The Zuma
Administration
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The Zuma
Administration
Critical Challenges
Edited by Kwandiwe Kondlo & Mashupye H Maserumule
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Published by HSRC Press
Private Bag X9182, Cape Town, 8000, South Africa
www.hsrcpress.ac.za
First published 2010
ISBN (soft cover) 978-0-7969-2316-5
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Contents

Preface v
Abbreviations and acronyms vii
1 Introduction: political and governance challenges 1
Kwandiwe Kondlo
2 Consolidating a developmental state agenda: a governance challenge 15
Mashupye H Maserumule
3 Rural development under a ‘developmental state’:
analysing the policy shift on agrarian transformation in South Africa 51
Gilingwe Mayende
4 Public service delivery issues in question 77
Modimowabarwa H Kanyane
5 Governmental relations in a maturing South African democracy 95
David M Mello
6 Socio-economic development and poverty reduction in South Africa 107
Polly Mashigo
Contributors 145
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| vii
This book examines the challenges accompanying the transformation of the political economy
and society of South Africa since 1994 – which now present challenges and prospects for the new
administration that took office in May 2009 under the leadership of Jacob Zuma. The book provides
interpretation, critique and fresh perspectives on political and administrative dynamics since the birth
of democracy in 1994, to the era of the Mbeki administration (1999–2008), and then to the transition
to the Zuma administration. That transition was led by the now deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe,
who provided ‘stop-gap’ presidency from September 2008 until the new president, Zuma, was sworn
into office in May 2009.
The Mbeki administration, which did not run its full term due to the ‘recalling’ of the president by
the governing party, provides an important context for the debates on the developmental state,
governance, service delivery and intergovernmental co-operation covered in the various chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces and contextualises the analysis and discussions advanced in the other chapters
of the volume. It begins by examining macro-political and governance challenges facing young
democracies in the world and narrows down to an analysis of the situation in southern and South
Africa. The challenges facing the Zuma administration are therefore located in a wider international
and continental context.
The challenges of building a developmental state in South Africa and delivering on the promise of land
reform, agrarian transformation and rural development, are all located within the international and
continental context of challenges facing democracy and state capacity to deliver public goods (the
latter including, for example, safety and security, employment opportunities, housing, the rule of law,
healthcare and so on). These challenges are amplified in the sections that deal with service delivery,
intergovernmental relations and poverty reduction. The issue of incoherence between traditional,
informal and formal institutions as well as the constraints presented by this to the overall nation-
building project are carefully explored and examined.
To write a book that deals with challenges and prospects for the Zuma administration is a difficult
enterprise not only because of the vastness and complexity of the subject but also because of the
difficulties in finding the right register with which to convey the complexity; there are diverse issues to
cover, some of which may not yet be ripe for scholarly synopsis. The book necessarily leaves out many
important topics, including the very important historical questions of nation state formation, and how
the state has worked to define the meaning of being ‘South African’ and in so doing constructed an
identity for itself. Nevertheless, the book focuses on a few selected topics, which are key to the mandate
and agenda of the new administration. Prominent among them are the issues of the developmental
state, rural development, socio-economic development, and service delivery.
As captured by Mark Gevisser in an essay commissioned for the Mail & Guardian (19 December 2008–8
January 2009), some of the fundamental questions about the challenges of the Zuma administration
that dominate in the public intellectual discourse, in this interesting era in the history of South Africa,
are as follows: how will the Zuma administration ensure continuity while at the same time effecting
‘some sharp and much-needed changes’ in the country’s political, economic, social and public
administration landscape? Will the Zuma administration be able to ‘steer economic policy through
the straits of an international economic crisis while still meeting the needs of an increasingly expectant’
Preface

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viii |
populace? These questions necessitate rigorous intellectual engagement. It is in this context that it
was deemed necessary to put together multidisciplinary perspectives – in the form of this volume – to
deal with some of the questions raised as part of the public debate on the challenges facing the Zuma
administration.
The book projects views into the future and explores the nature and scope of both the challenges and
the prospects for the Zuma administration, with the intention of enhancing the intellectual depth and
value of the debates on the subject. This collection of different perspectives, seeks to stir up debate; it is
not concerned with building consensus, but rather with stimulating thinking, challenging entrenched
views and perceptions and breaking new ground.
A note on government departments
The advent of the Zuma administration ushered in new and renamed government ministries and
departments, as follows:
Former New
Department of Agriculture Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Department of Land Aairs Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
Department of Provincial and Local Government Department of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Aairs
Department of Housing Department of Human Settlement
Department of Water Aairs and Forestry Department of Water and Environmental Aairs
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| ix
ANC African National Congress
ANCWL African National Congress Women’s League
ANCYL African National Congress Youth League
ASD alternative service delivery
ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
BEE black economic empowerment
C10 African Committee of 10

CBO community-based organisation
COPE Congress of the People
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
DFI development funding institution
DLA Department of Land Affairs
DoA Department of Agriculture
DPW Department of Public Works
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EPWP Extended Public Works Programme
GDP gross domestic product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy
GFOA Government Finance Officers Association
IDP Integrated Development Planning
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISRDP Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme
LRAD Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MEC Member of the Executive Council
MINMEC [Committee of] Ministers and Members of the Executive Council
MPCC multi-purpose community centre
NDR national democratic revolution
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO non-governmental organisation
PALAMA Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PFMA Public Finance Management Act
PPP public–private partnership
PSC Public Service Commission
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP South African Communist Party
SAMDI South African Management Development Institute

