The history of the Soviet Union is complicated and fascinating. In the
course of only seventyyears this country has seen the development of the
totally new system of state, economic growth, thegrowth of hopes for the
"brighter future", and then the sudden and expected by no one collapse
ofthe whole system leading to chaos, wars, and confusion. One period is
especially important in orderto realize how did things finally started to
change after the seventy years of blindly pursuing thedream of
communism which left the Soviet Union in a very bad economical and
moral state, and thisperiod is called perestroika, Russian for restructuring.
The main figure behind this process whichbegan in 1985 is Mikhail S.
Gorbachev who became General Secretary of the Communist Party ofthe
Soviet Union Central Committee in March 1985. The three books that
concentrate on the"Gorbachev phenomenon" were all unfortunately
written before perestroika was finished, so they donot analyze the
consequences that it had for the Soviet Union as well as for the whole
world . Onthe other hand, all three of these books do a good job in
explaining the changes that took place inthe course of the first three
years after Gorbachev came to power and why were these
changesnecessary.The first book "Gorbachev" was written by Zhores A.
Medvedev in 1986 and hence theauthor is concentrating on the first year
of the new course in Soviet history. The book itself basicallyconsists of
two parts: the first part where the author describes the "making of a
General Secretary",and the second part entitled "Gorbachev in power"
which describes Gorbachev's first year in theoffice. The first part of the
book gives a lot of background information which allows the reader tosee
the stages in development of the Soviet leader from childhood and youth
to second-in-command. One thing I found to be particularly interesting in
Medvedev's description of Gorbachev'syouth and that is the theory that
living with a Czech intellectual for five years changed the futureSoviet
leader in such a way that he became more "westernized" which "indirectly
provided the SovietUnion with a new style leader". Medvedev says that

during the time from 1950 to 1955 when youngGorbachev attended the
Moscow State University and had to share the room with a Czech
studentZdenek Mlynar he was "profoundly influenced" by the "culture and
attitudes of a traditionallyWestern nation". This influence lasted for years
and the fact that Gorbachev has become"westernized" in his appearance,
manners, dress and the "image he projects of tolerance and
cordialbehavior, all the small signs which mark him as different from the
usual Komsomol and Party boss",is according to Medvedev due to a
great extent to the fact that Mlynar was Gorbachev's
roommate(Medvedev, 1986, p. 43).Although the first part of the book is
certainly interesting and important I would like toconcentrate on the
second part of the book since it is directly deals with the subject that
interests memost, that is the years when Gorbachev was in power and
the development of the new course in theSoviet life called perestroika.
From just reading the first paragraph it is obvious that the authorapproves
of the new leader. Medvedev writes: "For the first time in Soviet history,
the leadershipsuccession has meant more than the arrival of a new
leader and the possibility of the implementationof the new policies. The
Gorbachev succession marks the appearance of a new political
generationwhich differs from the old guard in style, knowledge and
historical vision Gorbachev represents ayounger post-war political
generation, a generation which started its professional Party or
statecareer during the more liberal Krushchev era" (p. 165). Medvedev
quotes some of the veryenthusiastic Western newspaper comments
which called Gorbachev a "bright, incisive, brisk-mannered man", with
"high intelligence, considerable organizational abilities, political acumen".
According to the author no previous Soviet leader had received so much
immediate publicity andsuch an enthusiastic welcome from the general
public. "Gorbachev's popularity was closely linked tohis energetic,
charismatic, competent and obviously intelligent personality", says

Medvedev whichled to this immediate acceptance of Gorbachev as leader
(p. 183). Inspite the fact that Gorbachev'snew style was popular, some of
his methods found less favor. A lot of his actions were
purelyadministrative, imposed from above without any discussion and
seemed coercive and disciplinarianto some people, especially to
intellectuals who expected liberalism. Medvedev seems to
justifyGorbachev's first decrees since they were "not designed to impress
intellectuals, but rather aimed atimproving a sick economy" (p. 184).It was
very interesting to read about the "battle against the bottle" which
Gorbachev startedimmediately. For him vodka was a "public enemy
number one", the cause of increasing crime, poorproductivity, an
increasing number of problem children of alcoholic parents, reduced life
expectancyand alcohol-related health problems, all of which created a
heavy burden on the national economy. Some of the measures that were
taken by the government were increasing the drinking age from 18to 21,
alcohol could no longer be sold in ordinary food stores, special wine
shops would not bepermitted to sell any alcohol before 2 PM, stiff
sentences were introduced for private stills. But theanti-alcohol campaign
quickly has became unpopular and "has created a degree of social
tension"which led to the canceling of the whole campaign by the
government (p. 189).During his first year Gorbachev made some big
changes in the agricultural sector of theSoviet Union. The decision was
made to allocate annually from one million to one million twohundred
thousand allotments to citizens. Medvedev sees this decision as
"Gorbachev's secondpersonal initiative which had a real practical and
positive impact on the quality of people's lives. Thegarden co-operatives
reduced the pressure slightly on state retail sales of vegetables and
fruit,particularly in small towns" (p. 201).As for the domestic policy,
according to Medvedev, Gorbachev's first year in power wasmarked by
"unprecedently large changes in the personnel of the Politburo and

