Ministry of Justice
already was responsible for the Directorate for Civil Protection and Civil Defence, and for
the Police and rescue services (St.meld. nr. 24 (1992–1993)). In 1994, the Ministry was
formally assigned the task to coordinate civil preparedness across sectors (Serigstad, 2003).
4.2 The Vulnerability Commission and the Ministry of Justices’ responsibility for
coordination
In 1999, the Ministry of Justice initiated a project with a vision to enhance the attention to
the area of internal security and safety. This led to the establishment of a public commission
led by a former distinguished politician and Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch. The Commission
on the Vulnerability of Society (also called the Vulnerability Commission) presented a broad
range of proposals in order to improve efforts to reduce vulnerability and ensure safety,
security and civil protection for the Norwegian society (Serigstad, 2003; Lægreid &
Serigstad, 2006; NOU 2000: 24).
The Commission identified several problems concerning civil defence and internal security.

One of its central conclusions was that the policy area was highly fragmented, lacked
superior organizing principles, and was to a large extent organized in an ad hoc manner,
responding to specific crises or accidents (Høydal, 2007). Allegedly, this resulted in
ambiguity and serious liability concerns. A central argument was that the Ministry of Justice
did not execute its superior and coordinative functions within the area very well. Civil
protection and crisis management was mainly executed by a small unit with limited
resources, and was not adequately prioritized. Overall, internal security and safety was seen
as a policy area that had been systematically under-prioritized for quite a while.
Furthermore, the Ministry’s coordinative responsibilities were vaguely defined, and
therefore largely ignored by other relevant ministries and departments.
The Vulnerability Commission concluded by advocating a higher concentration of
responsibility, competence and resources, in order to give the area a stronger political
foothold and ensure better coordination. One central recommendation was to establish a
new Ministry for Internal Security and Safety, incorporating responsibility for assessing
national threats and vulnerabilities, establishing main goals and standards within the field,
coordinate efforts to handle terrorism and sabotage, as well as existing emergency
departments and the civil defence. This implied a total restructuring of the Ministry of
Justice, and a transfer of central administrative responsibilities from other sectors in order to
ensure a stronger and more autonomous role for the new ministry.
The Commission report was followed by public hearing and a government White Paper on the
Safety and Security of Society (St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). The decision-making process prior
to the White Paper was characterized by defensive institutional arguments and major conflicts
of interest, especially between the justice and defence/military sector (Serigstad, 2003). The
hearing did not provide any major changes to the original proposal. In the middle of this

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process came 9/11, and the following organizational changes in the US administration for
Homeland Security. The situation led to a delay and reassessment of the Commission’s work,

but in the end it did not have any major impact on its conclusions (Ibid.).
The proposal to establish a new Ministry for Internal Security and Safety turned out too
controversial. Instead, the White Paper proposed a further strengthening of existing
structures, by merging existing units and agencies, and by establishing new ones.
Consequently, the proposals confirmed existing principles and doctrines of public
organization and management within the field. The existing principles of liability,
decentralization and conformity were maintained. The result is a rather ambiguous and
hybrid organizational model (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006).
The White Paper proposed the reorganization of several existing agencies and the following
establishment of two (partly) new agencies; the Directorate for Civil Protection and
Emergency Planning (DSB), and the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM)
(St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). DSB was organized as an agency under the responsibility of
the Ministry of Justice. It supports the Ministry’s coordinative activities within the field, and
consists of the former Directorate for Civil Protection and the former Directorate for Fire and
Electrical Safety Inspection. DSB is responsible for overall emergency planning and crisis
management, providing information and advice as well as supervising responsible
ministries, county governors and municipalities.
The National Security Authority (NSM) is responsible for protective supervision and the
security of vital national interests, primarily countering threats of espionage, sabotage and
acts of terrorism (NOU 2006: 6, Act of 20 March 1998 on Protective Security Services).
Initially, the Vulnerability Commission wanted to establish NSM as an agency under the
proposed new Ministry. This would mean a transfer of the agency from the Ministry of
Defence. This resulted in a conflict of interest between the two Ministries involved, and
between the two corresponding parliamentary committees.
On one side, the Ministry of Justice and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice
argued for a broader definition of the field and the inclusion of civil protection and safety
within its realms. On the other side, the Ministry of Defence and the Parliamentary Standing
Committee for Defence wanted to keep a focus on (military) security issues, and therefore
also retain the administrative responsibility for NSM. The solution was a compromise. NSM
was administratively placed under the responsibility for the Ministry of Defence, but would

