Social and Psychological Bases
of Ideology and System Justifi cation
Series in Political Psychology
Series Editor
John T. Jost
Editorial Board
Mahzarin Banaji, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Christopher Federico, Donald P. Green,
John Hibbing, Jon Krosnick, Arie Kruglanski, Kathleen McGraw, David Sears,
Jim Sidanius, Philip E. Tetlock, Tom R. Tyler
Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justifi cation
John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir
Forthcoming Books in the Series:
The Political Psychology of Democratic Citizenship
Eugene Borgida, John Sullivan, and Christopher M. Federico
Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections
Maria E. Grabe and Erik P. Bucy
Social and Psychological Bases
of Ideology and System
Justifi cation
Edited by
John T. Jost
Aaron C. Kay
Hulda Thorisdottir
2009
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justifi cation /
edited by John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, Hulda Thorisdottir.
p. cm. — (Series in political psychology)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-532091-6
1. United States—Politics and government—2001– 2. Ideology—Political aspects—
United States. 3. Political psychology. 4. Religion and politics—United States.
5. Political culture—United States. 6. Right and left (Political science)—United States.
7. Public opinion—United States. I. Jost, John T. II. Kay, Aaron C.
III. Thorisdottir, Hulda.
JK275.S568 2009
320.97301'9—dc22 2008022080
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America

on acid-free paper
We dedicate this book to three of our teachers:
Irving E. Alexander
William J. McGuire
Lee Ross
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Oxford University Press for publishing this new book se-
ries on “Political Psychology” and to express special gratitude to Lori Han-
delman, Senior Editor in the Brain & Behavioral Sciences department. We
also owe considerable debts to Jennifer Rappaport and to Briehan Truesdell
and Cara Jolly for assisting with the administrative demands of the proj-
ect. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the fi nancial support of New York
University, the Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, and the
National Science Foundation.
vii
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ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword: Why Political Psychology Is Important xiii
George Lakoff
Contributors xv
I. INTRODUCTION
1 On the Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology
and System Justifi cation / 3
Hulda Thorisdottir, John T. Jost, and Aaron C. Kay
II. IDEOLOGY AND AUTOMATICITY
2 American Moral Exceptionalism / 27
Eric Luis Uhlmann, T. Andrew Poehlman, and John A. Bargh
3 On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideology:

The Case of the USA / 53
Melissa J. Ferguson, Travis J. Carter, and Ran R. Hassin
III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
4 A Psychological Advantage for the Status Quo / 85
Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall
5 Belief in a Just World, Perceived Fairness,
and Justifi cation of the Status Quo / 107
Carolyn L. Hafer and Becky L. Choma
6 Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations: Exploring
Perceived Fairness in Hypothetical Societies / 126
Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock
7 A Contextual Analysis of the System Justifi cation
Motive and Its Societal Consequences / 158
Aaron C. Kay and Mark P. Zanna
IV. EPISTEMIC AND EXISTENTIAL MOTIVES
8 The Social Psychology of Uncertainty Management and
System Justifi cation / 185
Kees van den Bos
9 Political Ideology in the 21st Century: A Terror
Management Perspective on Maintenance
and Change of the Status Quo / 210
Jacqueline Anson, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and
Jeff Greenberg
10 No Atheists in Foxholes: Motivated Reasoning
and Religious Belief / 241
Robb Willer
V. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
11 Motivated Social Cognition and Ideology: Is Attention
to Elite Discourse a Prerequisite for Epistemically
Motivated Political Affi nities? / 267