SMME small, medium and micro enterprise
SSDM shared service delivery model
UN United Nations
US United States
USA United States of America
YCL Young Communist League
Abbreviations and acronyms
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| 1
Kwandiwe Kondlo
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: political and
governance challenges
Is the new administration in a catch-22 situation?
The administration of Jacob Zuma came to power in May 2009, following the victory of the African
National Congress (ANC) in the fourth democratic elections in South Africa. It could be argued that
something amounting to a catch-22 situation may soon face the Zuma administration in more direct
ways than was the case for previous administrations. This will arise from the challenge of balancing
legitimacy with effectiveness in the governance of the country. The popular expectations and demands
for improved delivery on the part of the state are a demand for effectiveness; without effectiveness,
the legitimacy of the Zuma administration stands to decline. With declining legitimacy, the new
administration will further lose effectiveness; and so on in a downward spiral. The character of this
challenge to the Zuma administration cannot be divorced from the political character of Zuma’s victory.
From the ‘Polokwane moment’ (Fikeni 2009) to the 22 April 2009 elections and to the Union Buildings,
the political character of Zuma’s victory and the long-term impact it is likely to have in the deepening
of democracy in South Africa, continues to generate debate. It embodies an ‘uncertain hope’, as it both
unsettles and inspires the will of a divided polity. The political victory of Zuma is what Critchley (2006),
quoting Derrida, would term a messianic a priori; it is a promise to the masses of the poor, even if it
never defined itself as such. The popular expectation that ‘a new transition and change’ is on the cards

invokes the performative dimension of the ‘promise’ embedded in Zuma’s political victory, especially
after 15 years of disappointed popular expectations. Change or transition, though, is usually invaded
by that which it is not – in the same way that the invasion of ‘being’ by ‘non-being’ occurs in the coming
into ‘being’ (Kierkegaard 2009). Yet there is hope even beyond the promise of utopia.
At the heart of Zuma’s victory is the promise of and hope for improved service delivery to the masses of
the poor; the hope to have the voices of ordinary people heard in more meaningful ways than before
in the governance of the country; and the hope for pro-poor economic policy as implied by the idea
of a developmental state. Added to this is the hope of getting the wheels of government to move
faster, coherently and effectively. Yet the challenge of the institutional capacity of the state and what
it will take to improve it so that it delivers on the electoral promises of the ANC, stands as an obstacle
to the ‘delivery of public goods’; perhaps it is the necessary antidote to messianic expectations of
revolutionary change engendered by the rhetoric of the ruling party.
The catch-22 situation of the Zuma administration is typical of the situation in young democracies.
‘Lacking legitimacy they cannot become effective; lacking effectiveness they cannot develop
legitimacy’ (Huntington 1993: 258; see also Kapstein & Converse 2008). In essence, this attests to the
challenges of institutional capacity and organisation. Southall describes the challenges in the case of
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2 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges
South Africa as an instance of deficit in ‘ideational capacity’ (Southall 2007: 19), that is, the degree to
which the embeddedness and legitimacy of the state in state institutions, political practices and ideas
of individual members of society are eroded or lacking.
State institutional capacity and performance are critical to building and enhancing the credibility
and legitimacy of the state. In South Africa the challenge arises, first, at policy level. The fact that
the gap between the time of policy formulation and that of actual implementation is vast, and that
the disjuncture between the ‘policy talk and policy action’ is of great magnitude, creates a state of
‘non-simultaneous simultaneity’ (Benhabib 1994: 129; Block 1973), where the policy superstructures
and practices they engender are non-synchronous and thus constitute a failing transformative praxis.
Policy pronouncements and formulations, though good on paper, do not find simultaneous expression
in the real practices of governance. This is a key governance challenge for the Zuma administration.
As the gap between ‘knowing and doing’ persists and becomes more difficult to bridge, corruption,

which has now become so pervasive in the South African polity, grows into a permanent underworld
of democracy. Corruption is the ‘antithesis of good governance’ and influences perceptions of the
general citizenry about the legitimacy of the government (Camerer 1997). If these kinds of inadequacies
continue, it is hard to see how rhetorical claims of a developmental state and the promises to deliver on
land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development – issues that Chapters 2 and 3 examine in
detail – will be realised in practice. Reconfiguring Cabinet and establishing a new planning ministry in
the Presidency, as already done by the Zuma administration, are all good signs but they do not amount
to ‘effective actions’. It is not enough to have good intentions; it only makes material difference to
‘mean well and also act well’.
Sevice delivery is clearly the challenge of the Zuma administration. Getting government departments
to function in an integrated and coherent way is going to be nothing less than a nightmare for the
Zuma administration, because the problem is arguably not one of structures only but also of ethos
and the integrity of state institutions. For this reason, the volume includes a focus on public service
delivery issues for the Zuma administration (Chapter 4); governmental relations in a maturing South
African democracy (Chapter 5); and socio-economic development and poverty reduction in South
Africa (Chapter 6).
Issues of perceptions and the appropriateness of institutional models, even though not adequately
covered in the book, are very important. The questions in this regard are as follows: are existing state
institutional models appropriate to deliver on their mandates and do they create room for meaningful
citizen participation? Are the institutions of the state perceived to be serving all citizens, irrespective of
party political stripes and orientation, or are they perceived as favouring, even if inadvertently, special
interest groups and constituencies so as to help reinvent and reproduce the power and hegemonic
project of the ruling party? The deficit in South Africa’s democracy, a persistent political and governance
challenge of previous democratic administrations, is inadequate delivery of material improvements in
the lives of the majority of citizens. This deficit is exacerbated by inadequacies in responding to the
preferences of citizens at grassroots level, due to the gap that has developed between those who can
make their voices heard and those who cannot (except under situations of noticeable mass protest).
The degree of interaction between the government and citizens, the level of access to decision-
makers and decision-making by citizens at grassroots level, especially those outside urban centres, is
a challenge to the Zuma administration.