also report to the Ministry of Justice in matters concerning civil protection (Lægreid &
Serigstad, 2006).
The developments within the field illustrates how difficult it can be to restructure
established arrangements, and transfer responsibility between ministries, even in situations
where existing problems are recognized. The Norwegian case exposed a fundamental
conflict concerning the framing of the field. Should internal security and safety be defined as
a responsibility alongside many other equally important tasks, or should it rather be defined
as a particular policy field, characterized by distinct and more vital problems and
challenges? Was this mainly a security issue, and therefore a military defence matter, or was
it rather a safety issue, and therfore a problem concerning civil protection and defence?
Discussions on the degree of integration between civil and military protection and defence,
and safety and security issues, continued. In the end, the White Paper was discussed jointly
by the two Parliamentary committees. This indicates a shift towards safety and civil
protection, since earlier these issues were mainly discussed in the Standing Committee for
Defence alone.

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The basic conflicts and challenges portrayed here have had significant consequences for the
perception of relevant problems, policy solutions, of relevant actors and participants in the
process. The process can be perceived not only as a clear-cut decision-making process, but
also as a process of meaning-making, concerning the definition, interpretation and
development of a common understanding, and as a process of constructing a certain
political reality and negotiation ground for those best suited to implement the tasks at hand
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Kettl, 2004).
4.3 The Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group
The same reluctance to establish a stronger coordinative and authoritative role for the
Ministry of Justice through more permanent organizational arrangements can be observed
when analyzing the processes leading to the establishment of a Cabinet Crisis Council and a

Crisis Support Group in 2006. The Indian Ocean earthquake and the following tsunami on
Boxing day in South-East Asia in 2004 were crucial for the establishment of these
organizations.
Although the tsunami disaster hit abroad, it had important consequences for Norway. At
the time, about 4000 Norwegian citizens were in the area. Most of them were on vacation. 84
Norwegian citizens were killed. Because it happened abroad, and following from the
established principle of liability, the situation was handled by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. However, the Ministry was not very well prepared for a situation like this, and was
quickly criticized for their efforts to coordinate activities and responses, both within the
Ministry itself and across other involved ministries (Brygård, 2006; Jaffery & Lango, 2011).
After the tsunami, the Government presented a White Paper on Central Crisis Management,
referring directly to the tsunami disaster (St.meld. nr. 37 (2004–2005)). It continued the
discussion concerning the demarcation and responsibility lines between the different
ministries, authorities and administrative levels involved in the crisis, and presented several
measures to improve coordination and crisis management at central governmental level.
This included an effort to clarify responsibilities for crisis management. More importantly,
in a crisis the lead was to be placed with the Ministry mostly affected. The intention was to
stall potential conflicts of competence and responsibility one had experienced on earlier
occasions. This principle further emphasized the principle of liability.
The White Paper also proposed the establishment of a Cabinet Crisis Council, and a
strengthening of the administrative support through the setting up of a Crisis Support
Group. The initial proposal was to organize the Cabinet Crisis Council permanently to the
Prime Minister’s Office. However, this was turned down, and the result was a more ad hoc
organization. If and when a complex crisis that demands coordination at Ministerial level
hits, any affected Ministry may summon the Council. It consists of the Permanent
Secretary’s from the Prime Ministers Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence,
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When summoned, the Council
functions as the superior administrative coordinating body, and is responsible for
coordinating measures across the relevant ministries. However, the constitutional and
ministerial responsibility still rests within each Ministry.

