Authors libby rittenberg 829
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and every voter would already know how every program will affect him or
her. A world of costless information would have no lobbyists, no pressure
groups seeking a particular legislative agenda. No voter would be more
important than any other.
Now let us drop the assumption that information is costless but retain the
assumption that each legislator’s goal is to be reelected. Legislators no
longer know how people in the district feel about each issue. Furthermore,
voters may not be sure how particular programs will affect them. People
can obtain this information, but it is costly.
In this more realistic world of costly information, special-interest groups
suddenly play an important role. A legislator who does not know how
elderly voters in his or her district feel about a certain issue may find a
conversation with a representative of the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP) to be a useful source of information. A chat with a lobbyist
for the Teamster’s Union may reveal something about the views of union
members in the district. These groups also may be able to influence voter
preferences through speeches and through public information and political
action efforts.
A legislator in a world of costly information thus relies on special-interest
groups for information and for support. To ensure his or her reelection, the
legislator might try to fashion a program that appeals not to a majority of
individuals but to a coalition of special-interest groups capable of
delivering the support of a majority of voters. These groups are likely to
demand something in exchange for their support of a particular candidate;
they are likely to seek special programs to benefit their members. The role
of special-interest groups is thus inevitable, given the cost of information
Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen
Saylor URL: />
Saylor.org
829