government and therapid formulation of economic targets and methods of
economic development for the next 15 years. In all other respects,
however, the changes in domestic policy were merely cosmetic" (p. 208).
Policies were better presented, the style was more modern, but there was
little in the contents.Gorbachev has introduced very few social and
political changes in his first year in office. Medvedevargues that this was
due to the fact that Gorbachev, as a professional Party official understood
thatliberalization or democratization may turn against him (which is
exactly how everything worked outsome five years later, but of course
Medvedev did not know this for sure back in 1986). AlsoGorbachev's
new team had absolutely no desire to make the system more liberal.In
the last chapter Medvedev talks about Soviet new diplomacy which was
created byGorbachev in his first year in the office. First of all,
Gorbachev's charm, sense of humor, promptresponses, attempts to find
convincing arguments "suddenly introduced the human factor into
East-West confrontation which in itself served to reduce tension.
Gorbachev clearly did not resemble aperson who was waiting for the
opportunity to drop a nuclear bomb on the West" (p. 228). ForGorbachev
two main issues were the problem of the arms race and Afghanistan,
where the war hadgone for two long and there was no end in sight.
Gorbachev wanted to accelerate economicdevelopment and the main
task of his diplomacy was the reduction of the cost of the foreign
policyand that meant substantial arms reductions. In his book Medvedev
makes an assumption that theSoviet government would not withdraw its
troops from Afghanistan and Gorbachev will be aimingfor a "quick military
end to the war" - assumption that proved to be wrong . On the other hand
theauthor is right when he predicts the gradual thawing of the Soviet-US
relations, thawing that startedin Geneva with Reagan-Gorbachev
negotiations and continued throughout Gorbachev's rule.In his conclusion
Medvedev makes a statement that "it has been abundantly clear

thatGorbachev is neither a liberal nor a bold reformist. He prefers small
modifications, administrativemethods and economic adjustments to
structural reform it is a mistake to expect too much fromGorbachev" (p.
245). This statement, as we all know, quickly proved to be wrong.The
second book titled "The Gorbachev Phenomenon" was written by Moshe
Lewin in1988, two years after Medvedev published his work and therefore
it gives the reader a betterperspective on what happened while
Gorbachev was in power. Lewin's book is structured verysimilar to the
first book that I described above. It also consists of the two parts: one
deals with thehistory of the Soviet Union before 1985, and the second
part, entitled "The New Course" discussesthe changes that took place in
the country after Gorbachev became the General Secretary. Right from
the start the author says that the Soviet Union is on the "verge of
importantchanges in the way it conducts its affairs, maybe in the way it is
run Russia is now entering acrucial new stage and is therefore, in
many respects, just a beginner" (Lewin, 1988, p. 1). Lewinfollows
Medvedev's steps in describing the new Soviet leader and uses all kinds
of approving termssuch as "bright", "intelligent" and "incisive". But unlike
Medvedev Lewin makes an argument that themain reason for perestroika
was not the individualism of Gorbachev but rather the crisis that hadbeen
created by the mechanisms of economic management that had emerged
in the 1930's and werestill powerful. He also talks about the enormous
role of the people who were "placing pressure onthe governing model,
insisting that each sphere of action receive the attention it needed and
that newinstitutions and new methods be created to serve the new social
forms. The system needed toloosen up" (p. 112). The answer to people's
pressure Gorbachev began his new line which wascharacterized by an
appeal for frankness. The leaders were ready to face the truth and report
to thecountry that the system was in a bad shape. This was particularly
true about the economy. As theParty Congress put it : "The production