The Crisis Support Group may be called upon in certain demanding crisis situations by the
leading Ministry. It is formally organized under the Ministry of Justice, but can be called
upon by any responsible Ministry and be expanded upon need. It is mainly an
administrative resource supporting whichever Ministry takes the lead. The establishment of

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such a group was originally proposed by the Vulnerability Commission, but not followed
through until a larger crisis hits Norway, then.
Corresponding to earlier policy documents within the field, the White Paper following the
tsunami disaster emphasised the importance of the Ministry of Justice’s leading role in crisis
situations. However, the principle of liability was not to be altered. A consequence may be
an even more fragmented organization, whereas the Cabinet Crisis Councils functions may
counteract the recently established leading role for the Ministry of Justice in certain
exceptionally demanding disasters.
4.4 The Infrastructure Commission
A few months before the tsunami disaster hit, the Norwegian government set up a public
commission to report on the security of critical infrastructure. This resulted in a report on
the ‘Protection of critical infrastructures and critical societal functions in Norway (NOU
2006: 6). Four issues were central: A discussion concerning the extent of public ownership, a
discussion on the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice, a proposal for a statutory
obligation for preparedness in local authorities, and a proposal for a new, overarching and
sector-crossing Preparedness Act.
The commission presented several proposals concerning the Ministry of Justice’s
coordinative role, from having a superior yet advisory role, taking initiative and organizing
collaboration and information, to being a national junction and reference point in crises that
demanded international operations. Further, it argued for better coordination of relevant
agencies (NSM, DSB and the Police Security Service, PST). However, the proposal of
establishing a new and more authoritative Ministry for internal security and civil safety

launched by the Vulnerability Commission was not followed up.
The argument for a new Preparedness Act was that it would secure the integration of risk and
vulnerability analysis, operational and supply safety, preparedness planning, information
sharing, cooperation control and sanctions against both businesses and public authorities
responsible for critical infrastructure (Bjørgum, 2010; NOU 2006: 6). The commission argued
that this new legislation would give the Ministry of Justice stronger coordination powers.
Nevertheless, the report did not provide a detailed review of existing legislation. The result
was more a call for attention on the question, and it did not present any draft legislation. It was
implicit that more research and analysis was needed before a new law could be enacted.
The Commission report was followed by a new White Paper (St.meld. nr. 22 (2007–2008)).
Here, the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice was defined as a responsibility for
securing a general and coordinated preparedness. A sectoral approach to relevant agencies,
County governors and Joint Rescue Coordination Centres across the country was
emphasized. Hence, no radical reforms were proposed. The proposal to establish a new
Preparedness Act was not followed up, although the White Paper recommended a more
detailed examination of existing legislation in order to determine relevant priorities and
problem areas. The most significant proposal was the establishment of a statutory obligation
for local authorities to provide adequate preparedness. This was implemented when a
revised Civil Defence Act was adopted in 2010.
4.5 Critique from the Office of the Auditor General
In 2008, the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General presented a report on the Ministry of
Justice’s coordination responsibility within the field of internal safety and security

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(Riksrevisjonen, 2008). The report was rather critical. A central finding was that several
responsible Ministries did not perform adequate risk and vulnerability analyses, and thus
did not prioritize risk management. It also pointed out failings in the Ministry of Justice’s
audit of other ministries, and in its dialogue with them. Adequate coordination would

demand the Ministry to take a more active and deliberate role towards its coordinative
responsibilities within the field. The other Ministries found the coordinative responsibility
of the Ministry of Justice to be unclear. A main conclusion was that, despite evident changes
within the field, important challenges concerning accountability and coordination remained.
The Ministry’s response to this critique was to establish a Ministries’ Coordination
Consulting Group for internal security and safety. This is a common inter-ministerial arena
for exchange of information and experiences, and for the discussion of general rules
concerning preparedness. The arrangement followed the existing organizational policy, with
rather weak network arrangements that do not threat the power of line ministries.
The same findings pointing to an apparent lack of coordination can be found in the Office of
the Auditors Generals report on goal achievements and efficiency in the County governors’
offices (Riksrevisjonen, 2007). The County governors have important coordinative
responsibilities at regional level, and are responsible for preparedness, risk and crisis
management within their region (Rykkja 2011). The report from 2007 pointed out that risk
and crisis management was largely under-prioritized. Furthermore, there existed certain
ambiguities concerning the County governors’ coordinating role, and that the coordination
vis-à-vis municipalities and other state authorities within the region was characterized as
rather ineffective.
4.6 Summing up the reform process – a reluctant reformer
The most important changes in the Norwegian policy for internal security and safety since
the Cold War, have been the introduction of the three central steering principles (the
principle of liability, decentralization and conformity), a development and clarification of
the Ministry of Justices’ authority and coordination responsibilities, and the establishment of
new directorates, agencies and more ad hoc organizational arrangements under the
Ministry. This includes the Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group.
Furthermore, responsibilities between central and local government have been spelled out
more clearly through the establishment of a municipal preparedness duty.
Our analysis reveals that the principles of ministerial superiority and autonomous local
government have set distinct limitations on legislative and organizational proposals, on how
they are formed, followed up on, and carried through. In general, established organizational