Perhaps there is a need, at this point, to frame the wider theoretical and political context. Among
the key questions one needs to ask, as a starting point, is the following: what are the key political
and governance challenges facing democracies in the world today? The question is pertinent to a
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 3
young democracy like South Africa in this day and age, as there are growing concerns, worldwide,
about the fate of the world’s young democracies (Kapstein & Converse 2008). In the light of the
macro-perspectives that responses to this question may yield, a follow-up question could be: what
are the political and governance challenges facing democracy in Africa, and South Africa in particular?
This will then provide a proper perspective and the necessary context for examining, debating and
understanding the political and governance challenges facing the Zuma administration.
The questions raised above are part philosophical, part socio-historical and part political, and therefore
require an analysis that traverses international, continental and South African contexts. This is difficult
to achieve in a comprehensive way, especially in one small volume such as this. As the title of the book
indicates, the challenges examined in the book are on selected issues that are key to the ANC’s agenda
as indicated in both its 2009 election manifesto (ANC 2009) and in the State of the Nation address by
President Zuma on 4 June 2009 (Zuma 2009). The chapters cover selected but critically important
issues such as the developmental state; land, agrarian reform and rural development; service delivery;
governmental relations; and socio-economic development and poverty reduction. The present chapter
broadly sketches the political and governance challenges faced by democracies in today’s world and
shows how the challenges they imply touch on perennial questions running through the ‘veins’ of
South Africa’s democracy.
Democratic performance and state institutional capacity
State institutional capacity refers to the availability of ‘various necessary inputs and appropriate
skills’ for operationalising state programmes (Chirawu 2004: 234), in order to deliver valuable ‘public
goods’, which citizens have the right to expect from a legitimate state (Rotberg & Gisselquist 2008).
State institutional capacity also means the manner in which ‘democratic institutions function’ as well
as the extent to which effective citizen participation and ‘control over policy’ are constitutive of the
institutional capacity of the state (Huntington 1993: 9). The issue of the credibility, legitimacy and
performance of state institutions is one of the key challenges faced by democracies all over the world

today. The challenge is manifested in different forms, depending on the particular time and context
of the democracy in question, but is a common variable in the package of challenges in the entire
democratic world.
The challenge in our days is not so much opposition to multi-party liberal democracy but rather the
creation of responsive democratic states whose institutions function well – both in the ‘normative’ and
administrative senses – and conduct activities and deliver ‘public goods’ according to the wishes of the
citizenry (Back & Hadenius 2008; Huntington 1993). Worldwide, opposition to multi-party democracy
has been on the decline, especially after 1989, the period celebrated by political philosopher, Francis
Fukuyama, as having marked the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) and the establishment of Western
liberal democracy as universal. Of course, Fukuyama was strongly criticised by scholars from the ‘Left’
who argued that what happened to the countries in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, ‘owed more to
their histories than to the ideology’ that they professed (Hill 1992: 8). A new configuration of global
power at the beginning of the 21
st
century following the rise of China and India, and the return to power
of Japan and Russia, ‘ended’ Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’. By all indications, we are now witnessing ‘the
return of great power nationalism’ (Kagan 2008: 10). The incidence of the global economic ‘meltdown’
seems to give impetus to the idea of the ‘return of the state’. This is shown by the proliferation of state
interventions in the economy, as is the case in ‘advanced’ democracies, including the USA. This situation
has sparked new claims – about the ‘return of history’ and the ‘end of dreams’ (Kagan 2008).
Yet the return of history and the end of dreams brings with it too the dashing of hopes. A new era
of ‘global convergence’, which was signalled by the embracing of democracy in former communist
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4 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges
states, was regarded as marking the birth of new hope and a renewal of the liberal democratic project.
The ‘third wave’ of democracy (Huntington 1993), post-1990, confirmed this – it was dominated by
insistence on the ‘minimalist state’, and less intervention in the free market. With the recent return
of history, liberal democracy and free market fundamentalism seem to be going through a period of
stress. By 2008, it was estimated that almost half of the world’s most recent democracies were either
struggling to consolidate or reverting to authoritarianism (Kapstein & Converse 2008). This began in

the form of ‘power grabs’ by leaders in such countries as Bolivia, Georgia, Russia and Venezuela and
extended further to situations such as were found in Fiji (2006), Thailand (2006) and Bangladesh (2007),
where coups d’état occurred (Kapstein & Converse 2008). In South Africa there is still hope for the
survival of democracy. Yet South Africa seems to be looking ‘East’ for solutions; hence, in South Africa
we hear debate about the developmental state and, lately, nationalisation of the mining sector of the
economy, and the question is: why?
In reality, history never ‘ended’, hence it has not ‘returned’. The concepts are only good as markers
of the dynamics of political economy and historical change. Perhaps one important issue, now that
democracy as a political system is hardly contested, is the disappointment of the hopes of the poor
majority in many democratic states, an issue that raises questions about the correlation between
democracy and the capacity of democratic states to deliver. Back and Hadenius (2008) argue
convincingly that ‘the global tendency over recent decades has been towards a growing gap’ (2008:
1) between democratisation and the administrative capacity of the state. This is but one aspect of
the institutional capacity of the state. By the state’s administrative capacity, Back and Hadenius are
referring to the existence of a rational bureaucracy geared towards impartiality, professionalism and
accountability (Back & Hadenius 2008; Brynard & De Coning 2007).
Democratic institutions are fully established in many democratic states but a broad array of societal
resources required to ensure control and participation from below are lacking. Paul Ginsborg (2008), in
his pioneering work Democracy: Crisis and Renewal, demonstrates this point by examining democracies
in the European Union, where institutions are established but float above the people whom they are
meant to serve. In his critical assessment, he argues that:
in 1989 liberal democracy triumphed unqualifiedly over its now unpresentable
opponent. But at the moment of its global victory, many of its basic practices have
been found wanting and many of its proudest boasts proved unfounded. Today liberal
democracy is highly vulnerable. To protect it adequately, there is urgent need for
theoretical discussion and practical innovation. (Ginsborg 2008: 12)
De Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2007: ixii) describe the challenge as that of the ‘democratization of
democracy’, which not only means widening the social basis of democracy and ensuring its resonance
with the aspirations of the majority of citizens; but also, critically, how new complementarities or
articulations between participatory democracy and representative democracy are identified and

