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622 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government
a comparative advantage in making hard drives
because of the sheer scale of its production
capacity.
Finally, observe that physical parts account for
just under half of the iPod’s retail price. As with

most products, a bundle of different services is
needed to design, develop, and distribute the
iPod. The firms that perform those services—Apple
included—also end up with a sizable share of the
final selling price.

EX A M P L E 16.4 THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
SPECIAL PROTECTION
The demands for protectionist policies increased steadily during the
1980s and into the 1990s. They remain
a subject of debate today, whether
out of concern for trade with various
Asian countries or in relation to the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Protectionism can take many
forms, including tariffs and quotas
of the kind that we analyzed in Chapter 9, regulatory hurdles, subsidies to
domestic producers, and controls on the use of foreign exchange. Table 16.5
highlights the findings of one study of U.S.-imposed trade restrictions.9

TABLE 16.5
INDUSTRY
Book manufacturing
Orange juice


Textiles and apparel
Carbon steel
Color televisions
Dairy products

QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF PROTECTION
PRODUCER GAINSa
($ MILLIONS)
622

CONSUMER LOSSES b
($ MILLIONS)
1,020

EFFICIENCY LOSSES c
($ MILLIONS)
59

796

1,071

265

44,883

55,084

9,895


7,753

13,873

673

388

857

14

10,201

11,221

2,795

Meat

3,264

3,672

296

Sugar

1,431


2,882

614

Producer gains in the tariff case are defined as the area of trapezoid A in Figure 9.15.

a

Consumer losses are the sum of areas A, B, C, and D in Figure 9.15.

b
c

These are given by triangles B and C in Figure 9.15.

9

This example is based on Cletus Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal, and Geoffrey E. Wood, “Protectionist
Trade Policies: A Survey of Theory, Evidence, and Rationale,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(January/February 1988): 12–30. The data in the table are taken from Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Diane T.
Berliner, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Trade Protection in the United States: 31 Case Studies,” Institute
for International Economics (1986). The dollar amounts have been scaled to 2011 using the CPI. The
sugar data are from Figure 9.15.



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