relations that exist currently, the system of husbanding andmanaging,
emerged, in substance, in conditions of extensive economic
development. Gradually they became obsolete, lost their stimulating
power and turned, in many ways, into a hindrance" (p. 115). This new line
did not stop with criticisms of the management of the economy. Ideology
andideological life were also described as being in shambles. The
leaders admitted that Soviet peopledid not believe official statements and
ideological dogma was a powerful obstacle to the country'sdevelopment.
This was the beginning of the new page in the history of the Soviet Union
whichbecame known all over the world as glasnost.Together with the
appeal for glasnost - a slogan but also a pledge to ease censorship
andfacilitate the access to information - there was a call for uskorenie, a
"speeding up of the pace ofeconomic development, especially
technological progress". Lewin can not comprehend how someWestern
observers can still claim that nothing really happens, that "there is no
well-defined program,notably for economic reforms". Such statements
are "sheer obstinacy", according to the author sinceideas for change are
being debated, implemented, and tested. And the fact that no
comprehensiveprogram has been announced seems rather as a good
sign to Lewin, since "for what single programcould fill the bill?" (p.
116-117).As against Medvedev, Lewin does not spend much time
describing "the battle against thebottle". He sums everything up in one
sentence instead of two chapters and has a different view ofthe
successfulness of this initiative: "Although many predicted failure, the
government stuck to itsguns, gained public support for its aims and the
anti-drinking campaign has achieved some success. This was clever and
promising opening" (p. 116).Lewin's conclusions about the changes in the
agricultural sector and foreign policy are verysimilar to that of Medvedev.
The author talks about how the center would ease its control,
howgovernment would give more freedom in the choices that people

involved in producing theagricultural goods can have. Lewin underlined
the importance of Gorbachev's decision to allocateallotments which led to
the bigger interest of the Soviet people in working the land which
ultimatelyled to the increase in agricultural production. Lewin also
mentions the better Russian-Americanrelations which was due to the fact
that Gorbachev was ready for discussions with the Americanpresident
and has chosen such international policy that led to the slowing down of
the arms race andthe reduction of the accumulation of arms.As for the
domestic policy Lewin has a different position than Medvedev, this is due
to alarge extent to the fact that Lewin is writing his work two years after
Medvedev. "Glasnost,democratization, self-government in the workplace,
orientation to the social sphere, social justice,human rights, and respect
for human individuality" - reforms in these areas took place after
threeyears of Gorbachev in power and influenced domestic policy a lot
according to Lewin (p. 119).At the very end of the book Lewin makes a
statement that proved to be so true after thecouple of years since this
work was published. "The old system is still in place and its
supporters,deeply disturbed by the perestroika, will certainly resist
change. The reformers are not assured ofvictory: they will have to fight
hard for it, go for bold new moves. Their failure would be terriblycostly for
the USSR and could well produce negative repercussions worldwide.
The world is nowwatching Moscow attentively and with good reason" (p.
153). It is hard to believe that these wordswere written eight years
ago The third book is probably the most important one since it is the
work of the man who isdirectly responsible for the changes that took
place in the Soviet Union and who is also responsible,although indirectly,
for the changes that took place in the whole Eastern Europe. Gorbachev
wrote abook entitled "Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the
World" back in 1987, two yearsafter he became the new Soviet leader. In
this book the author tries to answer the question of whatis perestroika?

Why does the Soviet society need it? What are its substance and
objectives? Whatdoes it reject and what does it create? How is it
proceeding and what might be its consequences forthe Soviet Union and
the world community? In other words, all the questions that were raised
anddiscussed by Medvedev and Lewin but answered by the
originator.Perestroika, according to Gorbachev, is an "urgent necessity
arising from the profoundprocesses of development in our socialist
society. This society is ripe for change. It has been longyearning for it"
(Gorbachev, 1987, p. 17). Perestroika was caused by all sorts of
problems that theSoviet Union had accumulated over the seventy years.
First factor was a slowing economic growthwhich caused "a country that
was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations began tolose
one position after another". At the same time the gap in the efficiency of
production, quality ofproducts, scientific and technological development
began to widen, and not to our advantage". All this eventually led to an
economic deadlock and stagnation that paralyzed Soviet society.
Declining rates of growth affected other aspects of the Soviet life, for
instance the social sphere,which began to lag behind other spheres in
terms of technological development, personnel, know-how and quality of
work. Gorbachev also mentions a gradual erosion of the ideological and
moralvalues of Soviet people as another argument for the need of
restructuring. People did not believe inthe government because of the
many promises that it made and never accomplished; because theneeds
and opinions of ordinary working people, of the public at large, were
ignored. There was aprocess of decay in public morals; "the great feeling
of solidarity with each other that was forgedduring the heroic times of the
Revolution, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic War andpostwar
rehabilitation was weakening" (p. 21-22). Gorbachev also talks about
alcoholism, drugaddiction and culture alien to Soviet people, which "bred
vulgarity and low tastes and brought aboutideological bareness". This