enhanced in democratic practice.
The institutional capacity of the state is more than a matter of appropriate skills. It involves the
orientation of governance; how governance comes across and is felt by ordinary citizens; citizen
participation; and ‘a rational bureaucracy’, which is effective and efficient in the delivery of public
goods. The institutional capacity of the democratic state is therefore crucial to democratic performance.
In the context of neo-liberal democracy, the corresponding types of democratic institutions have only
ensured the formalism of democratic processes without delivering the concrete, material dividends of
democracy to the majority. This situation, according to Van Beek, in East Germany, Poland and South
Africa, has led to the rising phenomenon of ‘dissatisfied democrats’; a situation where the support for
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 5
democracy as an ideal is countervailed by the negative evaluation of how it works on the ground (Van
Beek 2006).
There is an emerging view that in the case of the USA the institutional capacity of the state has been
blunted and compromised by ‘big business’ (Reich 2009). This brings in another perspective about
inhibitors and enablers to the institutional capacity of states. These are derived from their location
in the international context. This is a factor that, according to Van Beek, makes ‘sound economic
policies and policy implementation alone not enough to ensure satisfactory performance’ (2006: 29).
The incentives provided by the existing structure of the global political economy are a crucial factor
without which democracies may stand or fall; and hence Kapstein and Converse correctly argue that
‘the international environment plays a more important role than is commonly appreciated’ (2008: xvi).
In other words, the institutional capacity of the state and the critical role played by institutions in a
polity – something of the essence of governance – are products of both endogenous and exogenous
factors, hence the importance of political leadership.
In the case of emerging democracies the situation is even more challenging. Added to these factors
are the different legacies bequeathed to emerging democracies by pre-transitional circumstances. The
‘initial conditions’ (Kapstein & Converse 2008) are critical to subsequent democratic performance (Van
Beek 2006). Hence, the institutional capacity of the democratic state – enabled and augmented by a
self-organising civil society, independent of the state and its political parties – is vital in addressing the
challenges. Heller and Isaac, referring to the experience of India, also indicate that ‘a free and lively civil

society makes the state and its agents more accountable by guaranteeing that consultation takes place
not just through electoral representation (periodic mandates) but also through constant feedback and
negotiations’ (2007: 408). They conclude that the institutional capacity of the state is central to the
effectiveness of democracy.
These issues also apply, though differently, to the situation in Africa. I say ‘differently’ in the African
context because of the legacy of colonialism on the continent and its differential impact on the cultures
of its people. Even today there is still reference to Francophone and Anglophone parts of Africa. Most
importantly, there is the ‘unique’ southern African context. Former liberation movements such as
Frelimo (Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia), MPLA (Angola), ZANU (Zimbabwe) and the ANC (South
Africa), even though still in power, seem to have come to preside over a gradually dying promise
of what they were once thought to epitomise (Saul 2008). Olowu and Mukwena (2004) explain the
southern African context – the immediate context of the South African democratisation project, in
other words, the context closest to and most definitive of the Zuma administration – as not only
one where the continent’s middle-income countries are concentrated, but also where ‘the project of
permanent white settler communities’ has meant that ‘governance regimes’ legitimise the inequalities
associated with the colonial system (Olowu & Mukwena 2004: 7). They argue that it is not surprising
that in southern Africa there is serious debate on issues such as the redistribution of land. Chapter 3
of this volume, in which Mayende analyses the latest policy shift on agrarian transformation in South
Africa, hits the very nerve of this issue to show the constraints and possibilities presented to the Zuma
administration in the areas of land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development.
At the heart of Africa’s challenges to democratic consolidation is the problem of fragmented institutions
(Berman et al. 2004). In part due to the manner in which the post-colonial African state was formed,
formal and informal institutions have not evolved in a coherent manner. Formal institutions (state
sponsored, mostly inherited from colonialism), traditional institutions and informal institutions, based
on societal norms and often varying according to religion, ethnic identity and mode of production,
remain fragmented and incoherent despite over four decades of efforts at institution building (HSRC
& PSU 2009). The problem exists not only in other parts of the African continent, but also in South
Africa itself.
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6 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges

In Chapter 5, on governmental relations in a maturing South African democracy, Mello emphasises
the challenge for the Zuma administration represented by the distance – both geographical and
other – between government and the more traditional, rural communities in South Africa. The chapter
touches on the role of traditional leaders and argues that they are ‘a missing link in intergovernmental
relations’. Mello argues: ‘Sidelining traditional leaders in rural areas has proved to be a problem in
South Africa…Where traditional leaders are custodians of the land where communities live, there have
been development challenges resulting from disputes between councillors and traditional leaders.’
Thus, a key challenge for the Zuma administration is to further outline the responsibilities and position
of traditional leaders in the intergovernmental relations puzzle.
A ‘deformed’ realisation of the developmental state?
Is South Africa headed for a deformed realisation of the developmental state? This is one of the
questions to think about, given the absence of a combination of conditions critical to the realisation
of a developmental state including, among others, an efficient and effective bureaucracy that can
deliver on its mandate. Besides that, thus far policy direction and implementation seem not to have
found coherence and refinement under the new presidential leadership. It is, of course, still early, but
all indications are that the landscape of policy remains characterised both by a tendency still to debate
and discuss fundamental assumptions and by the resulting stalemate: a central tension is between
conceptions of a developmental state as overtly pushing a pro-working-class agenda – as conceived by
the Congress of South African Trade Unions – and conceptions of a developmental state premised on
the ANC’s multi-class project, a project that inadvertently provides refuge for elite ambitions.
So, I would argue, the realisation of the developmental state during the Zuma administration is likely
to be a deformed one. Perhaps there will be useful lessons to learn. A developmental state cannot be
built in a rush; you also do not simply promise it and it occurs. It is not a product of some obscure team
of party pseudo-intellectuals, who know it all because they are accredited by only ‘one god’ – their own
party. In a deeply divided society such as South Africa, the developmental state cannot be the outcome
of the hegemonic project of a single party; it can only be the product of collective efforts of a united
polity (rather than a fractured polity) – the collective will of a people united around a single purpose.
The model and mechanics of the developmental state in South Africa seem at this stage perennially
debatable within the ruling party itself, and it seems that the finalisation of the real micromechanics of
the developmental state is likely to take a very long time. Five years, then, is not enough for President