Christopher M. Federico and Paul Goren
12 A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological
Attitudes and System Justifi cation / 292
John Duckitt and Chris G. Sibley
13 Statewide Differences in Personality Predict Voting
Patterns in 1996–2004 U.S. Presidential Elections / 314
Peter J. Rentfrow, John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeffrey Potter
VI. PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE AND MORALITY
14 Procedural Justice and System-Justifying
Motivations / 351
Irina Feygina and Tom R. Tyler
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents xi
15 Planet of the Durkheimians, Where Community, Authority,
and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality / 371
Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham
16 Ideology of the Good Old Days: Exaggerated Perceptions
of Moral Decline and Conservative Politics / 402
Richard P. Eibach and Lisa K. Libby
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF, GROUP, AND SOCIETY
17 Group Status and Feelings of Personal
Entitlement: The Roles of Social Comparison
and System-Justifying Beliefs / 427
Laurie T. O’Brien and Brenda Major
18 Ambivalent Sexism at Home and at Work: How Attitudes
Toward Women in Relationships Foster Exclusion in the
Public Sphere / 444
Mina Cikara, Tiane L. Lee, Susan T. Fiske, and Peter Glick
19 Acknowledging and Redressing Historical Injustices / 463
Katherine B. Starzyk, Craig W. Blatz, and Michael Ross

20 The Politics of Intergroup Attitudes / 480
Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and John T. Jost
Name Index / 507
Subject Index / 513
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FOREWORD
Why Political Psychology Is Important
The knowledge of our own minds can be put to no better use than in un-
derstanding our social and political lives. That is why political psychology
matters. Political psychology applies an important branch of the cognitive
and brain sciences—experimental psychology, including social and cogni-
tive psychology—to politics. Although the methodologies may be limited to
the techniques of one or more subfi elds, the results nonetheless contribute
substantially to the overall picture: Political thought is not what it appears to
be. It is much deeper, as we strive to show in Social and Psychological Bases of
Ideology and System Justifi cation.
Over the past three decades, the cognitive and brain sciences have utterly
changed our understanding of the mind and how it works. The results are
startling to most people, including academics in most fi elds and political
professionals. Perhaps most startling is the concept that ideas are not ab-
stract; they are physical structures in the brain—and once there, they don’t
change easily. A widely accepted view of the mind assumes that reason is
conscious, literal (it can directly fi t the world), logical, dispassionate, univer-
sal, disembodied (independent of perception and bodily movement), and
serving of self-interest, so much so that it is seen to be irrational to act against
one’s own interests.
We now know from scientifi c studies of the brain and mind that all of
these commonplace views of reason are false. Reason is mostly unconscious,
automatic, and effortless. We make inevitable use of conceptual framing and
metaphor to understand and reason about reality. Thus reason does not fi t

the world directly—in most politically important cases, it’s not even close.
Our “logic” is frame- and metaphor-based; it is not the logic of logicians
and mathematicians. Reason is anything but dispassionate. The reverse is
true. If brain damage (say from a stroke or an accident) has eliminated your
emotional capacities, you would not know what to want or how anyone else
would want you to act: loss of emotion makes the use of reason virtually
impossible.
Reason is anything but universal: even conservatives and progressives
in the same country do not use the same forms of thought. Since you think
with your brains, and since concepts arise from the body, reason is anything
but disembodied. Moreover, mirror neuron studies indicate that we are born
xiii
with a natural capacity for empathy and cooperation, and do not use reason
simply in the service of self-interest.
Viewed through the lens of my fi eld, cognitive linguistics, the political
environment is not what the TV pundits tell you. Conservatives and pro-
gressives don’t just have different beliefs; they have different views of the
world and different modes of reasoning—mostly unconscious. The central
difference arises from a commonplace metaphorical understanding of the
nation as family, with confl icting ideas of what an ideal family should be,
either strict or nurturant. Many Americans are biconceptual; they have both
worldviews and modes of thought, but apply them in different arenas of
life—say, conservative on foreign policy and progressive on domestic mat-
ters, or the reverse. Foundational concepts, like freedom, fairness, equality,
and democracy don’t have just one meaning. They are essentially contested;
they will inevitably have multiple incompatible meanings, refl ecting the
multiple differences in worldview. Most people will be unaware of all this
because thought is mostly unconscious. Similarly, they will be unaware that
we all normally think in terms of conceptual frames and metaphors.
Why should we care that our main political modes of thought operate