forms are strengthened, resulting in a somewhat cautious adaptation to a new situation
following the end of the Cold War. Although it took a very long time to realize, the
establishment of a statutory obligation for preparedness within the local authorities
indicates that the principle of autonomous local government may be easier to shift than the
principle of ministerial superiority securing strong sector hegemony.
A central tension has been the relationship between the military and civil sector (Serigstad,
2003; Dyndal, 2010). The concept of ‘total defence’ signalized increased focus on civil issues.
Over the years we see a shift from the military towards the civil sector and issues
concerning internal security and safety (NOU 2006: 6). This has resulted in new relations
between the military and the civil sector. An example is the establishment of the National
Security Authority (NSM), subordinate to the Ministry of Justice in matters of civil concerns,

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and subordinate to the Ministry of Defence in matters of military concern. This joint
arrangement may result in tensions between ministries, concerning allocation of resources,
establishment of central goals and priorities, and adequate steering and adequate steering.
In the same period, there has been an effort to strengthen coordinating authorities within the
field through the clarification the responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice, the Directorate for
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), the National Security Authority (NSM), the
County governors and the municipalities. However, our analysis reveals that the principle of
liability has not been surrendered, and still stands strong. This continues to create tensions
between organizational units, sectors and administrative levels. An indication of the complex
relationship is that the different ministries are required to perform internal control and system
audit within their respective sectors, while at the same time the Ministry of Justice and DSB
audits the individual ministries. Høydal (2007) reports that it is especially difficult to get this
arrangement to work.
Experiences with certain crises have revealed that the responsible authorities are not always
well prepared. This is also documented in the general literature on disasters and crisis

management (Fimreite et al., 2011). A particular relevant example in our case is the handling of
the tsunami disaster in South East Asia in 2004. This crisis revealed serious challenges related
to the coordination and specialization between responsible ministries (Jaffery & Lango, 2011).
Organizational changes after the Cold War have been rather discrete. Parallel processes
have been influential, and major proposals have been countered by strong sector interests.
The experiences after the tsunami led to some reorganization in the central administration,
but not to the establishment of completely new arrangements. This seems to follow a rather
common pattern, where Norway has been labelled a reluctant reformer compared to other
countries (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Other events, such as the Mad Cow Disease (BSE),
also led to changes that to a large extent followed existing lines of responsibilities (Rykkja,
2008).
Our analysis shows that coordination and strengthening of central government in this policy
area seems difficult, mainly due to strong line ministries with different interests, and also
influenced by a strong preference of decentralized solutions following the doctrine of local
self government. The government is reluctant to build up strong permanent core
organizations in central government, with adequate capacity and resources, within this
policy field. The Ministry of Justice remains the central coordinating body, but is still
characterized as rather weak. Attempts to build a strong overarching coordinating ministry
failed, largely due to the strength of the principle of ministerial responsibility. Crises have
not resulted in radical changes. Instead, our analysis reveals incremental processes.
5. Understanding processes and outcomes
In accordance with an instrumental perspective, the development of a new coordination
policy for internal security and safety can be seen as a process of deliberate and strategic
choices following an interest in strengthening the Ministry of Justices’ coordinating
functions. In this perspective, policy-making and reorganization are important tools,
utilized to improve practices and results within the field. However, the process exhibits
examples of bounded rationality, and local rationality seems linked to the relevant
organizations’ apprehension of problems and solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). Changes in
practices can partly be seen as relevant measures for ensuring the unity of the policy field
and a strengthening of horizontal coordination. Our study has nevertheless shown that