Zuma, the ‘son of Hope’, to deliver on his promises. Part of the problem is that there is not yet clarity
and consensus on whether the notion of the developmental state in South Africa is meant to replace
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) ‘or whether the developmental state will
formulate and implement policies that will co-exist with GEAR’ (Kagwanja 2009: xxxvi). In Chapter 2,
Maserumule examines contending views in this regard within the Tripartite Alliance.
Nonetheless, the idea of a developmental state stands very prominently in the list of promises that the
ANC has made and continues to make to the majority of the poor in South Africa. This can be traced
back to the time of the ANC congress in Stellenbosch in 2002 and it gained momentum in the ANC
up to the time of the Polokwane national conference in December 2007 (ANC 2007a; 2007b). It also
appeared as the cornerstone of the ANC’s election manifesto during the 2009 general elections (ANC
2009). When Zuma delivered his State of the Nation address on 3 June 2009, he also made reference
to a developmental state and the creation of an economically inclusive society in South Africa (Zuma
2009).
To transform the idea of a developmental state into reality, it is argued, the Zuma administration stands
on the precipice of hope; it also looks down into the abyss of disappointed popular expectations,
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 7
given the possibility that it may deliver a deformed developmental state. A deformed realisation of the
developmental state may occur despite the orientation and organisation of the state and its institutions.
The effective capacity of the state institutions, the coherent functioning and organisation of state
institutions, and their relationship with non-state institutions and actors, as well as the participatory
nature of governance, when all added together serve as critical aspects of the realisation of the idea
of a developmental state.
Chapters 2 and 3 take the debate even further. They both start by engaging the conceptual foundations
of the developmental state, to explore the various meanings attached to it. The question of the
institutional capacity of the state, most importantly the nature of the interface between administrators
and politicians, emerges in their discussions as key to the realisation of a developmental state. In an
article entitled ‘Conflicts between Directors-General and Ministers in South Africa: A “Postulative”
Approach’, Maserumule (2007) systematically examines this challenge during the Mbeki administration
and observes that its frequent occurrence at the political–administrative interface impacted negatively

on the state’s capacity to deliver services to the citizenry. Conflicts at the political–administrative
interface pose a challenge to efforts aimed at building a developmental state. Maserumule (2007)
argues that such conflicts are occasioned by contradictions in the policies formulated to serve as
framework for the management of the public service.
In the case of land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development, in Chapter 3 Mayende
emphasises the importance of focused political leadership and championship of rural development
and agrarian transformation to enhance coordination, ensure more efficient resource allocation,
and sharpen management focus on key deliverables. Existing shortcomings relevant to the field of
implementation – e.g. capacity within the cluster of government departments that have rural-related
responsibilities, and the need for the state to allocate significant amounts of resources to training
and capacity-building programmes – are some of the issues that Mayende examines in his chapter.
He argues that the development of capacity in key areas such as project management, agricultural
economics, extension, rural finance and marketing systems will help improve efficiencies in programme
and project delivery. At a micro level, capacity building should also be applied to the crucial level of
extension officers and community development workers, as the grassroots-level cadres who would
interface closely with the producers.
The challenge of intergovernmental coordination
and the crisis of service delivery
In South Africa, as in many post-colonial situations, the state after independence was as it was inherited
from the colonial and apartheid regimes. Much of the functioning architecture of the previous
state was kept intact and gradually amended, following the recommendations of public service
review commissions that took place during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations. Despite such
amendments, it can be argued that the culture and ethos in the day-to-day running of government
business has hardly changed. Before one even talks of intergovernmental coordination (i.e. between
governmental bodies), there must be intragovernmental integrity. In fact, the anthropology of the
state, of professional cultures, of administrative conduits, and of the ethics of the public service is
a whole area of research that could inform and strengthen policy during the Zuma administration
(Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006).
Recently, much of the architecture of the state has been reconfigured and a new orientation in the
organisation of national and provincial departments has emerged with the Zuma administration. The

Presidency now houses not only the deputy president, but also two new ministries: one for national
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8 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges
planning and one for monitoring and evaluation. Yet the key question – and one that remains
unanswered – is the extent to which the new reconfiguration of national government is designed to
be responsive, accountable and participatory, so that it is informed by (rather than simply seeking to
inform) the will of the people whom it serves. In addition to this, the calibre of the political elites who
emerged subsequent to the 2007 ANC national conference in Polokwane, and the existing capacity
to lead state institutions during the Zuma administration, to serve ordinary citizens effectively, are
other questions. If each government department is saddled with what Mehta (2003) terms an almost
‘compulsive emphasis on endless formal procedures’, where layer upon layer of procedure provides
oversight on various layers of decision-making, at what point does coordination take priority and the
organic blending required for integrated delivery occur? These issues constitute another challenge for
the Zuma administration.
It does not matter how optimistic one may choose to be in the analysis of the Zuma administration,
one cannot gloss over the fact that it is a seriously challenged one. It could be said to exist in a ‘triple
temporality’. Barnard and Farred (2004), in their publication After the Thrill is Gone: A Decade of Post-
apartheid South Africa, invented the notion of ‘double temporality’ of the post-apartheid state to
describe how the post-apartheid state continued to live in two historical realities at the same time;
that is, the reality of Afrikaner domination and of the democratic state (Barnard & Farred 2004: 594). The
concept refers to a situation where the present is dominated by continuities with the past. The same
analogy can be used to describe the situation of post-1994 democratic administrations. It is argued
here that the Zuma administration lives in three histories at the same time: the history of the Mandela
administration, the subsequent realities created by the administration of former president Thabo
Mbeki and, lastly, its own realities. The new administration obviously cannot escape the shadows of the
two preceding eras; the realities created by the politics and governance strategies of those periods are
a foundation for the new administration. In other words, the fact is that, for the Zuma administration,
the past will always tend to weigh heavily on the present; and shifting the realities created by past
administrations is going to be a formidable challenge. The dominance of the past in the present will
pose challenges and opportunities; challenges that could indeed be overcome and opportunities that