below the radar screen? Because conservatives, through their think tanks,
have taken advantage of the situation, framing just about every issue in pub-
lic discussion their way via conservative messages fi lling the airways. Our
political discourse is disastrously out of balance. To remedy the situation, we
need to understand more about how our minds are linked to our politics.
This book will take you on a grand tour of political psychology. What
justifi es systems of hierarchical power and vastly unequal wealth? Why does
the status quo have an advantage over change? How do people manage un-
certainty and terror, and what are the consequences? How do personality
types line up with political ideologies? Why do so many people think the
world is getting worse? Why do people tend to care more about injustices
done to others by outsiders, than about injustices done to others by their own
group members?
Read on.
George Lakoff
Berkeley, CA
April 2008
xiv FOREWORD
xv
CONTRIBUTORS
Jacqueline Anson
Doctoral Student
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY
Mahzarin R. Banaji
Professor of Psychology
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA
John A. Bargh
Professor of Psychology

Yale University
New Haven, CT
Craig W. Blatz
SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow
Simon Fraser University
Vancouver, BC
Canada
Travis J. Carter
Doctoral Student
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Becky L. Choma
Post-Doctoral Fellow
York University
Toronto, ON
Canada
Mina Cikara
Doctoral Student
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Chris Crandall
Professor of Psychology
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS
John Duckitt
Professor of Psychology
The University
of Auckland
Auckland, NZ
Richard P. Eibach

Assistant Professor
Yale University
New Haven, CT
Scott Eidelman
Assistant Professor
University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, AR
Christopher M. Federico
Associate Professor
University of
Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN
Melissa J. Ferguson
Associate Professor
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Irina Feygina
Doctoral Student
New York University
New York, NY
Susan T. Fiske
Professor of Psychology
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Paul Goren
Associate Professor
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN
Sam Gosling
Associate Professor

University of Texas, Austin
Austin, TX
Jesse Graham
Doctoral Student
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
Jeff Greenberg
Professor of Psychology
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ
Carolyn L. Hafer
Professor of Psychology
Brock University
St. Catharines, ON
Canada
Jonathan Haidt
Associate Professor
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
Ran R. Hassin
Professor of Psychology
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
John T. Jost
Professor of Psychology
New York University
New York, NY
Aaron C. Kay
Assistant Professor
University of Waterloo

Waterloo, ON
Canada
George Lakoff
Professor of Linguistics and
Cognitive Science
University of California
Berkeley, CA
Tiane L. Lee
Doctoral Student
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Lisa K. Libby
Assistant Professor
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
Brenda Major
Professor of Psychology
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA
Gregory Mitchell
Professor of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
xvi CONTRIBUTORS
Brian Nosek
Associate Professor
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
Laurie T. O’Brien
Assistant Professor

Tulane University
New Orleans, LA
T. Andrew Poehlman
Assistant Professor
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, TX
Tom Pyszczynski
Professor of Psychology
University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs
Colorado Springs, CO
Peter J. Rentfrow
Lecturer
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, UK
Mike Ross
Professor of Psychology
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, ON
Canada
Chris G. Sibley
Lecturer
The University of Auckland
Auckland, NZ
Sheldon Solomon
Professor of Psychology
Skidmore College
Saratoga Springs, NY
Katherine B. Starzyk
Assistant Professor

University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, MB
Canada
Philip E. Tetlock
Professor of Organizational
Behavior
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA
Hulda Thorisdottir
Postdoctoral Fellow
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Tom R. Tyler
Professor of Psychology
New York University
New York, NY
Eric Luis Uhlmann
Postdoctoral Fellow
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
Kees van den Bos
Professor of Psychology
Utrecht University
The Netherlands
Robb Willer
Assistant Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA
Mark Zanna
Professor of Psychology

University of Waterloo
Waterloo, ON
Canada
Contributors xvii
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PART I
Introduction
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3
CHAPTER 1
On the Social and Psychological Bases
of Ideology and System Justifi cation
Hulda Thorisdottir, John T. Jost, and Aaron C. Kay
Abstract
This book both refl ects and exemplifi es the recent resurgence of interest in the
social and psychological characteristics and processes that give rise to ideo-
logical forms. Ideology is an elusive, multifaceted construct that can usefully
be analyzed in terms of “top-down” processes related to the social construc-
tion and dissemination of ideology as well as “bottom-up” processes, includ-
ing dispositional and situational factors, that make certain ideological outcomes
more likely than others. In this chapter, we briefl y summarize the contents of this
volume, focusing especially on the cognitive and motivational antecedents and
consequences of adopting specifi c ideologies, the functions served by those
ideologies, and the myriad ways in which people accept and justify (versus re-
ject) aspects of the social and political worlds they inhabit. Current challenges
and future directions for the study of ideology and system justifi cation are also
discussed.
Ideas about how to structure and govern society change reluctantly when
they change at all. Although democracy, social welfare, and equality under
the law have been implemented over the last few centuries in many parts