statement about "alien to us" culture reminded me of how this fightagainst
"degeneration" which American movies and other media brings was
carried out - how peoplewere hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how
it would be almost impossible to get a videotapewith an American movie
but people would still manage to get it "through a friend of a friend"
andthen watch it, which as Gorbachev puts it "bred vulgarity and low
tastes". Considering all theproblems the government made "the only
logical conclusion" that the country was verging on crisis. This conclusion
was announced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central
Committee, "whichinaugurated the new strategy of perestroika and
formulated its basic principles" (p. 24).Gorbachev gives a plan of
perestroika, its component parts which include: overcoming
thestagnation process, breaking down the braking mechanism. It means
mass initiative. "It is thecomprehensive development of democracy,
socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative,improved order and
discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all spheres of the society; respect
for theindividual". Perestroika is also the intensification of the Soviet
economy, development of theprinciples of democratic centralism and
encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also means "theelimination from
society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the
principles of socialjustice. It means the unity of words and deeds, rights
and duties". But Gorbachev does not forgetto include Lenin and says
that "the essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism
withdemocracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction
both in theory and in practice"(p.34-35).Gorbachev also gives his
evaluation of perestroika. He is writing this book two and a halfyears after
the new line was launched and his assessment is as follows: "perestroika
is just getting ofthe ground. So far we have only been shaping the
mechanisms of acceleration" (p. 64). The realwork for him is still ahead
and the main task is to get the whole society involved in the process

ofrestructuring.In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about
"new political thinking", newSoviet foreign policy which should benefit
international relations, especially Soviet-Americanrelations and provide
for "nuclear-free, non-violent world". The main task of the Soviet
foreignpolicy is to move "from suspicion and hostility to confidence, from
a balance of fear to a balance ofreason and goodwill, from narrow
nationalist egoism to cooperation" (p. 254). Gorbachev feels thatthe not
only the Soviet Union but the whole world needs restructuring, a
fundamental change - this,of course, does not come as a surprise, if we
remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks and thancommunists wanted
to make this "fundamental change".The three books that were discussed
above were all written by different authors and indifferent times but still
basically they all have the same approach. Medvedev and Lewin
bothapprove the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all kinds of
good adjectives to describe himsuch as "bright" and "intelligent". They
both are optimistic about the future of the country althoughmake it clear
that this is only a beginning of the story to follow and since the
perestroika just startedat the time they were writing their works they can
only speculate about what would happen to thecountry. As for
Gorbachev he is probably the most optimistic about the new line which is
notsurprising since he is the leader and leaders should radiate with
confidence. He is also the bestsource for finding out what perestroika is
all about, its goals and its origins. Of course now in 1996many of his
statements sound unfounded, even funny but when we read his work we
have to keep inmind that back in 1985 Gorbachev's ideas sounded new
and revolutionary, destined to change theSoviet Union and even the
whole world - which did in fact happen.The question whether
Gorbachev's perestroika was a failure or a success does not have aneasy
immediate answer. Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted
from 1985 to 1990caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the

country on the verge of crisis, with economy inchaos and no certain
future. Joan E. Spero, the author of the book "The Politics Of
InternationalEconomic Relations", is the supporter of this point of view.
In the chapter entitled "The Failure ofPerestroika" she shows by using
different examples, such as economical progress, stability of thecountry
and so on, that Gorbachev failed to achive the objectives of perestroika
(Spero, 1996,p336). Although I agree that Gorbachev did not achieve
some of the goals stated in his book"Perestroika", I believe that
perestroka was a success to a certain extent. First of all, he did
achievesome of the objectives. For instance, after the reforms the
society did become more open thanks toglasnost. People for the first
time since 1917 could say what they really thought and not what
was"good for the party". People also gained access to all sorts of
information which was previouslydenied to them. Children in schools and
students in colleges could finally learn the history as it wasand not as it
was seen by the Communist party. Another major success of perestroika
was theincreasing openness of the country to the West which led to a
considerable improvements in East-West relations. This also led to the
gradual reduction of arms and considerable decline in defensespending
in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Considering these
and other positiveresults of perestroika I would have to disagree with
those people who say that it was a completefailure. The restructuring
that took place in the Soviet Union has many dimensions - some
arepositive, some are negative. One-sided view which Joan E. Spero
and other scholars advocate isnot correct, since it concentrates only on
the adverse effects of perestroika, completely ignoring allthe positive
effects that it had.