could indeed be lost.
Zuma’s administration is perceived by the masses as the ‘delivery administration’. It came to power on
the back of promises to the poor majority and on the ticket of improved service delivery to provide a
‘better future for all’. This follows the poor service delivery record of the Mbeki administration. There
are at least three major challenges. The first is how to manage widespread and almost messianic
expectations of revolutionary change – popular perceptions of Zuma as some kind of messiah, sent to
save them; perceptions fed, incidentally, by the rhetoric of the ANC during the campaign for elections
(which took place on 22 April 2009). The second challenge is the array of problems presented by the
need to create a responsive government, that is, a government in which the voices of ordinary citizens,
and their choices and aspirations, make it to policy decision-making. The third challenge is creating a
government that has the administrative capacity to deliver faster and better.
Chapter 4 by Kanyane examines in detail the public service delivery challenges of the Zuma
administration and outlines how service delivery could be if it were underpinned by a social agenda –
that is, commited to realising the power of public service delivery to sustain and improve the quality
of life of communities. He also interrogates the governance framework for public service delivery and
argues for the importance of ethical leadership, especially at the level of local government, in order
to deal with pervasive corruption and inefficiency. Kanyane further proposes the need to consider
alternative service delivery approaches, including public–private partnerships and the shared service
delivery model, as part of the solution to service delivery improvement; and he argues for the value
of monitoring and evaluation to be embedded in implementation. To support the interventions
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 9
proposed in Chapter 4, Mello in Chapter 5 examines the framework that has been introduced with the
aim of improving intergovernmental relations. In line with Kanyane’s view on the importance of ethical
leadership for service delivery improvement, Mello goes on to explore the importance of the ‘human
factor’, which involves investment in human resource capacity in order to improve governmental
relations (i.e. not only relations between governmental institutions but also with non-state actors),
thus in turn improving service delivery. Mello argues that monitoring and oversight – and, where
necessary, intervention – by national government are essential to ensuring that the lower spheres of
government fulfil their constitutional mandates.

In summary, the most important challenge of the Zuma administration is not only at the macro-
institutional level, that is, at national level and in the Office of the Presidency; it is also at the levels of
intermediate and local institutions and forums of consultation located at the interstices of state and
society, where day-to-day forms of democracy either flounder or flourish (Heller & Isaac 2007). Analysing
the local government experiences of Kerala in India, Heller and Isaac correctly observe that as the
state ‘radiates out from the geographic and functional core of its authority, its effectiveness fluctuates
dramatically’ (2007: 407). Hence, problems of service delivery tend to occur at local government
level. This is part of the challenge confronting developmental local government in South Africa. The
effectiveness of the state outside the national core of its authority will need to be felt through robust
delivery of services.
Delivering on the promise of economic inclusivity
and poverty reduction
After 1990, as the economy began to expand, there occurred a steady rise in the investment–output
ratio. Simultaneously, there was a sharp decline in the share of wages in national outputs – in other
words, income distribution worsened such that the rising investment–GDP ratio generated, instead,
higher levels of inequality. The problem that arises from the Mbeki era and confronts the Zuma
administration, as a key challenge, is what Malikane refers to as the ‘disconnect’ between ‘the then
rising investment–output ratio’, which was a success, and ‘worsening distribution of income’ (2007: 67).
This resulted in a situation in South Africa where, despite five years of uninterrupted economic growth,
poverty and inequality continued to grow and the gap between rich and poor continued to widen.
Besley and Cord argue that ‘growth is less efficient in lowering poverty levels in countries with high
initial inequality or in which the distributional pattern of growth favours [the] non-poor’ (2007: 1). In
other words, the core of the challenge is to make sure that distributional patterns of economic growth
are oriented in such a way as to benefit the poor – to close the gap between the rich and the poor.
Despite the immediate interventions that are required, perhaps a long-term view is the way to lasting
solutions in this area. The problem with long-term strategies, however, is that they do not have
immediate electoral pay-offs, which ruling parties normally want in order to sustain their political
power. One hopes that the Zuma administration will be different in this regard – that it will not be
limited to a partisan vision but will take a long-term view of strategic investment in education and skills
development. Empowering ordinary citizens with the requisite skills to navigate the vicissitudes of the

market economy on their own is perhaps part of the solution.
The democratic state, post-1994, despite the radical pretensions of the ruling ANC, cannot deal
effectively with the challenge of poverty, as this challenge has implications for the reordering of socio-
economic relations in South Africa. The reordering of socio-economic relations is necessary, according
to Besley and Cord (2007), to deal with ‘high initial inequality’, which distorts the distributional effects
of economic growth in favour of the non-poor. Kapstein and Converse (2008) argue that the character
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10 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges
of initial conditions, i.e. pre-transformation conditions, affects – in fact determines – the performance
of young democracies. To echo this point, Magubane (2004) casts the situation as ‘the dilemma the
ANC is facing’. But how does fundamental reordering occur or how effective is gradual economic
transformation? The change in socio-economic relations of power is the key project, which goes
beyond the removal of institutionalised racial oppression. The politics of poverty is essentially about
differences in socio-economic power between individuals or groups in society. ‘The battle against
poverty is largely a question of creating the circumstances that enable an individual or group to gain
power and emerge from poverty on a longer-term basis’ (Teunissen & Akkerman 2005: 2).
Green (2008) adopts a new angle. He examines the notion that, in addition to these factors, the way
markets operate exacerbates poverty and inequality. And he argues that poor people need to exert
influence and have a voice over the way markets and ‘institutions which govern them’ operate (Green
2008: 108). In Chapter 6, Mashigo focuses on socio-economic development and poverty reduction
in South Africa as a key challenge for the Zuma administration, and examines and debates these
issues, including the ongoing – indeed increasing – marginalisation of those vast numbers of people
in South Africa stuck in the so-called second economy. She offers exploratory ideas that could be
useful in the design of policy solutions. The point of departure, according to Mashigo, has to be the
consideration of international best practice, which adopts group lending mechanisms to deal with
underdevelopment and poverty. International practices have shown that it is possible, through the
relevant lending mechanisms, to provide credit to poor communities. For example, the legal and
regulatory environment in countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya and Indonesia has permitted
the establishment of specialised lending mechanisms or banking and financial institutions that target
poor communities. Examples are rural or community banks that are able to make sound savings and