of the world, such innovations have been surprisingly slow to spread else-
where. For example, only about half of the 165 independent nation-states in
which most of the world’s population resides can be considered democra-
cies, and of those, only 27 are “full” democracies (Kekic, 2007). Compared
to the sweeping scientifi c and technological advances that have permeated
nearly every aspect of modern life around the globe, political systems hardly
budge. In this chapter and this book, we suggest that one reason why ide-
ology does not “advance” at the rate of other technologies is that it is con-
strained in fundamental ways by human nature. That is, the stability of so-
cial and political orders and the belief systems that underpin them can be
said to stem from basic human predispositions and regularities in social life
(see Jost, 2006, for a similar argument with respect to left–right ideology in
particular).
4 INTRODUCTION
THE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY
Ideology has been described as one of the most elusive constructs in all of the
social sciences, largely because it has been enormously diffi cult for research-
ers to agree on a compact, yet comprehensive, defi nition of ideology (e.g., see
Gerring, 1997; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; McLellan, 1995; Mullins, 1972).
Attempts by social scientists to whittle down the defi nition of ideology to one
or two sentences bring to mind the well-known Indian legend of the blind
men describing an elephant. Their descriptions refl ected whichever part of
the animal they happened to touch (trunk, tusk, tail, etc.) and therefore failed
to capture their target in its complex entirety. It is diffi cult to avoid this fate
in trying to capture the multifaceted construct of ideology. Any single defi -
nition of ideology is bound to approach the concept from a limited vantage
point and to be at least somewhat incomplete (see also Eagleton, 1991).
“Top-Down” and “Bottom-Up” Approaches to the Study of Ideology
The approach we take in this volume is to strive to illuminate a phenom-
enon (or set of phenomena) that we readily acknowledge as too large and

complicated—even sprawling—to describe exhaustively from a single theo-
retical perspective. This is one reason why the chapters in this volume address
the topic of ideology in ways that go well beyond political belief systems as
they are conventionally understood in terms of socialism, liberalism, and
conservatism. Some of the chapters, for example, address religious ideology,
and others address everyday beliefs about fairness and legitimacy that are not
as formal and systematic as most defi nitions of ideology would require. We
believe that this highly inclusive approach to ideological (or proto- ideological)
subject matter not only gives the reader a more nuanced view of the construct,
but it also refl ects current research in the fi eld more accurately than a narrow
conception would allow.
Even if a perfect defi nition of ideology eludes scholars and researchers,
an imperfect defi nition can be useful in guiding research and theory. For
our present purposes, a relatively simple, practical defi nition will do (see
also Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2009), such as the two-part defi nition offered in the
fourth edition of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language:
1. The body of ideas refl ecting the social needs and aspirations of an indi-
vidual, group, class, or culture.
2. A set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic,
or other system.
This kind of broad defi nition allows for considerable fl exibility in inves-
tigating ideology from a social psychological perspective. It also highlights
On the Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justifi cation 5
the fact that ideology can be analyzed in terms of both “top-down” pro-
cesses, whereby political elites in the media and elsewhere construct and
publicly disseminate ideological “bundles,” and “bottom-up” processes
arising from the psychological needs and motives of ordinary citizens ( Jost
et al., 2009). Attention to top-down processes has dominated research in
political science, especially research in the rational choice tradition, with rel-
atively little consideration given to the infl uence of other psychological fac-

