(8th edition) (the pearson series in economics) robert pindyck, daniel rubinfeld microecon 538
Bạn đang xem bản rút gọn của tài liệu. Xem và tải ngay bản đầy đủ của tài liệu tại đây (69.19 KB, 1 trang )
CHAPTER 13 • Game Theory and Competitive Strategy 513
give a country an advantage in international markets and so be an important
instrument of trade policy.
Does this conflict with what you have learned about the benefits of free
trade? In Chapter 9, for example, we saw how trade restrictions such as tariffs
or quotas lead to deadweight losses. In Chapter 16 we go further and show how,
in a general way, free trade between people (or between countries) is mutually
beneficial. Given the virtues of free trade, how can government intervention
in an international market ever be warranted? In certain situations, a country
can benefit by adopting policies that give its domestic industries a competitive
advantage.
To see how this might occur, consider an industry with substantial economies
of scale—one in which a few large firms can produce much more efficiently than
many small ones. Suppose that by granting subsidies or tax breaks, the government can encourage domestic firms to expand faster than they would otherwise.
This might prevent firms in other countries from entering the world market,
so that the domestic industry can enjoy higher prices and greater sales. Such a
policy works by creating a credible threat to potential entrants. Large domestic firms, taking advantage of scale economies, would be able to satisfy world
demand at a low price; if other firms entered, price would be driven below the
point at which they could make a profit.
THE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT MARKET As an example, consider the international market for commercial aircraft. The development and production of
a new line of aircraft are subject to substantial economies of scale; it would
not pay to develop a new aircraft unless a firm expected to sell many of them.
Suppose that Boeing and Airbus (a European consortium that includes France,
Germany, Britain, and Spain) are each considering developing a new aircraft.
The ultimate payoff to each firm depends in part on what the other firm does.
Suppose it is only economical for one firm to produce the new aircraft. Then the
payoffs might look like those in Table 13.17(a).14
If Boeing has a head start in the development process, the outcome of the
game is the upper right-hand corner of the payoff matrix. Boeing will produce a
new aircraft, and Airbus, realizing that it will lose money if it does the same, will
not. Boeing will then earn a profit of 100.
European governments, of course, would prefer that Airbus produce the new
aircraft. Can they change the outcome of this game? Suppose they commit to
subsidizing Airbus and make this commitment before Boeing has committed
itself to produce. If the European governments commit to a subsidy of 20 to
Airbus if it produces the plane regardless of what Boeing does, the payoff matrix
would change to the one in Table 13.17(b).
TABLE 13.17(a)
DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW AIRCRAFT
Airbus
Boeing
14
Produce
Don’t produce
Produce
Don’t produce
؊10, ؊10
100, 0
0, 100
0, 0
This example is drawn from Paul R. Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passé?” Journal of Economic Perspectives
1 (Fall 1987): 131–44.