credit judgements because of their knowledge of the local community. This is done through the
establishment of informal groups, which are linked to the village bank.
Of course this suggestion can only work if the proposed new partnership between the public and private
sectors is defined and implemented. As Mashigo argues, this involves government, in consultation
with financial institutions, establishing prudent non-discriminatory lending criteria, especially in
respect of creditworthiness and collateral, reforming laws on women and banking to ensure equality,
developing simpler forms for contracts and applications, and creating an environment that reduces the
risk profile of lending to poor (and low-income) communities. On another level, especially if one takes
a longer-term view of the solution, the promotion of human capital accumulation through investment
in education and health is crucial. Investment in education will empower the poor to navigate, on their
own, the vicissitudes of the market economy. Education and health are on the list of priorities of the
new ANC government, post-April 2009. The extent to which the investment in education and health
will be made, and the outcomes monitored and oriented towards critical measures of socio-economic
development, remains to be seen.
Overarching messages
In discussing South Africa’s democratic experiment, this book aims to maintain a delicate balance
between appreciation and critique, and also to provide useful insights which could serve as advice for
policy-makers and as food for thought for researchers.
In terms of the volume’s overarching messages, the first and key message involves the inherent
institutional difficulties the state faces in translating aspirations of liberation on the part of the masses
into effective socio-economic outcomes. The discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, on the developmental
state, demonstrate this. Second, it is clear that the mundane modalities of implementing the
transformation agenda to yield quality material dividends to the poor majority are still cause for concern.
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 11
This, it is argued, manifests in endless – often seemingly directionless – drifts in policy debate within
the ruling party (the ANC and its Alliance partners), numerous strikes over wages, and widespread
service delivery protests. The issue, it seems, is that the transformation agenda, and the terms on
which it is conducted, is still defined by the elites – it is not the agenda of the poor and marginalised
that defines the character of change. Hence, the demands made by the poor majority are not merely

for delivery of public goods but also for an effective voice in the governance of the country. Chapters
4, 5 and 6 convey the nature of the problems around service delivery, coordinated governance and
poverty reduction. The development and role of traditional institutions in strengthening democratic
governance in rural areas is touched on in Chapter 5; this is very important for the development of a
collective will, which is important in the life of a nation.
Summary and structure of the book
The book consists of six chapters focusing on different but related topical issues identified by the
authors as part of the challenge facing the Zuma administration. Chapter 2 by Maserumule examines
the need to consolidate a developmental state agenda as a critical governance challenge for the Zuma
administration. Maserumule offers various governance policy options that the Zuma administration
could consider – in governing in a political context fraught with ideological contradictions and
contestations – in defining a South African developmental state.
On the one hand, the Left in the Tripartite Alliance, which constitutes an integral part of the coalition
that secured Zuma’s victory as the president of the ANC at its national conference of December 2007
in Polokwane, and as president of the Republic of South Africa, propagates a more redistributive socio-
economic approach as part of the agenda for a South African developmental state. On the other hand,
there are those within the ANC who argue for the continuation of the Mbeki administration’s neo-
liberal economic orthodoxy in repositioning South Africa as a developmental state. As a dominant
figure in the contemporary political scene in South Africa who emerged out of the traditional African
countryside as a well-rounded personality and who operates in a modern environment, Zuma may be
able to successfully navigate the two ideological extremes that Maserumule’s contribution enunciates
as being in contestation with each other.
The notion of a developmental state is further considered in Chapter 3 on rural development in South
Africa. In this chapter, Mayende presents a systematic analysis of the ANC’s ‘shift’ in paradigm on rural
development and agrarian transformation, with specific reference to the question: to what extent does
the new policy perspective provide a viable framework for accelerating the process of raising the living
conditions of the rural masses and facilitating their integration into the national economy? The analysis
explores the new policy positions in some detail, and then proceeds to identify and examine a range
of potential shortcomings, inconsistencies and self-evident lacunae. Within this context, the chapter
begins by analysing the concept of the developmental state and its role in driving rural development

and agrarian transformation interventions, using as examples several East Asian countries that are
generally considered as having succeeded in this regard. The chapter then provides an overview of
the country’s rather chequered experience in rural development and agrarian transformation policy
and practice since 1994. The chapter highlights the inherent weaknesses associated with two key
programmes implemented during this period, namely the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development
Programme and the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub-programme of the
land reform programme. The chapter explores the combination of factors that led to the failure of
both programmes in making significant inroads into addressing the legacies of land dispossession,
underdevelopment and economic stagnation, as well as widespread poverty and social marginalisation
that continue to characterise South Africa’s rural areas. The lessons that have emerged from these
programmes are also highlighted and analysed.
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12 | The Zuma administration: critical challenges
Chapter 3 further analyses some of the assumptions that are made in the new policy perspective with
regard to the efficacy of rural development and agrarian transformation strategies – assumptions based
on subsistence and the promotion of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ versus surplus-oriented commercial
production. The wisdom behind the optimism shown for the success of such interventions within what
Mayende terms the communal areas is also subjected to critical scrutiny. In a discussion of the important
issue of land acquisition, the chapter highlights a number of fundamental constraints, particularly the
constitutional property clause and the willing-buyer, willing-seller policy, as well as major bottlenecks
that could impede the shift towards an approach based on legal expropriation. The chapter examines
the challenges that could confront planned attempts at institutional restructuring, and discusses the
importance of support for the targeted beneficiaries, and the renewed push for the establishment of
viable and vibrant co-operatives, as important elements in giving impetus to enhanced delivery. Due
consideration is also given to key ‘cross-cutting issues’, such as the central position of infrastructural
development, the role of indigenous knowledge, and gender, youth and disability, which are also
deeply embedded within the rural socio-political and economic context within which the challenge
of rural development and agrarian transformation has to be addressed.
Any discourse on the governance challenges for the Zuma administration without reference to
the issue of service delivery would be incomplete, for enhancing the quality of life of the citizens

