Authors libby rittenberg 828
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that reflects the preferences of the electorate do not accrue directly to any
one voter; a voter faces only some of the benefits of voting and essentially
all of the costs. Voter turnouts are thus likely to be lower than is
economically efficient.
In the 2000 presidential election, for example, just 50.7% of the voting-age
population actually cast votes. President Bush received 47.9% of the vote,
which means he was elected with the support of just 24% of the electorate.
Mr. Bush actually received fewer votes than his opponent, Albert Gore, Jr.
Mr. Bush, however, won a majority in the Electoral College. The Case in
Point essay describes the 2000 election in more detail. Voter turnout was
higher in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections.
Legislative Choice and Special Interests
One alternative to having the general public vote on issues is to elect
representatives who will make choices on their behalf. Public choice
theory suggests that there are some difficulties with this option as well.
Suppose legislators seek to maximize the probability that they will be
reelected. That requires that a legislator appeal to a majority of voters in
his or her district. Suppose that each legislator can, at zero cost, learn the
preferences of every voter in his or her district. Further, suppose that
every voter knows, at zero cost, precisely how every government program
will affect him or her.
In this imaginary world of costless information and ambitious legislators,
each representative would support programs designed to appeal to a
majority of voters. Organized groups would play no special role. Each
legislator would already know how every voter feels about every issue,
Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen
Saylor URL: />
Saylor.org
828