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conflicts of interests between central actors have limited horizontal coordination and the
development of a coherent coordination policy.
Institutionalized opinions and the persistence of institutions are central elements in an
institutional perspective (Krasner, 1988). Our research reveals that the institutionalized
tradition of ministerial responsibility continues to stand strong within the Norwegian polity,
limiting the efforts to strengthen horizontal coordination. The processes can well be seen as
a result of path dependency, that at least partly may explain why the changes within the
field are incremental. This points to processes where former routines and established
practices lead to selective and inconsistent attention to new problems (Cyert & March, 1963).
The end of the Cold War represents an important contextual factor that might explain the
gradual shift from a military focus to a stronger attention to civil protection and safety. It
may also be regarded as a manifestation of historical inefficiency, where old organization
patterns and understandings still linger and hinder major reforms and reorganizations,
despite obvious changes in the context (March & Olsen, 1989).
The events of 9/11 2001 happened at the same time as the Norwegian Vulnerability
Commission worked with their report, and was definitely an external shock with important
consequences for the American government (Kettl, 2004). However, we find little evidence
that it had a decisive influence on the Norwegian reorganization process. The White Paper
was put on hold for a while, but no radical proposals were put forward (St.meld. nr. 17
(2001–2002)). Furthermore, many of the proposals of the Vulnerability Commission were not
followed up. The incidents of 9/11 led to changes in terror legislation in many countries,
including Norway (Meyer, 2009; Rykkja, Fimreite & Lægreid, 2011). The Norwegian
government was obviously aware of a new kind of threat after 9/11, but it does not seem
that the organizational changes and establishment of Department of Homeland Security in
the US (described as the largest reorganization in the American central administration in
newer history) had any major impact.

The tsunami disaster in 2004 seems to have had a stronger direct impact on the
reorganization processes. It hit Norwegian citizens more directly, and also created notable
difficulties for the responsible authorities. Problems related to ambiguous responsibility
lines and competences, and a corresponding lack of coordination between relevant
ministries was revealed. This promoted the enactment of organizational changes within the
central administration (the Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group).
To some extent, Norway represents a special case, whereas it has largely been spared direct
encounters with path-breaking and devastating disasters. The reform processes in the
Norwegian approach to internal security and safety resulted in a reorganization of agencies
reaffirming a network based model (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006). Our study reveals a process
and a policy field characterized by complex interactions between mutually influential
factors. Rather than holding different explanatory factors up against each other as
competing or alternative, we argue that they complement each other. External shocks and
incidents have had an impact, but changes within the field do not always follow predictable
patterns. Individual choices and behaviour can, at least to some extent, be determined by
examining characteristics and changes in the organizations’ scope of action. However, we
emphasize that this is not a deterministic relationship. Some scope of action for deliberate
interference and proactive behaviour by political and administrative leaders remain.
Firstly, our analysis of the reform process within the field of internal security and safety in
Norway bear witness that reforms are to a large extent formed through established

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181
organizational arrangements, doctrines and principles that set limits to the scope of action.
Secondly, we find that the process and outcome cannot be characterized as a result of
rational planning alone but has clear negotiation based features. The reform initiatives
involved actors with partly conflicting interests, and the organizational pattern appears to
be a result of turf wars, conflicts of interests, compromises, and the establishment of certain
winning coalitions. Thirdly, the established arrangements and institutions seem infused by