through improved service delivery is one of the strategic imperatives of a developmental state. This
underscores the importance of service delivery, which is the focus of Chapter 4. Kanyane argues that
the government, in the past decade and a half, focused too much on the physical infrastructure of
public service delivery (i.e. tangible public service delivery), overlooking its social (i.e. intangible) impact
in sustaining the quality of life of the citizenry. According to Kanyane, the challenge for the Zuma
administration is, therefore, to focus seriously on both the physical and intangible developmental
impact of service delivery – a challenge that has also been highlighted in the present chapter. Kanyane
argues for a more humanised and humanising public service that has as its vision empowerment and
consciousness raising of the communities it serves.
In Chapter 5, Mello deals with questions of governmental and intergovernmental relations, which are
among the key imperatives in improving service delivery and important for achieving an integrated
system of governance. The issue of integrated planning and coherence in managing the affairs of
government, as Maserumule points out in Chapter 2, was one of the fundamental challenges that
beset the Mbeki administration. In discussing various structures and processes that have been devised
with the aim of improving intergovernmental relations, Chapter 5 focuses on the Intergovernmental
Relations Framework Act (No. 13 of 2005) and makes suggestions for further possible improvements.
Reflecting on various governmental relations challenges, Mello advises the Zuma administration to
take seriously the challenges from the previous administration and learn lessons from these, with a
view to improving governmental relations for the benefit of the South African people.
Chapter 6 by Mashigo argues that poverty reduction is the mainspring of economic development and
that it is important to put greater emphasis on it if the desired levels of economic development are
to be achieved. In this chapter the critical factors that contribute to the persistence of poverty and
underdevelopment, and the related challenges, are examined with the objective of determining what
interventions can be put in place by the Zuma administration. The chapter discusses the so-called first
and second economies, particularly the second economy, what constitutes it and why it has become
central in the discussions pertaining to underdevelopment and poverty alleviation.
Chapter 6 focuses on the 2009 ANC election manifesto, which outlines the ANC’s commitment to
transforming the country and/or society; the election manifesto emphasises nation building, support
and respect for basic human and democratic rights, socio-economic rights, and the strengthening of
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Introduction: political and governance challenges | 13
representative and participatory democracy (ANC 2009). The priority areas of the election manifesto,
which include creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, promoting human
health, the fight against crime, and rural development, are discussed. Another priority area of the
election manifesto, social security, is also considered.
Chapter 6 also looks at the global financial crisis and its impacts on South Africa. Of particular importance
is the discussion of effective and sustainable rural development and poverty reduction strategies.
Financing strategies in South Africa are closely analysed and it is shown how existing strategies hamper
the provision of such finance, particularly to poor households. The chapter provides insight into how
international financing practices have succeeded, through specialised financing/lending mechanisms,
in financing poor households. Similar existing mechanisms in poor communities in South Africa are
explored for possible lessons in this regard. The chapter concludes with a focus on small/survivalist
enterprise development.
It is hoped that this book will make a valuable contribution to contemporary discourse on the Zuma
administration.
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| 15
Mashupye H Maserumule
CHAPTER 2
Consolidating a developmental state
agenda: a governance challenge
The notion of a developmental state dominates in the formulation and the manner of presentation of
the African National Congress’s (ANC) 52
nd
national conference resolutions of 2007 (ANC 2007c), which
set the political context for the Zuma administration’s strategic policy orientation and direction. In
recalling the resolution of its 2002 national conference, the 2007 ANC national conference ‘highlighted
the need for cadres to actively build a developmental state, capable of implementing the objectives
of the national democratic revolution (NDR), including the creation of a better life for all, addressing
the legacy of apartheid colonialism and patriarchy, and acting as the driving force for socio-economic
transformation’ (ANC 2007c). The concept of a developmental state and the commitment to styling
the country along its imperatives have long been part of the political lexicon and strategic agenda of
the ANC on the transformation of state and governance.
In the context of South Africa, the imperatives of a developmental state require that, on the one hand,
the quality of life of the citizenry is enhanced through improved service delivery and, on the other
hand, citizen participation in the mainstream economy is maximised, particularly for those previously
marginalised by the apartheid system. These twin challenges preoccupied the Mbeki administration at
the dawn of the second decade of democracy in South Africa, when its strategic transformation focus
was on building a developmental state. Empirical evidence, as presented in this chapter, indicates that
the ANC government, during the Mbeki administration, scored significant achievements in some areas
while failing dismally in others in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda.

The Zuma administration is expected to consolidate the achievements of the Mbeki administration
and correct its failures, while at the same time effecting the much needed changes for which the
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) –
the more left-wing organisations within the Tripartite Alliance
1
– argue with regard to the social and
economic dimensions of a developmental state. The Alliance Left secured the installation of Jacob
Zuma as the president of the ANC in the December 2007 Polokwane national conference. Its support
for Zuma is premised on the conviction that in him, the Alliance Left has found a voice that Mbeki
obscurantism had vehemently condemned as ultra-Leftist. So, to the Alliance Left, the rise of Zuma
to the presidency of the ANC, coupled with ‘the dramatic events of September 2008 [that] saw Mbeki
[recalled] and several key ministers resign’ and the victory of the ANC in the 2009 general elections,
with Zuma assuming the presidential leadership of the country, means ‘a victory against [the] neo-
liberal orthodoxy’ of the Mbeki project (Pillay 2008: 12).
1 The Tripartite Alliance is the strategic political partnership of national liberation forces that comprises the ANC, SACP
and COSATU, and which is led by the ANC (ANC 2007a; 2007c). In this chapter, the term ‘Alliance Left’ refers to the SACP
and COSATU.
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