(8th edition) (the pearson series in economics) robert pindyck, daniel rubinfeld microecon 533
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508 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy
does (refer to Table 13.12a). Now the threat might be credible without any further action; after all, you can’t be sure that an irrational manager will always
make a profit-maximizing decision. In gaming situations, the party that is
known (or thought) to be a little crazy can have a significant advantage.
Developing a reputation can be an especially important strategy in a repeated
game. A firm might find it advantageous to behave irrationally for several plays
of the game. This might give it a reputation that will allow it to increase its longrun profits substantially.
Bargaining Strategy
Our discussion of commitment and credibility also applies to bargaining problems. The outcome of a bargaining situation can depend on the ability of either
side to take an action that alters its relative bargaining position.
For example, consider two firms that are each planning to introduce one
of two products which are complementary goods. As the payoff matrix in
Table 13.13 shows, Firm 1 has a cost advantage over Firm 2 in producing A.
Therefore, if both firms produce A, Firm 1 can maintain a lower price and earn
a higher profit. Similarly, Firm 2 has a cost advantage over Firm 1 in producing
product B. If the two firms could agree about who will produce what, the rational outcome would be the one in the upper right-hand corner: Firm 1 produces
A, Firm 2 produces B, and both firms make profits of 50. Indeed, even without
cooperation, this outcome will result whether Firm 1 or Firm 2 moves first or both
firms move simultaneously. Why? Because producing B is a dominant strategy
for Firm 2, so (A, B) is the only Nash equilibrium.
Firm 1, of course, would prefer the outcome in the lower left-hand corner of
the payoff matrix. But in the context of this limited set of decisions, it cannot
achieve that outcome. Suppose, however, that Firms 1 and 2 are also bargaining
over a second issue—whether to join a research consortium that a third firm is
trying to form. Table 13.14 shows the payoff matrix for this decision problem.
Clearly, the dominant strategy is for both firms to enter the consortium, thereby
increasing profits to 40.
Now suppose that Firm 1 links the two bargaining problems by announcing that it
will join the consortium only if Firm 2 agrees to produce product A. In this case, it
is indeed in Firm 2’s interest to produce A (with Firm 1 producing B) in return for
Firm 1’s participation in the consortium. This example illustrates how combining
issues in a bargaining agenda can sometimes benefit one side at the other’s expense.
As another example, consider bargaining over the price of a house. Suppose
I, as a potential buyer, do not want to pay more than $200,000 for a house that is
actually worth $250,000 to me. The seller is willing to part with the house at any
price above $180,000 but would like to receive the highest price she can. If I am
the only bidder for the house, how can I make the seller think that I will walk
away rather than pay more than $200,000?
TABLE 13.13
PRODUCTION DECISION
Firm 2
Firm 1
Produce A
Produce B
Produce A
40, 5
50, 50
Produce B
60, 40
5, 45