traditions, organizational culture, established routines and rules, and informal norms,
values and identities. This has a vital independent influence on how work within the field is
carried out, and more particularly on how crises are prevented and managed. Central actors
do not necessarily easily adapt, neither to new signals from political or administrative
leaders, nor to alterations in the external environment.
Crisis and risk management typically takes place under uncertain and ambiguous
conditions. In these situations, the prevalence of rational choices characterized by clear,
stable and consistent goals, a fair understanding of available goals and means, and an
apparent centre of authority and power, is not realistic. More likely, central goals will be
rather unclear, ambiguous and partly conflicting, technological constraints may be
uncertain, and there will be difficulties concerning the prediction of events and effects of
relevant choices. In these situations, a flexible political and administrative coordination
based on institutionally fixed rules, routines and roles may be a reasonable alternative to
action based on calculated planning (Olsen, 1989). The extent to which such coordination
processes succeed, is related to the existence of mutual trust and dependence between
political and administrative leaders, between different professions, between central and
local governments, between sectors, and between the population and government.
In Norway, such high levels of mutual trust are relatively well established (Rothstein &
Stolle, 2003). This is the case both between public organizations, and between the population
and the government. It has facilitated the introduction of trust-based regulatory
arrangements, such as internal audit and control. It can also explain a relatively high
acceptance of strong measures in the fight against terror (Rykkja, Fimreite & Lægreid, 2011).
An explanation for the high level of trust in the Norwegian community is that there have
been few disasters or path-breaking crises that have challenged these trust relationships.
However, there are also examples of crises that are largely the result of poor internal audit
and lack of control, for example the management of an explosion accident that spread toxic
gases in western Norway in 2007 (Lervåg, 2010).
A discussion of adequate risk management raises the question of accountability. When risks
with potentially large adverse effects are identified, the next step is to ask who is
responsible, or who should take the blame? A natural institutional response is often to evade

responsibility and try to avoid blame. If responsibility is not placed, the result is often
damaging blame games. The tsunami disaster in 2004 may be a telling example. The
reorganization process we have followed in this chapter also touches upon these issues.
Accountability relationships in crisis situations are complex, and illustrate the ‘wickedness’
of the field of internal security and safety. A main a question is to whom account is to be
rendered. Bovens has framed this as ‘the question of the many eyes’ (Bovens, 2007). Here, there
is a central dividing line between administrative or managerial accountability, and political
accountability. Fimreite, Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja (2011) show, by analyzing several
different cases of crisis management in Norway, that managerial accountability is more

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often discussed than political accountability. This is especially the case in complex crisis
situations and in situations where problems cross traditional sector lines. Judging from
these case-studies, it seems that politicians have a tendency avoid blame, while
administrative leaders leave office. Because the decentralization principle dictates that a
crisis should be handled at the lowest possible level, it can be seen to emphasize
managerial accountability. The question of political accountability is a difficult one.
Causes, as well as responsibility lines are often diffuse and difficult to trace. Politicians
may frame policies, but administrators and civil servants implement them and have the
operational responsibility, thereby creating potentially influential policy outcomes.
Furthermore, the framing of the crisis is important, but may change over time, creating
even more accountability problems.
Lastly, professional accountability is often an important dimension. In situations of
uncertainly, and often when ‘new’ risks arise, there are frequently disagreements concerning
who has the relevant type of expertise, which type of (scientific) knowledge is the most
reliable, and questions as to whether experts are independent (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996;
Jasanoff, 1990). Conflicts between different groups of experts are not uncommon. In these
kinds of situations the question on professional accountability is especially difficult to

handle.
6. Conclusions
Our chapter has revealed that organization for internal security and safety is a struggle
concerning both attention to and definition of relevant problems and organizational
solutions. A central theme has been the establishment of permanent organizations that can
address the wicked inter-organizational issues in a coordinated and continuous manner,
with enough resources and capacity. We have also seen that the definition of problems and
solutions varies over time, and is affected by executive design, historical-institutional
constraints, negotiations and external pressures.
The established principles concerning liability, decentralization and conformity represent
different forms of specialization, but have little to offer when it comes to coordination, a
particular pressing problem within the field. The principle of conformity seems particularly
difficult to practice. The expectation that the organization model in extreme crisis situations
is to be similar to a normal situation is difficult to live up to. Crises and disasters are in their
being unexpected and surprising situations, where established organizational forms often
prove inadequate. Generally, there is an urgent need for improvisation, rapid and flexible
response. Often, established hierarchical structures, lines of command and competence areas
are overstepped.
The principle of liability is also problematic, whereas crises and disasters are exceedingly
‘wicked’, in the sense that they typically cross established organizational borders.
Increasingly, successful crisis management has to be performed at the interface between
organizations and levels of administration. The principle of liability establishes
responsibility within single organizations, but represents an obstruction for the coordination
problems in a larger crisis situation. The principle of decentralization may also represent a
problem, whereas crisis situations often demand a balancing of the need for a flexible scope
of action at the local level, and the need for central control and leadership. A central