tors (e.g., Hinich & Munger, 1994; Zaller, 1992). Psychologists have argued
that the success of top-down processes is affected also by characteristics of
message recipients, especially the extent to which the general public pos-
sesses the cognitive abilities and motivations required to accurately grasp
and apply the ideological messages proffered by elites (e.g., Federico, 2007;
Judd & Krosnick, 1989; McGuire, 1985).
In contrast to the top-down approach, research on bottom-up processes
is premised on the notion that a variety of psychological factors, both dispo-
sitional and situational, tend to determine ideological proclivities. This idea
is clearly on display in the present volume, especially the notion that vari-
ability in epistemic, existential, and relational motives generally map onto
ideological differences. One example comes from the accumulated body of
research documenting correlations between the endorsement of politically
conservative opinions and epistemic needs for certainty and structure, ex-
istential needs for security and threat management, and relational needs for
conformity and solidarity ( Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost,
Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, et al., 2007). We as-
sume that a reciprocal, dynamic relationship exists between top-down and
bottom-up processes. Several social psychological phenomena—such as ste-
reotyping, persuasion, and the rationalization of hierarchical arrangements
among social groups—link the two. Stereotypes and group status differences
are well-known to the general public and to political elites, and they are fre-
quently part of the subtext (if not the text) of ideological discourse (e.g., Men-
delberg, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002).
The End of the End of Ideology?
Until fairly recently, research on political ideology had fallen out of favor
among many social scientists. Some very prominent sociologists and politi-
cal scientists in the 1950s and 1960s declared that ideology was neither rele-
vant nor helpful in explaining ordinary citizens’ social and political behavior
(e.g., Bell, 1960/1988; Converse, 1964; Lipset, 1960; Shils, 1955/1968). Their

basic argument was that most people were not cognitively sophisticated or
politically motivated enough to structure their attitudes according to ab-
stract philosophical conceptions associated with the left–right dimension.
6 INTRODUCTION
The “end-of-ideologists” also disputed observations made by Adorno and
colleagues (1950) and others that psychological differences are at the heart
of ideological differences between liberals and conservatives (for a critical
discussion of these arguments, see Jost, 2006).
Although several researchers did investigate the determinants of ide-
ology from a bottom-up (psychological) perspective during the 1980s—
focusing on variables such as cognitive style (Sidanius, 1985, 1988; Tetlock,
1983, 1984), authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), and the effects of
threat on political preferences (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991)—these con-
stituted relatively independent strands of research. It took several years
before these insights were integrated into a broader theoretical framework
(e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003). It now seems clear
to many observers that the current historical period is a particularly ideo-
logical one, especially in the United States (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008;
Barker & Tinnick, 2006; Jost, 2006; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Stimson, 2004),
and research on the social and psychological bases of ideology has begun
in earnest again. As Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) noted, a signifi cant re-
surgence of interest has occurred among researchers in the social, cognitive,
and motivational underpinnings of political orientation (e.g., see Block &
Block, 2006; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost et al.,
2003, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Skitka et al., 2002; Tetlock, 2007; van
Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Willer, 2004). Social and behavioral scientists are
now much more likely to acknowledge that the abilities, needs, values, and
motivations of individuals infl uence the contents of political belief systems
from the bottom up (Bizer et al., 2004; Duckitt, 2001; Federico, 2007; Fed-
erico & Schneider, 2007; Feldman, 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Lavine, Lodge, &

Freitas, 2005; Weber & Federico, 2007).
Many researchers working on the psychological basis of ideology rec-
ognize that—as Converse (1964) and others famously argued—the political
opinions of ordinary citizens are generally not tightly constrained by pres-
sures for consistency and logic, but this does not mean that they are uncon-
strained by other psychological forces (for a recent review, see Jost et al.,
2009). So, although it would be a mistake to equate ideological thinking with
political sophistication and rationality, mounting psychological evidence
suggests that political scientists and others must attend to the social and psy-
chological bases of ideology in order to gain a fuller understanding of citi-
zens’ political preferences ( Jost, 2006). In other words, bottom-up processes
do reliably predict ideological opinions and voting preferences. Jost and
colleagues (2003) showed, for example, that psychological needs to manage
uncertainty and threat consistently give rise to politically conservative (more
than liberal or moderate) opinions. They argued that a special affi nity exists