Organizing for Internal Security and Safety in Norway

183

question is therefore how to handle the demand for more hierarchical control and
leadership when major crises, disasters or risks threat society.
Several studies have shown that military command and control methods in crisis
management can be problematic (Boin et al., 2008). In crises of a larger magnitude, and
where the issue crosses traditional institutional borders, crisis management may take place
in the shadows of formal hierarchy, especially since there often is a need for flexibility,
improvisation and network cooperation. Traditional risk management is often focused on
single issues, neglecting the risk of complex and wicked issues.
The two main doctrines in the Norwegian government system, the principle of ministerial
responsibility and the principle of local self government, have quite clearly set limitations to
the efforts to solve cross-cutting coordination problems. Our analysis shows that these
doctrines stand firm. Attempts to establish a strong coordination at the centre over the last
years have largely failed. Instead, we have seen a rather cautious upgrading of the over-
arching and coordinative responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice and its underlying
agencies. New organizational arrangements have been set up as more ad hoc or virtual
organizations without permanent resources attached.
Organizing for internal security and safety is a constant struggle to gain sufficient attention.
It concerns definitions of what are the relevant problems and organizational solutions, and
has been concentrated on discussions on the establishment of permanent bodies that may
work continuously within the field and with sufficient resources. Definitions of and
solutions vary across time, and are affected by traditions and interest of the different actors
involved. What we see is a mixture of rational design, negotiations, administrative cultural
constraints and adaptation to external changes and pressure. There is no simple explanation
to the reorganization processes. Our argument is that the reforms in this policy field are
based on a combination of different driving forces (Fimreite, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2011). Both
instrumental and institutional approaches contribute to the understanding of the
reorganization process. Single-factor explanations face considerable problems when their
claims are confronted with empirical data (Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010). The organization of
this policy field is becoming increasingly complex with different organizational principles
resulting from multiple factors working together in a complex mix. It is an example of a

compound administrative reform process, which is multi-dimensional and represents
‘mixed’ orders, and a combination of competing, inconsistent and partly contradictory
organizational principles and structures that co-exist and balances different interests and
values (Olsen 2010).
The field of internal security and safety in Norway has developed and changed since the
end of the Cold War, and has gained new focus and attention. The development of a new
coordination policy is characterized by the shift from a military to stronger civil focus. But
despite the radical proposals from the Vulnerability Commission and Infrastructure
Commission, changes have been small and incremental. The tsunami disaster in 2004
resulted in a new effort in the reorganization process, but largely only led to slight changes
to the established responsibility relationships. The development on this field is distinct to
other reforms in Norway, for instance the hospital reform and the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Service reform, where organizational changes have been more radical (Christensen
& Lægreid, 2010). In these cases the government managed to implement large structural
reforms. An important difference is that these reforms did not raise cross-sector issues to the

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same degree. Both reforms happened largely within closed sectors. This confirms the
strengths of the separate policy sectors in the Norwegian case.
A strengthening of the central governmental core within the internal security and safety
area has proved difficult in the Norwegian case. However, risk management can not be
based on an excessive belief in hierarchy, command and control. To manage internal
security issues by establishing central meta-organizations, such as the Department of
Homeland Security in the US in 2003, do not necessarily reduce risk-levels (Peters, 2004).
In spite of the reluctant organizational changes, our study illustrates that the field is still
very fragmented. Responsibility is divided among several actors at different levels, at
different levels, and within different sectors and organizational settings. There is a mismatch
between the strong specialization by sector, administrative apparatus, and a policy field that

does not follow traditional sector lines. A strengthening of the horizontal coordination
between the ministries might be necessary to handle the need for better integration and
horizontal coordination. The dominant steering principles and in the Norwegian system, are
still fundamental cornerstones, and have not been altered. Thus, any change within the field
will take time, or may possibly require the effects of a major and path-breaking disaster
hitting Norway more directly.
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